The Russian army has launched its spring offensive, and the situation in Ukraine is getting worse. Could Putin’s war end in 2023? Western tanks are arriving too late to repel the Russian army’s next offensive in Ukraine. Kremlin boss Vladimir Putin has not yet given up his war goals in 2023 and his troops are attacking on many front sections in the east of the country. A bloody war of attrition is raging. In an interview with t-online, military and Russia expert Gustav Gressel explains why the Ukrainian defenders could now lose the profits from their successful counter-offensive in late summer 2022 – and what China has to do with it. t-online: Mr. Gressel, Ukraine fears a major Russian spring offensive. What is the current situation at the front? Gustav Gressel: Russia’s spring offensive is already underway. Russian attacks have been increasing steadily for a month. The Russian army is advancing even in those sectors of the front where the Ukrainians still had the initiative. The clear focus of the Russian attacks is the Donetsk Oblast. What are the concrete consequences of the attacks on the war situation in eastern Ukraine? Ukraine will probably have to give up Bakhmut soon. Krasna Hora is almost surrounded and the Ukrainian army will probably have to withdraw from the city soon. But actually there are massive attacks on many front sections, the Russian army is testing where there are weak points in the defense. Bakhmut in particular was a meat grinder for many months, into which both sides sent and lost more and more forces. Is the loss a major setback for Ukraine? It is of course a demoralizing setback for the Ukrainian army, but Kyiv will not lose the war because of Bakhmut. and will likely continue to do so for the next few months. Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization is having an effect, and I assume that the offensive will reach its peak in late spring. Then it will subside again. But it is unclear how much terrain the Russian army can capture. Will Ukraine now lose the terrain it liberated with the successful counter-offensive in late summer 2022? That is the question. It depends on who can take the losses from the attacks better – the Russian or the Ukrainian army. It will only be finally possible to say in the coming weeks. What is Ukraine’s defense strategy in the face of the current Russian offensive? The Ukrainian army tries to hold territory as long as it causes heavy losses to the Russian army. Then they retreat to the nearest line of defense and continue the fight there. This is a fight with heavy losses, because for Russia, too, the attrition of Ukrainian forces is in the foreground, not the gaining of territory. So far, however, Russia has had difficulties in taking larger cities. Local fighting is better for Ukraine than for the Russians. In the open field, the Russian army has a huge firepower advantage with its armored personnel carriers, main battle tanks and artillery, but in cities the Ukrainians can force the opponent into close-range infantry combat, where they are qualitatively better. That’s why Ukrainian defenders cling to cities like Bakhmut, because in such cities there is the best ratio of wear and tear for them. Means: most Russian deaths for fewest Ukrainian deaths. It is frightening that a war of attrition is often just a death count. Right. Are Russian troops still trying to avoid house-to-house fighting? The Russian army is trying not to take towns head-on, but to capture the terrain around them, then force the Ukrainians to retreat. That is why Ukraine has an advantage in the Donetsk Oblast, because it is a heavy industrial region that is densely populated. There are many places that can be defended very well. That’s why Putin’s troops are biting their teeth. Ukraine is now conscripting over 60-year-olds for military service. Will the defenders soon run out of soldiers? No. Russian casualties are now much higher than Ukrainian ones. Ukraine still has manpower reserves, but material shortages are more serious. On the other hand, you mentioned the mass of soldiers that are available as a result of Putin’s mobilization. But has the Russian army also succeeded in bringing military equipment and heavy equipment to Ukraine?Putin’s army has suffered heavy losses, but Russia can reproduce parts of heavy equipment faster than Ukraine can get it from the West.For example?combat and infantry fighting vehicles, grenade launchers, artillery systems. Putin switched his economy to war production, but the Russian economy was already more militarized than Western economies. That’s why Russia is doing it a little easier with post-production. What are the consequences for Ukraine? Above all, the Ukrainian army has an acute ammunition problem. Russia is not in a good position there, but at least it is in a better position. Putin has an enormous number of problems, but the ammunition and equipment situation is not as bad as on the Ukrainian side. This also applies to tanks? Exactly. Russia produces about 200 to 250 main battle tanks a year, that’s about 17 a month. These are T-90M and there are also tanks of older models from the depots. So Russia has a larger supply of tanks? We expect that Moscow can bring more than 20 main battle tanks to the front a month. But that doesn’t make up for the losses Russia is suffering in Ukraine. That’s why the Russian army is getting weaker and weaker. However, the Ukrainian army is also suffering heavy casualties, and