SHANGHAI (Reuters) – China’s first weekend after the end of its “zero-corona” policy to contain the spread of the new coronavirus. At a heavy metal band concert held in a small living room in Shanghai, dozens of young people came into the darkness, smelling of sweat and strong alcohol.
That’s the kind of freedom young people are seeking in the zero-coronavirus protests that swept across China at the end of November last year. The protests quickly escalated into the biggest public outcry in a decade since President Xi Jinping came to power.
China’s 280 million “Generation Z” people, born between 1995 and 2010, have emerged with new political voices after three years of testing, lockdown, testing, economic hardship and isolation. They find ways to express themselves, and side with the Communist Party and write patriotic posts online, or deny the traditional label of political apathy.
Meanwhile, Xi, who has just entered an unusual third term as leader, will have a difficult task to reassure Generation Z as they face near-record unemployment and the slowest growth in nearly 50 agonizing years.
This is because improving the living standards of young people and maintaining the export-oriented economic model that has developed China so far is completely at odds with the Communist Party and the government, which prioritizes social stability.
According to various surveys, Generation Z is more pessimistic about the future than any other age group in China. And some experts warn that although the protests have succeeded in speeding up the process of lifting the coronavirus pandemic, the obstacles for young people to improve their living standards will rise.
Wu Qian, a former lecturer at Tsinghua University and now an independent critic, said, “The road ahead for young people is getting narrower and more difficult, and their hopes for the future are fading. Young people no longer have “blind trust and admiration” for China’s leaders, he added.
In fact, voices of discontent can be heard among the young people interviewed by Reuters. A 26-year-old woman who came to the Shanghai concert earlier said, “If the leadership didn’t change the (zero corona) policy, more people would have protested. So in the end, we will correct the course. “Not think that young people will go back to thinking that nothing bad will ever happen in China.”
It can be said that it is a global trend that young people, especially in urban areas, are at the forefront of protests. In China, students led the largest democratic movement that led to the Tiananmen protests of 1989.
However, some experts say that China’s Generation Z has characteristics that puzzle Mr Xi.
In recent years, it has attracted the attention of the international community that young people who use social media in China violently express opinions that are critical of the country’s policies, including the zero-coronavirus policy.
They came to be known as “little pinks” after the background colors of patriotic websites, and were the driving force behind the Chinese government’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” and the Cultural Revolution during the Mao era. the red guards came.
However, since the start of the pandemic, the economy has slowed down under various regulations, and the antithesis of such a fierce attitude has emerged. However, it is different from the liberals who oppose the rise of nationalism as in the West. Many young people in China choose to lie down and do nothing, denying the torture of being a “company slave” and being content with what they can get.
The truth is, there is no data to show how many young people are leaning towards this lifestyle. However, there was only one element brewing under the surface before the zero corona protest. unsatisfactory feelings about their projected economic future.
Generation Z is more pessimistic about China’s economic prospects than any other age group, according to a survey of 4,000 Chinese people conducted last October and published in December by the consulting firm Oliver Wyman ing. 62% of them are worried about their jobs and 56% think their lives will not improve.
In contrast, a McKinsey survey released in October found that Generation Z in the United States is more optimistic about future economic opportunities than any other generation except those aged 25-34.
At the beginning of the Xi administration in China, young people’s outlook was more optimistic.
A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found that 70% of people born in the late 1980s had a positive view of the economic environment, and 96% said their living standards had improved compared to their parents’ generation in the field rice
Zak Dichtwald, founder of a company that tracks trends in China’s youth, said that Gen Z is a “learned pessimism. It is based on the facts and the reality they have seen.” He said no-corona protests wouldn’t have happened a decade ago, but young people today believe they need to voice their opinions in ways older generations didn’t.
Dichtwald said further social unrest was unlikely anytime soon, but the Communist Party was forced to offer young people “some hope and direction” at the National People’s Congress in March. Failure to find such a solution could lead to a resurgence of protests in the long term.
In his New Year’s speech, Mr Xi acknowledged that improving the future of young people was essential, stating, “Unless young people become prosperous, the nation will not prosper,” but he did not mention specific policy responses.
The Communist Party, which cares about social stability above all else, cannot be expected to give Generation Z more political freedom.
Instead, authorities should create high-paying jobs for young people and ensure they have the same economic prosperity as their parents, experts say.
However, this is becoming more difficult to achieve in the context of slowing economic growth. Moreover, some policies to raise living standards for young people are another priority: maintaining the engine that has driven China’s economy to expand 15 times over the past two decades, according to political analysts and economists who disagree with
For example, making Generation Z expect higher wages will make China’s exports less competitive. Lowering house prices to more affordable levels could collapse the housing sector, which accounted for 25% of economic activity in recent years.
Xi’s crackdown on technology and other private sectors in his second term has also led to a decline in youth unemployment and job opportunities.
Huang Shu, an urban sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley, claims that no matter how much the Chinese government advocates “co-prosperity,” closing the gap for Generation Z is nearly impossible.
Xu said their parents were able to amass great wealth through the housing market and entrepreneurship, but stressed that wealth building in those areas is unlikely to be repeated. Closing inequality means pushing down real estate prices to make it easier for young people to buy homes, which will hit older generations hard, he said.
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Under these circumstances, some young people follow their dreams and hopes outside of China.
Deng, a 19-year-old university student, told Reuters that there was not much room for wealth in the country anymore. I will do what I am told, go back to my hometown, take the civil service exam, and spend my time doing nothing with no desire to improve.” She hates both roads and plans to emigrate.
Searches for studying abroad last year were five times the 2021 average, as Shanghai’s 25 million citizens were forced into a two-month lockdown, according to data from Baidu. A similar surge in searches occurred during the zero-corona protests in November.
Alex is philosophical, saying, “We have no choice but to accept the Chinese regime or leave if we don’t like it. The power of the authorities is too strong to change the regime.”
(Reporters Casey Hal, Josh Horwitz, Yew Lun Tian)
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