The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s unprecedented live-fire exercise 400 miles off the south coast of New South Wales, swiftly followed by a second such exercise closer to New Zealand, was both provocative and deeply regrettable. However, it does not necessitate an immediate aggressive response from Australia. It does not indicate that the Australian government’s diplomacy is failing, nor does it suggest that Australia is helpless in the face of China’s growing military power.[2]If this exercise somehow demonstrated that the government hasn’t been tough enough on China, then what would that say about the frequent foreign naval activity in waters off China’s coast? For example, it is widely acknowledged that Beijing’s illegal artificial island-building campaign in the South China Sea has succeeded. China now exercises a high degree of control over that area, thanks to the overwhelming military and constabulary forces it has staged there, which can move around the area quickly.[[3]Australia, along with its allies and partners, routinely sails warships through South China Sea waters claimed by Beijing. But would anyone seriously claim that Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea has therefore failed? Those transits are designed to make a political and legal point about the status of the waters. They don’t materially change the fact that China is de facto in charge there, and that in a shooting match it would start with a major advantage.

The lesson for Australia is to ensure that the same applies to China as its navy grows and, inevitably, it increases its activity near Australia. China needs to know that, while it is free to operate in those waters, it does so in the knowledge that, in the worst case, Australia can overcome whatever Beijing sends our way. That means building an Australian Defence Force focused tightly on the job of sinking ships and shooting down aircraft that threaten our landmass. Contra Alan Kohler who wrote that “Australia would have no hope against China, as Beijing reminded us last week with live warship drills off the NSW coast,” that’s a job Australia is quite capable of doing, even without a reliable American ally.

Geography is Australia’s biggest asset in this regard. It’s over 4,300 miles from Sydney to Hainan Island, China’s southern fleet headquarters. China is clearly capable of sending a flotilla that far, but it’s an extremely taxing and expensive journey, and it is difficult for even the most capable navy to sustain forces at those distances.

Which makes it imperative for Australia to maintain its advantage by ensuring that China can never build military bases closer to Australia. In that regard, Australian policy has been rather successful lately, starting with the Pacific Step-Up under the previous government and continuing in more recent times with defense agreements with Nauru, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea.

I’ve written previously about the need for Australia to adopt a stoical position on China. It can be tempting, in moments like these, to demand an immediate and forceful response. But let’s remember the lesson of China’s economic coercion campaign against Australia, which ended just last year. Australian policy ultimately succeeded not because the government was aggressive or obstreperous, but because it was quietly implacable. Over decades, Australia had built a resilient, globalized economy that could absorb the shocks China meted out. This allowed the Morrison and Albanese governments to pursue essentially the same policy: they never escalated the dispute, and they never backed down.

Provocations such as China’s weapons drills are the moments when stoicism is tested, when the temptation is to lash out because it fulfills a psychological need to feel like you’re doing something, and the political pressure to look like you’re doing something. But the right response is to continue the quiet work of Australia is echidna: unthreatening to those who mean the nation no harm, but prickly and indigestible to those who do.

In the context of U.S. foreign policy, this approach echoes the strategy of “strategic patience,” which has been employed in various forms to deal with global adversaries. For instance, the U.S. has maintained a consistent, albeit quiet, stance against North Korea’s nuclear provocations, focusing on diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions rather than immediate military action. This strategy, while not without its critics, has shown some effectiveness in containing North Korea’s ambitions without escalating into a full-blown conflict.

However, some critics argue that a more assertive stance is necessary to deter China’s aggressive behavior. They point to the success of the U.S. military interventions in the past, such as the Gulf War, as evidence that a strong military response can be effective. Yet, these interventions often come with significant costs, both in terms of human lives and economic resources. The U.S. experience in the Middle East serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting the potential pitfalls of aggressive military action.

Moreover, the U.S. has been actively involved in the South China Sea, conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s territorial claims. These operations, while important for maintaining international law and order, do not fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. They serve as a reminder that China’s military and economic might cannot be ignored, but they also underscore the need for a balanced approach that combines military readiness with diplomatic engagement.

In conclusion, Australia’s response to China’s naval exercises should be measured and strategic, focusing on building a resilient defense capability while maintaining diplomatic channels. This approach, while challenging, offers the best chance of ensuring regional stability and security. As the U.S. continues to navigate its own complex relationship with China, it can learn from Australia’s example, balancing firmness with restraint to achieve long-term goals.