supplies of tanks from the West make up for them even less. That’s an advantage for Putin, and that’s why he’s steadfast in his maximalist war goals. Back in the summer of 2022, we talked about how Ukraine had already lost a large part of its heavy equipment. Aren’t western main battle tanks too late now? Unfortunately, the hurdle in the west to supply tanks fell extremely late. The tanks will not arrive on the battlefield in time for the spring offensive, but the war will not end with this offensive. That means? The tanks will come in time to help Ukraine not to collapse. Until the tanks are there and the ammunition situation improves – especially with artillery ammunition – it will be difficult for the Ukrainian army. Things will get better for Ukraine over the course of the year, but unfortunately only over the course of the year for ammunition production as well, because certain steps were only initiated in the autumn of last year. The West is already having problems mobilizing the number of tanks that the Ukraine needed. This doesn’t bode well for a long war of attrition scenario. In the long run I think there are a lot more tanks that can be supplied by the Leopard 2 A4, but many of those need to be refurbished first and that takes time. Due to the late decision for the Panzerwende we are a bit behind the situation. I hope that as many states as possible in the western alliance will now order new tanks so that they can better sell old ones. Then we can also speed up Leopard 2 production in Germany and that would help Ukraine on the tank front. Is it credible for Germany to lead a tank alliance after so many months of hesitation? Yes, I think so . Boris Pistorius has now set up a tank summit in Warsaw to take other states with him. He’s doing well so far. For Germany, a lot of reputation is at stake. After all, the federal government was internationally considered to be the brakeman on the tank issue. Chancellor Olaf Scholz completely overslept the fact that Putin is still playing for maximum victory at this point in time. This has changed the strategic war goals of the western alliance to the point where they don’t just have to somehow keep Ukraine alive. In essence, Russian defeat and Ukraine’s survival are now two identical goals. And the West has to back up these goals with material material. Has Scholz understood that? I believe that Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has long since realized this. There are also more and more politicians in the SPD who have realized and understood this. Pistorius is one of them and therefore the discussion mechanics are turned in the right direction and this also changes the environment around the Chancellor. The weapons debate now continues on fighter planes. Does it even make sense to deliver jets to Ukraine? The Ukrainian Air Force currently flies mostly air-to-air sorties to intercept drones or missiles. The delivery of fighter jets makes sense, but it will change little on the battlefield. Giving up F16 fighter jets would make it easier for Ukraine to shoot western munitions. Russia doesn’t care about this red line anyway, so the West can also deliver. But the question is not as acute as it is with battle tanks – the alarm bells were already ringing there. Has Germany also made a strategic miscalculation on the issue of arms deliveries? The West has relied on sanctions against Russia to take effect quickly and throw the Russians out of the war effort . Unfortunately, if you look at the production figures of the Russian armaments industry, this is not the case. We lived too much in the belief that because of economic problems, Putin would only be able to wage his war for a year. That was a fallacy. Nevertheless, the collective West seems to have a clear advantage compared to Russia, doesn’t it? Of course. The West has far more economic capital, more innovation and far greater financial clout. But we have hardly put this financial power at the service of a military effort that could now help Ukraine. That’s the problem at the moment. Where does Russia get the semiconductors for its armaments production from? Most of them come from China. Isn’t Beijing still delivering any weapons to Russia? I don’t think so. The warheads for artillery shells are supposed to come from North Korea. But it could be that containers with material from China roll over the North Korean border and that they are repainted there. Beijing fears US sanctions and is therefore cautious. On the other hand, China has no interest in Putin losing with a bang, and is already intervening to support him. How do you get that? It can be clearly seen on the battlefield that the wear and tear of modern weapon systems and missiles is also very high in the Russian army is. That’s why you can watch live how the stocks decrease and the attack intervals increase. In the case of mortar and artillery ammunition, however, there has been little decrease in fire intensity since the beginning of the war. There must be a helping hand for Putin. In conclusion: On February 24, the war has been raging for a year. What’s next? The Ukrainians are currently in a weak phase. But I have hope that, due to the terrain, they will manage to wear out the Russian army in a controlled manner, despite the lack of equipment and ammunition. The war of attrition will not end this year, but we will go a little further towards the preliminary decision. Thank you for the interview, Mr. Gressel.
