More than two months after the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, which left 15 people dead, fundamental questions surrounding the event remain unanswered. The attack, carried out by two gunmen described as Islamic State-inspired, has prompted a wave of new security measures and sparked debate over the response of Australian authorities.
The assailants, identified as father and son Sajid and Naveed Akram, managed to acquire a significant arsenal of weaponry and execute their plan despite, according to reports, both individuals being known to authorities. Naveed Akram, the surviving attacker, had previously been linked to a convicted Islamic State terrorist, while evidence suggests his father was also under surveillance. The circumstances surrounding how they were able to operate undetected remain a central point of contention.
The Bondi attack, the deadliest act of terrorism on Australian soil, has been swiftly leveraged by Labor governments at both the federal and state levels to implement sweeping changes to security protocols. These measures include expanded police powers, bans on protests, and provisions allowing for the outlawing of organizations and political parties deemed to promote “hate speech.” However, critics argue that the focus has shifted from investigating the attack itself to using it as justification for curtailing civil liberties.
A key concern revolves around the role of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Initial statements from government and police officials indicated that Naveed Akram had briefly been on ASIO’s radar, but was considered a peripheral figure. Later admissions revealed a six-month investigation into Akram in , prompted by his association with Isaac El Matari, an individual with a history of attempting to join Islamic State in Lebanon and who was later convicted of terror offenses in Australia.
El Matari had allegedly attempted to establish a support base for Islamic State in Sydney, discussing potential attacks on prominent landmarks. Despite this background, ASIO concluded in that Akram did not pose a significant threat. This assessment has come under scrutiny, particularly following a recent investigation by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) “Four Corners” program.
The “Four Corners” report featured testimony from an individual identified as “Marcus,” a former undercover agent who claims to have infiltrated a small Sunni extremist network in Sydney in . Marcus alleges he repeatedly warned ASIO that both Naveed and Sajid Akram were supporters of Islamic State. He claims to have observed Naveed Akram attending a religious retreat with El Matari and others, where he was allegedly exposed to extremist materials.
Marcus further asserts that Sajid Akram was also an Islamic State supporter, and even more radicalized than his son. He claims to have overheard the elder Akram justifying El Matari’s terrorist plans during a conversation with an ASIO agent. This claim was corroborated by an associate of Wissam Haddad, a figure identified as central to the extremist network, who stated that Sajid Akram had introduced his son to the group and shared an interest in the teachings of Al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.
ASIO has disputed Marcus’ claims, simultaneously questioning his veracity and issuing legal threats to the ABC. However, the agency’s strong reaction has raised further questions about its handling of the case. Marcus’s presence within the network, as an ASIO informant, highlights the extent to which the agency was monitoring – and potentially influencing – the group’s activities.
Reports suggest that in , ASIO shared information about Naveed Akram with the Joint Counter Terrorism Team, and that New South Wales Police added him to an intelligence database known as the Known Entity Management System (KEMS). Akram was reportedly removed from KEMS prior to the attack, but the timing of this removal remains unclear.
Also in , Sajid Akram applied for a firearms license, a process that took three years to complete. This lengthy delay has prompted criticism, with some questioning whether the authorities adequately vetted the applicant. Experts have noted that the simultaneous purchase of three identical shotguns by Akram should have triggered an automatic review, but this did not occur.
The lack of transparency surrounding these events has fueled speculation about potential failures in intelligence gathering and communication. One source, speaking to the Australian Financial Review, suggested that ASIO may have been prioritizing surveillance of pro-Palestinian organizations following the October 7th attacks in Israel, potentially diverting resources from monitoring Islamic State supporters.
The broader context of Western intelligence agencies’ relationships with Islamist groups also warrants consideration. The rise of Islamic State was, in part, a consequence of the US-led intervention in Syria, which saw the CIA support Islamist militias fighting against the Syrian government. This history raises questions about the complex dynamics at play and the potential for unintended consequences.
The Bondi Beach attack remains a deeply sensitive issue in Australia, and the unanswered questions surrounding it continue to fuel public debate. As the country grapples with the aftermath of the tragedy, demands for accountability and a thorough investigation into the events leading up to the attack are likely to persist.
