Africa: Sudan, Ebola, Mozambique -

Africa: Sudan, Ebola, Mozambique -

Bullaitín AfricaFocus usually contains content on one topic, as in earlier announcements this year on Mozambique in January and March, Sudan in March, and Ebola in April. Each provides substantial exceptions from current content as well as links for continuous coverage.

This bulletin is an exception: updates on a number of topics where significant new developments have taken place from the earlier bulletins. It is also an experiment; how often will I do this in the future it will depend on your response.


The break in April of the Sudanese dictator Omar el-Bashir opened a period of optimism, while protesters continued demanding a comprehensive change to civilian government. The mock military crackdown on 3 June put an end to this period, despite protesters having decided to find ways to continue their struggle. As mentioned in the updates here, international playing forces included criticism from the international community, namely the African Union and Western countries. But the strongest intervention came from Saudi and the Arab Union's military and economic support.

See short extracts and links to key updates below:

"Sudan Ousted Brutal dictator. His Governor was an Enforcer," New York Times, June 14, 2019

KHARTOUM, Sudan – When a camel trader in charge of militia has been charged with genocide violence in Darfur, Gen. Lieutenant. Mohamed Hamdan is now at the top of power in Sudan, overlooking the streets detached from his wooden pane office at the top of the high military headquarters.

From his office in the capital, Khartoum, the site can see where his unit, the Rapid-Support paramilitary forces, tens of thousands of pro-democracy protesters in a violent storm began on June 3. women and many people were killed, some dumped in the Nile, according to numerous accounts from protesters and witnesses.

The blood bath consolidated the vertical rise by General Hamdan, widely known as Hemeti, and is now the de facto ruler of Sudan. Many of the Sudanese are evidence of a serious reality: Although they rejected one dictator in April, he is determined by the pressed system he left to defend his power.

"We thought this could happen," said Alaa Salah, 22, the woman dressed in white who led canals from the top of the car and brought the Sudan's revolution to the world. "For many years Hemeti was killed and burned in Darfur. Now Darfur has come to Khartoum."

"Companies in blocks in the Nile show Sudanese protesters were very worried that Arabian and UAE money would come in," Independent, June 11, 2019

Sudanese democracy demonstrators were the first to protest at the Saudi Arabia revolution. We all knew that the Saudis and the Emiratis were attracting millions of dollars into the reign of Omar al-Bashir, which was sought by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and by military cabal like Sisi. But it was the protesters who first thought about the motto: "Saudi doesn't need help even if we have to eat beans and falafel!"

… The many submersible bodies drawn from the Nile should focus on the support of Emiratis and in particular Saudis declining the transitional military government in Sudan.

We should not be surprised. The pioneering incidence of prisoners of Saudi prisoners after decontamination trials, then the chopped remains of Saudi journalist death and now the decaying Sudanese bodies sliding along the longest river in Africa – as well as Saudi-Emirati's attack on Yemen and beyond that's killing – you have some grief. Political problems solved with cruel death.

The protesters would like answers to the real nature of the relationship between the Gulf states and two men: the commander of the "Rapid Support Forces", the alarming head Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo – and "Hemeti" – and Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, head the military advice taken by the country after applying for Bashir. The two men visited Gulf states recently – and Sudanese wanted to be camped out in their capital to find out why Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates promised $ 3bn (£ 2.7bn) to help the government transitional. t

Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Hemeti ', vice chairman of Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC) and commander of Rapid Support Forces militia (RSF) Credit: Dabanga Sudan

"U. S. calls for Sudanese military crackdown," independent inquisitive, "Washington Post, June 14, 2019

The top African diplomat pushed Friday to Sudan's "independent and credible" investigation into a June 3 military crackdown on pro-democracy protesters who left dead scores.

The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Nagib Tibor, described the attack on "sitting-in" a long time near the military headquarters in the capital, Khartoum, as "just disastrous."

Medical organizations linked to the protesters put at least 118 tolls, and the military command led by military control acknowledged that at least 60 were killed when security forces cleared the square.

He refused to specify what further measures the United States could take and said that the main focus of the Civil Service was to support intermediary and military advice by representatives of the African Union and nearby Ethiopia. .

