Bioterrorism and the Threat of a New Global Pandemic

As global health officials continue to monitor emerging infectious disease threats, concerns are growing about the potential misuse of synthetic biology and gain-of-function research by non-state actors. A recent analysis published in the journal Health Security highlights how advances in genetic engineering could enable terrorist groups to create or modify viruses with pandemic potential, raising urgent questions about biosecurity, dual-use research oversight, and pandemic preparedness.

The study, conducted by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, warns that the accessibility of gene-editing tools like CRISPR-Cas9, combined with publicly available genomic sequences of high-consequence pathogens, lowers the technical barrier for malicious actors seeking to weaponize biological agents. While no credible evidence currently exists of terrorist organizations possessing the capability to engineer and deploy such pathogens at scale, experts stress that the risk is not theoretical and warrants proactive mitigation strategies.

“We are entering an era where the tools to manipulate life are increasingly democratized,” said Dr. Anita Cicero, deputy director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and co-author of the study. “That brings tremendous promise for medicine and public health, but it also means we must strengthen safeguards against misuse. The same techniques that could lead to breakthrough vaccines could, in the wrong hands, be adapted to enhance transmissibility, evade immunity, or increase virulence.”

The report draws parallels between current capabilities and the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, noting that while the natural zoonotic spillover hypothesis remains the leading explanation for the emergence of COVID-19, the pandemic has underscored how a highly transmissible respiratory virus can disrupt global health, economies, and social systems. This realization has intensified scrutiny over laboratory biosafety and the need for international norms governing gain-of-function research—studies that enhance the pathogenicity or transmissibility of viruses to better understand their pandemic potential.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how a single biological threat can overwhelm health systems and destabilize societies. We must now prepare not only for naturally emerging pathogens but also for the possibility of deliberate biological threats.

Dr. Anita Cicero, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

In response to these concerns, the report recommends a multi-layered approach to biodefense. This includes strengthening the oversight of dual-use life science research through improved institutional review mechanisms, expanding international cooperation under frameworks like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and investing in rapid-response capabilities such as universal vaccine platforms, broad-spectrum antivirals, and real-time genomic surveillance networks.

Public health agencies are also urged to integrate biosecurity considerations into routine pandemic planning. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have both emphasized the importance of maintaining robust laboratory networks, training first responders in biological threat recognition, and ensuring transparent communication during potential outbreaks—whether natural or suspected to be man-made.

Despite these efforts, challenges remain. The BWC, while the cornerstone of international efforts to prohibit biological weapons, lacks a formal verification mechanism, making compliance difficult to monitor. The rapid pace of innovation in synthetic biology often outstrips the ability of regulatory frameworks to adapt, creating gaps that could be exploited.

Experts caution against sensationalism while advocating for vigilance. Dr. Gregory Koblentz, director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University and another contributor to the analysis, noted that while the technical hurdles to creating a pandemic-capable virus remain significant for non-state actors, complacency is not an option.

The likelihood of a terrorist group successfully engineering and releasing a virus capable of causing millions of deaths is currently low—but not zero. Our focus should be on reducing that probability through prevention, preparedness, and resilience, not on assuming it cannot happen.

Dr. Gregory Koblentz, George Mason University

As the world continues to recover from the societal and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic, the intersection of emerging technology and global health security demands sustained attention. Policymakers, scientists, and public health officials are increasingly calling for a renewed commitment to strengthening biological norms, investing in defensive capabilities, and fostering international trust—all essential components in reducing the risk of future biological catastrophes, whether arising from nature or human intent.