Armor Transformation: Lessons from Recent Wars – War on the Rocks
Armored Warfare‘s Enduring Relevance: Adapting to the Modern Battlefield
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Recent conflicts in Ukraine,Israel,and Nagorno-Karabakh have undeniably exposed vulnerabilities in how armored forces are employed and highlighted the impact of outdated doctrines.However, these engagements also offer invaluable lessons for the future of armored warfare. The U.S. Army,with its robust training,unwavering commitment to combined arms operations,and inherent capacity for rapid adaptation,is uniquely positioned to navigate these evolving challenges and maintain the decisive combat effectiveness of its armored formations.
the Imperative of Adaptability and Innovation
The contemporary battlefield demands a paradigm shift in how armored units operate. To prepare for future conflicts,armored units must cultivate proficiency in dispersed operations across vast areas. This necessitates the ability to rapidly consolidate forces at critical junctures, seizing opportunities and generating the overwhelming mass required to defeat enemy formations.
The U.S. Army’s dedication to rigorous training and professional progress is a cornerstone of its strength. this commitment ensures that armored crews and leaders are among the world’s best, equipped with the skills and knowledge to excel in complex, high-intensity combat scenarios. Regular exercises, such as those conducted at the National Training Center (NTC), are crucial for honing these capabilities. These rotations meticulously replicate contemporary battlefield challenges, fostering the adaptability and resilience essential for success.
furthermore, the armored force must continue to prioritize intensive multi-echelon home-station training. This training should focus on refining fire and maneuver tactics, building leaders who are not only skilled but also adaptive, creative, and critical thinkers. The ability to think critically and adapt to unforeseen circumstances is paramount in a rapidly changing operational environment.
Lessons from Contemporary Conflicts: A Call to Action
While some may interpret the recent conflicts as signaling the decline of armored warfare, this viewpoint misses the crucial lessons embedded within these engagements. The vulnerabilities observed are not inherent flaws of armored formations themselves, but rather consequences of their suboptimal employment or the use of outdated tactics and equipment.
the U.S. Army’s superior training infrastructure, its deeply ingrained principles of combined arms warfare, and its proven capacity for swift transformation provide a distinct advantage. These attributes position the Army to effectively adapt to the new realities of the modern battlefield. Achieving this adaptation will require a profound professional commitment and intellectual collaboration from every soldier and leader within the Army’s armor corps.
To dismiss the future role of armored formations based on instances of ineffective employment or perceived vulnerabilities would be a grave miscalculation, leaving the Army unprepared for the conflicts to come. Rather,the lessons learned from contemporary wars should serve as a powerful impetus for adaptation.
Ensuring Armored Dominance in Future Conflicts
by embracing the principles of adaptability, innovation, and resilience, the U.S. Army can ensure that its armored formations not only survive but thrive. They must retain their position as a cornerstone of modern military power, capable of delivering decisive effects and shaping the outcome of future conflicts. The future of armored warfare is not one of obsolescence, but of evolution and continued dominance.**
Lt. Gen. Kevin D. Admiral is the commanding general of III Armored Corps. He has 31 years of experience leading armor, infantry, and cavalry formations, including previous assignments as commanding general of 1st cavalry Division, chief of armor, and 76th colonel of the 3d Cavalry regiment.
Nicholas Drake is a U.S. Army officer and the armor brigade transformation lead for III Armored Corps. He has 18 years of experience leading armor and cavalry formations in armored, Stryker, and infantry brigade combat teams.
The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Defence Department, or any part of the U.S. government.*