"The Gender Crisis Genealogy in the Sudanese Revolution," Courtesy of Africa, June 14, 2019

Bashir's strong military loyalty sent to power through transitional military advice (TMC) to the former president, Omar al Bashir, from power to lodge. They supervised the killing of more than 100 people and left 700 of them injured in the recent attack on sitting in and made by paramilitaries over 70 rapes.

Notwithstanding the negotiations the TMC and the de facto leader of the revolution, the Association of Sudanese Professionals, and the Forces of Independence and Change (FFC) embraced various factions in the field of political and armed rebels under the Declaration of Freedom and Change.

The pictures from the negotiation meetings were very different from those of the month-long revolution news. We were back to a lack of confidence in women's ability and ability in politics. This was evident as the negotiating team was selected despite criticism. A total of 8 negotiators were selected, with only one female participating.

As well as that

AfricaFocus Bulletin, March 11, 2019

Sudan Dingle, June 14, 2019

For daily updates


Ebola is now dispersed from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo into Uganda. The debate continues on whether a new WHO declaration would help with the effects of exciting travel bans and other adverse effects as occurred during the West African Ebola epidemic. But there are two very clear points: (1) that international funding and support is still falling, and (2) international and national health respondents failed to achieve confidence in the Congolese local communities among conflict, a necessary part to effect to achieve action.

See short extracts and links to key updates below:

"EDS experts say Ebola is not a global health emergency," CIDRAP, June 14, 2019

A World Health Organization (WHO) emergency committee held after Ebola cases imported in Uganda today said that the case is not yet a cause of urgent international public health concerns (PHEIC), but they have raised serious concerns about the threat to the Republic. Democratic Congo (DRC) and its neighbors and over lack of funds.

Despite such surveillance efforts at the border of both countries, Ebola is jumping from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Uganda. Credit: Matt Taylor / World Health Organization

The members of the Committee are disappointed that the WHO and its response partners have not received sufficient funding and resources to fight Ebola. Currently, $ 98 million is required to support the response by July, but to date health officials have received only $ 43.6 million, resulting in a gap of $ 54 million.

Mike Ryan, MD, executive director of the WHO's emergency program, said there was little funding available to help the DRC's four closest members prepare for Ebola import cases – and there is still a $ 27 million deficit in this support.

Mosoka Fallah, "Radical thoughts are needed to break the Ebola of the DRC to break. Here are some," The Conversation, May 22, 2019

The critical, rescue lessons learned from the West African outbreak are not being implemented; while acknowledging that conditions in the DRC have difficulties.

For example, one of the biggest take-aways from the 2014 epidemic is that fears play a major role in the communities where Ebola occurs. In Liberia people were initially afraid of health workers that they had refused treatment and did not pay attention to orders without self-quarantine.

As one of the main coordinators of the national response to Ebola in Liberia, one of my main jobs was to mitigate the widespread fear. We did this by engaging with local communities. We recruited them with help in various ways, including being active people to find and negotiate with hostile community members.

There is a lack of confidence from worrying reports that many are engaging in vaccination. We still don't know why. The resistance is side by side with the acceptance of people with other Ebola treatment.

From my previous experience it recommends that health workers need to find a way to break the path to effective vaccination – and to ensure that opposition does not grow resistant to the overall response.

What can the leaders of the response do?

We had to think outside the standard conventions of emergency response.

Firstly, they can incentivize community leaders (chieftains, medical personnel, women, priests) on fixed stalls to respond in their respective towns or villages. This will result in a network of reliable messengers who can communicate effectively with people who are scared, confused. We did this in Liberia. And it can be done in the DRC, despite the challenges of the war.

In Liberia we incentivized a local infected party to offer them illicit drugs. It was unusual – there were no rules on this type of participation – but it worked: we negotiated a self-quarantine of 32 homeless members. We also offered armed robbers food in exchange for a safe passage through a slum called West Point.

Secondly, food can be used to encourage community response and self-quarantine. Food is historically used as a war weapon, but we met it in Liberia and used it as a force for Ebola control. We did this successfully in conjunction with the World Food Program. We provided food for villages where Ebola had occurred. The village leaders then decided that no one would leave their villages for 21 days and that no new visitors would be allowed. By providing food and their basic needs, these local leaders were empowered to work with their people to maintain the outbreak.

