Al-Shabaab Somalia: Resurgence & Threat Analysis
Al-Shabaab’s offensive, launched in late february 2025, marks its most enterprising push in years. The group is reversing government gains and reasserting control in central and southern Somalia. These territorial losses highlight structural weaknesses within the Somali state and the shortcomings of the international military strategy.
These gains come as Somalia enters a period of political and institutional transition.With elections approaching and international donor support uncertain, the state is politically vulnerable. There is a need to rethink international engagement with Somalia. Supporting a fragile central government with limited territorial control and political leverage is unsustainable. A more realistic strategy would shift away from military-first approaches and focus on a durable political settlement, including engagement with al-Shabaab.
In late February 2025, al-Shabaab launched coordinated attacks targeting Jowhar, Adan Yabal, and Adale in Middle Shabelle; Afgooye in Lower Shabelle; and Bulo Burde and key areas east of the Shabelle river in Hiran. The offensive stretched government forces and allied clan militias. Probing attacks began in January,but the government has yet to launch a coordinated counteroffensive. Airstrikes and local counterattacks have slowed the advance, but al-Shabaab has reclaimed territory it had not held as 2019 and is approaching Mogadishu. after a year of restraint, al-Shabaab has returned to large-scale operations, aiming to recapture and govern territory.
In mid-2022, an uprising against al-Shabaab by the Macawiisley, a clan-based armed group backed by the Somali National Army and the African Union, had pushed al-Shabaab out of central Somalia.
The Somali government promised improved security and basic services in liberated areas of Hirshabelle and Galmudug, but lacked a clear implementation plan.Promises went unfulfilled as the government-backed clan offensive expanded. Some residents expressed regret, comparing the clan militias’ extortion and lack of cohesion unfavorably to al-Shabaab’s consistent taxation and judicial practices.Many of these places are now back under al-Shabaab control.
The Somali government’s strategy used clan ties to generate local momentum,but failed to pair military success with political and clan reconciliation. In some cases,the government arrested clan elders who previously supported al-Shabaab but wanted to reconcile with the government. Old clan grievances erupted into violence,which the government struggled to quell. Al-Shabaab had previously managed such conflicts through its sharia courts, local governance, and force.
Al-Shabaab was weakened, but not routed. The group anticipated that the government would fail to hold regained areas. Al-Shabaab exploited residents’ disillusionment with the government’s broken promises. In some places, al-Shabaab withdrew on its own terms, relocating fighters, displacing civilians, or embedding operatives in the population. The group also prepared for the moment when government forces would be most exposed.
That moment came in August 2023, when al-Shabaab overran three Somali military bases in Oswein, north of Mogadishu, killing many fighters.The overextension of government forces strained logistical capacities. The government denied the losses,but al-Shabaab responded with video of captured vehicles and soldiers.These attacks undermined public confidence in the government’s ability to maintain security.
A planned second phase of the campaign, Operation Black lion, would have enlisted forces from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to push further south into al-Shabaab strongholds, but infighting between federal and regional authorities stalled coordination, and international backing evaporated.
Al-Shabaab’s resurgence stems from its ability to govern and control populations. While scholars have documented the group’s local governance structures and its manipulation of clan politics,international policy discourse has focused on military capabilities,territorial control,and counterterrorism metrics. This obscures al-Shabaab’s management of local governance and clans, enabling the group to exploit local grievances and co-opt clan elders into running its taxation and governance systems, creating incentives for cooperation and local legitimacy. The central government has little presence in much of rural Somalia, leaving al-Shabaab as the only functioning authority.
in recent months, the group has ramped up negotiating local power-sharing agreements. Al-Shabaab offered Macawiisley fighters reconciliation and allowed them to keep their weapons in exchange for standing down. Al-Shabaab often trades leniency for compliance initially, only to crack down later, but this level of mercy is unusual. Clan elders recounted that al-Shabaab had contacted them by phone, warning them of their return, and assuring them everything would be fine if they complied.
Al-Shabaab has also adjusted its public engagement strategy. In April, it lifted a nearly decade-long blockade in South West state, just before it reduced its force presence there to redeploy to the Shabelle region, closer to Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab has encouraged residents to remain in the areas that come under its control and appears more willing to accommodate some local demands and soften its rules to maintain control and legitimacy.
In late April, rumors suggested that al-Shabaab was preparing to attack Mogadishu, revealing a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to defend the capital. Al-shabaab added to the confusion by promising clan relatives inside the government that they would not be targeted if they stood aside or cooperated with the group.
Al-Shabaab attacks inside Mogadishu had dropped sharply since early 2023, which many observers viewed as a sign of government success. Rather of routine bombings, al-Shabaab began carrying out less frequent but more symbolic, high-profile attacks aimed at undermining the government’s authority. The March 2025 improvised explosive device attack on the president’s motorcade and the May 2025 attack on a Mogadishu army recruitment center eroded public confidence in the government and stoked fear of al-Shabaab.
The Somali government is straining under the weight of internal tensions. The current political settlement is based on a balance between the country’s major clans and its regional power centers. Somalia consists of six federal member states, one of which, Somaliland, is an unrecognized de facto independent state.
Somalia is facing three major elections over the next 18 months: local council elections in June 2025, state-level elections in November 2025, and federal parliament and presidential elections sometime in 2026. Somali president Hassan Sheikh has insisted on a one-person, one-vote system, which hasn’t been attempted since 1969; indirect elections have been the norm.
What’s next
To be added.