Newsletter

Five questions asked of former President Moon in the case of the murder of a public official in the West Sea

​[이종훈의 政說] “It is directly related to national security,” but some unclear parts remain

[동아DB]

The first report of the ‘West Sea Government Official Murder Case’ was published at around 1:30 pm on September 23, 2020. The Ministry of National Defense revealed three main facts that day. First, at around 12:51 pm on September 21st, a report was received by the Coast Guard that one crew member of the fishing guidance ship belonging to the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries) went missing in the sea 1.2 miles south of Soyeonpyeong Island (see table). Second, from 1:50 pm after receiving the report, about 20 rescue forces, including marine police and naval ships, ships and aircraft from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, were sent in to search the missing sea area, but no missing persons were found. Third, according to military intelligence, the situation in which a missing person was found in North Korean waters on the afternoon of September 22 is being closely analyzed.

Reported to Wen 7 hours after the meeting

The time the public official was assassinated was around 9:40 pm on September 22, the day before the release of the Ministry of National Defense press release. The military authorities reported the killings to the Minister of National Defense and the Blue House Crisis Management Center immediately after that, from 11 to 12 pm. It is known that the Ministerial Meeting was held at 1 am on September 23 at the Blue House. When was the report made to former President Moon Jae-in? At 8:30 a.m. on September 23rd, the Blue House announced that then Chief of Staff Roh Young-min and National Security Office Director Suh Hoon had reported face-to-face with the president. Eight to nine hours after the military authorities reported the attack to the Defense Minister and the Blue House Crisis Management Center. It was determined that the matter was serious, so a meeting of related ministers was convened to discuss it around 1 am, but the report was made 7 hours later. not common sense

The same goes for the fact that the previous Ministry of National Defense press release did not contain any information about the shooting death. The fact that the North Korean military fired fire and burned the body began to become known when the Ministry of National Defense officially confirmed it in the morning of the next day after rumors of North Korea were reported on the afternoon of September 23, 2020. Even if a fishing boat capsizes, it is common to report it immediately on the same day. If there is no result as a result of the night search, there are also reports that the Navy and Coast Guard resumed the search the next morning along with the fact. At the time of the disappearance of a public official in the West Sea, there were no reports until two days after the incident occurred. At the beginning of the incident, someone was wary of reports and actively prevented information leakage, raising doubts.

If the report had been made normally right after the disappearance was confirmed, then President Moon should have given an order to find the missing person as soon as possible. Even if the first report was not made properly, if the official was found in North Korean waters, the report should have been made at that time. This is evidence that the report to the president was not made in time.

The attack took place about six hours after the official was found in North Korean waters. On September 22, 2020, around 9:40 pm, it was a time of transition to a major event. According to the explanation of the Blue House, no report was made to the president even at this time. If true, former Chief of Staff Roh and former Chief of Security Affairs Seo made negligence in reporting omissions. Even if former President Moon also did not receive the report, he cannot avoid responsibility. Even if it is presumed that they have defected to North Korea, at that point, they should have been proactive in protecting the public, such as warning maneuvers and broadcasting, assuming that they are missing persons who have flowed into the northern waters.

Coincidentally, at 1:30 am on September 23, 2020, around the time of the relevant ministerial meeting, President Moon’s non-face-to-face speech at the UN General Assembly began. right after the shooting incident. A month ago, on September 8, former President Moon sent a personal letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. It was part of an effort to make the North Korea-US summit a success in October. Naturally, the speech at the UN General Assembly also contained content emphasizing the necessity of a declaration of an end to the war. In this situation, the North killed a South Korean official and burned the body. It can’t be a big bad thing. If public opinion suddenly changes to the atmosphere of accusing North Korea, all efforts may go to waste. However, it is a different story when it comes to North Korea. This is because the right to dispose of defectors is basically in the North. It can also have the effect of shifting responsibility to the North.

North Korea doctor’s intelligence shakes the truth

If the former President Moon and the Blue House moved as intended, most of the doubts would be dispelled. In summary, the sequence is as follows: As soon as it was confirmed that the public official was missing, the president, the secretariat, and the security office responded promptly, started controlling the news, and tried to minimize the incident by observing the development of the situation. However, as the North fired an unexpected gunshot, it was forced to inform the public. It means that it was not reported to the president in advance because it was necessary to prevent the claim of former President Moon’s responsibility from being raised.

Ex-President Moon refused to disclose related data despite the request of the bereaved family. Rather, it was designated as a presidential record and sealed. If there is clear evidence that the report was received in a timely manner, that he gave appropriate instructions, and that he concluded that he had defected to North Korea, it would rather be material that should have been actively disclosed. “There are many things that are directly related to national security,” but I wonder if it is because of the possibility that errors will be revealed.

The Moon Jae-in government cited four reasons for its decision to visit North Korea. First, public officials at the time wore life jackets. Second, he took off his shoes. Third, he used small floats. Fourth, the North expressed its intention to defect to North Korea. He added that he had a lot of gambling debt and was in a state of mental panic. Among these, the most convincing evidence is the espionage that ‘they expressed their intention to defect to North Korea’ that it was obtained through wiretapping. However, even this is in a state of loss of decisive evidence as it is pointed out that this is an expression of opinion that can be done in a life-threatening situation.

Former President Moon, former chief of staff Roh, and former chief of security, Seo, must answer the following questions. First, when did former President Moon receive the first report? Second, did former President Moon take appropriate measures? Third, why did President Moon seal the data? Fourth, he was driven to North Korea because of his speech at the UN General Assembly. Fifth, who the hell are the people who decided to defect to North Korea?

Jonghoon Lee, CEO of Political Management Consulting, Ph.D. in Political Science

<This article is Weekly Donga It was published in No. 1345>