Thirdly, find all the means necessary to encourage the rebels and make them part of the answer. A trusted third party – like the South African Development Republic, WHO or some other organization – must convince the national government to allow them to fulfill the war factions and to give them the resources to take steps in their territory.

"Resetting an Ebola response in the Congo means the trust of those who influence them," New Humanitarian, May 24, 2019

Throughout the response, an enhanced strategy of public participation must re-deliver local requests for deeper information on Ebola, the response and treatment procedures. Local actors continue to assert that improved information streams can raise more political views of Ebola. Communities encourage more forums (facilitated discussions) where they can ask questions and get more detailed information about the virus, its treatment, vaccination, and response activities. Both actors are opposed to the response as well as those who support the introduction of civilian access to laboratories and treatment plants to be familiar with the procedures used. Given the very confident environment, the granting of more direct access will help fear the unknown; and can mislead misleadingly.

While the recent attacks have been very visible, communities continue to make repeated efforts to communicate peacefully with government and national and international respondents. Members of the public circulate notices and situation reports from the WHO and other agencies through WhatsApp, indicating their intention to be aware of response activities. This level of engagement is positive and should be maximized. It should be the basis of the reset.

As well as that

BBC, June 16, 2019 – with graphics

For daily updates

AfricaFocus Bulletin, April 15, 2019


The Idai Cyclone and the Chicón met Kenneth earlier this year, Mozambique both north and north have a direct impact. The country is under pressure from around $ 2 billion in fraudulent debt to global banks and global bond holders, which directly regulates Mozambique's constitutional advice. And a crisis in northern Cabo province Delgado is making it more deadly by serious military responses of unrest based on a great storm of fundamental reasons for dissatisfaction. See short extracts and links to key updates below, including videos and audio of a half day June 6 conference with outstanding panels on the crisis in northern Mozambique.

"Mozambique: Rules of the Constitutional Council Null and Void Ematum Guarantee," AIM, June 4, 2019

Maputo – Mozambican Constitutional Council, the highest body in the country in constitutional law and elections, announced Tuesday void all actions relating to a loan of 850 million US dollars which were contracted by Mozambique Tuna Company (Ematum). 2013.

Also void "with all the legal consequences" of the loan guarantee issued by government of the time, headed by President Armando Guebuza.

The loan in the form of bond issuance was 850 million dollars, which issued banks Credit Suisse and Russian VTB, on the European market. The proceeds were designed to purchase fishing boats and other equipment for Ematum, and to obtain coastal protection.

In addition, the loans to Ematum, and two other fraudulent companies, Proindicus and MAM (Mozambique Asset Management), are now the subject of law in both Maputo and the US. The main debt figures are captured, including financial minister Guebuza, Manuel Chang, who is in South African police custody, three former Suisse Credit directors and Jean Boustani, of the founding company, Privinvest, who became a contractor. single for the three fake companies.

It is clear from the US indictment that, based on a million pages of bank statements, e-mails, transcripts of telephone calls and other documents, Ematum was a fraud right from the outset. He was cooked by senior members of Privinvest and Credit Suisse, and had no connection with the legitimate fishing needs of Mozambique. Instead, according to the US indictment, the project was "an excuse to borrow as much as possible".

"The Humanitarian Deputy Principal visits countries affected by the Idol Encounter and calls for additional support to tackle the effects of climate change," OCHA, June 12, 2019

"While the impact of Cyclone Idai was in the three countries, this disaster gives us a clear picture of how the effects of climate change are increasing the humanitarian needs of those who are already very vulnerable," said Mr Mueller. "The climate crisis is affecting most of those who have done the least to create it."

In Mozambique, which went into two successive cycles, Idai and Kenneth, the humanitarian deputy principal visited Beira, the port city that took very Idai, and traveled to Dondo, where she met people resettled after losing everything. "I am inspired by the incredible resilience of the people of Mozambique, who are already rebuilding their lives," she said. "However, I am very concerned about the coming months, as food insecurity is expected to rise due to the huge damage caused to crops and livelihoods. We need to ensure that no-one is left on the road. center, and displaced persons are relocated in a safe, dignified, voluntary, knowledgeable and durable manner. "

Ms Mueller welcomed the initial trend of support and solidarity with Mozambique, but urged the international community to do more. The Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique, which asks US $ 440 million, including the response to the Idai Cycling and Kenneth and the drought in the south, is only 34 percent funding.

"Anadarko allows a $ 20 billion GNC export project in Mozambique," Reuters, June 18, 2019

The energy company Anadarko Petroleum Corp Tuesday gave permission to go to build a $ 20 billion gas liquidation and export terminal in Mozambique, the single largest LNG project approved in Africa.

Widely expected the announcement, which occurred at an event in Mozambique, after Anadarko last month to specify the date.

"As the world seeks cleaner energy forms, the project led by Anadarko 1 project Mozambique LNG is ideally located to meet growing demand, especially in the Asian and European markets to expand," said The Chief Executive of Al Walker in a statement here

Anadarko agreed to accept it at Occidental Petroleum Corp. When the deal is continued, Occidental agreed to sell assets including a Mozambican LNG project with a major oil SA and a large LNG trader. Total officials were not immediately available for comments.

Video and audio cards available on Parenting Understanding panels in Northern Mozambique, CSIS, 6th June, 2019. The video is on Youtube at]

Mozambique was three out of six panels. Each panel is a true expert with a deep knowledge of the topic, providing different but overlapping perspectives. There are no definite answers – that is the nature of the truth they were dealing with. But provided a very clear background and analysis. And, for those concerned about the issues elsewhere in Africa and Mozambique, there are many similarities in conflict and how it is increased because of failures in national and international response. It is also a matter of whether policy makers at both levels will pay attention.

Panel 1: Examining Social, Political, and Religious Drivers

Dr Alex Vines (Chatham House), Dr. Yussuf Adam (Universidade Eduardo Mondlane), and Dr. Liazzat Bonate (University of West Indies)

Directed by Emilia Columbo

Panel 2: Investigating Regional and International Response Efforts

By H. Dean Pittman (former Ambassador of U. to Mozambique), Zenaida Machado (Human Rights Watch), and Dr Gregory Pirio (Enabling Communications)

Directed by J. Devermont (Director, CSIS Program in Africa)

Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Adam Yussuf, "The many Drivers that enable violent extremism in Northern Mozambique," Africa's Center for Strategic Studies, May 20, 2019

The Islamic armed movement in the northern province of Mozambique Cabo Delgado, known locally as "al Shabaab" (with no direct involvement in the Somali militant group) or "Congregation Sunnah" (Coastal path), among other names, is responsible for more than 100 deaths, property destruction, and displacement of thousands of people. The group first received attention to an attack on a police station in October 2017. Inspired by the teaching of the radical sermon from Kenya Aboud Rogo, the group was considered young and brave – and at odds with the established Muslim Council in the region. . If they fail to win Muslim leadership, the group set up their own mosques and dog and were recruited from local youth by playing an unhappy feeling.

Since May 2018, the group's assaults – including de-escalation – are less discriminatory and violent. Many villages were attacked, and over 1,000 houses were opened or destroyed. It is also reported that a military has begun to kidnap women and girls.

Mozambique's security forces have had heavy replies after extremist attacks which have affected local people. According to Human Rights Watch, men have been found in Cabo Delgado villages with security forces rounded up and kept in military detention without due process. It is alleged that these security responses contributed to Sha Shaab's additional recruitment in the region.

The pattern of violent violent assaults is increasing and thereafter, again, security responses without distinction have been made in other parts of Africa – Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, and the Maghreb. The situation in northern Mozambique is, however, more complex through a series of fundamental factors – including competition over land, relocation, and the confidence of local political actors – promoting fuels and demanding more comprehensive demand.

As well as that

"In Wake of Cyclone Idai, Climate Debt is Payable by the North," Foreign Policy in Focus, April 4, 2019 debt -a-pay-to-climate /

AfricaFocus Bulletin, March 22, 2019

AfricaFocus Bulletin, January 8, 2019

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication providing commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on the United States and international policies. William Minter organizes AfricaFocus Bulletin.

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