Boric’s Salary: Politics, Institutions, and Social Progress in Chile

Recent criticisms leveled against Chilean President Gabriel Boric contain elements of legitimate concern alongside politically motivated attacks. Protests in Rapa Nui and scrutiny over a December bonus received by the President exemplify this dynamic.

The current situation in Chile mirrors trends observed in other Latin American nations. In Peru, a recent change in government occurred following the removal of José Jerí, replaced by José María Balcázar. However, the core issue isn’t the change itself, but rather the instability of the Peruvian presidency. Since 2000, only three presidents – Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan García (2006-2011), and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) – have completed their five-year terms. Peru has seen eight presidents in the last decade, creating an impression of crisis, despite these transitions occurring within the country’s constitutional framework.

Similar patterns can be observed in Spain and Argentina, albeit in different contexts. In Spain, there is ongoing debate surrounding the government of President Pedro Sánchez, with speculation about a potential early election before the scheduled 2027 date. What we have is partly driven by political disagreements, but also by the Spanish parliamentary system’s allowance for early elections. In Argentina, President Javier Milei has reduced the number of ministries, a decision possible due to the country’s administrative structure, which doesn’t require legislation for such changes. The interplay between political and institutional factors driving changes, and to recognize that governments evolve at different paces and in different ways, as dictated by their respective constitutions, and laws.

This perspective is relevant when analyzing Chile’s current situation and the decisions made by the Boric administration in its final stages. These include bonuses to public officials – including the President – government travel, and so-called “tie-in” regulations or appointments. Some of these decisions are debatable, potentially politically inexpedient, or aesthetically questionable. However, the fundamental institutional question is whether these actions are acceptable, whether it is appropriate for the government to make appointments affecting the incoming administration, or whether public resources are being used effectively. Chile needs to define more efficient criteria for state action and reduce the burden on ordinary citizens.

Chile currently enjoys international prestige and recognition, particularly within Latin America. However, two key points must be remembered. First, in 2019, Chile experienced significant political and social unrest, with revolutionary or transformative demands for radical changes to the political and socio-economic system, leading to an unprecedented constitutional process with unpredictable consequences. Second, a narrative has recently emerged suggesting Chile is on the verge of collapse, a claim the government has actively sought to refute. In both cases, a common thread exists: Chile was, or is, in a precarious state, a claim that holds a degree of plausibility.

The problem is not solely political, but also institutional. If the Presidential bonus is considered inappropriate, alternatives exist. One is to exclude government officials and authorities from receiving such benefits. Another is to impose stricter requirements for bonuses, such as demonstrable progress in reducing public spending, shortening hospital wait times, improving educational outcomes, or addressing the housing deficit. These challenges, if addressed successfully, would contribute to Chile’s social progress and could be worthy of recognition, potentially even a financial reward.

Further information would be beneficial for a comprehensive analysis. For example, knowing how many presidents have received the same bonus as Gabriel Boric, and how many public officials have failed to achieve performance-based bonuses (PMG), would be valuable. There is a perception that most officials receive these bonuses, or that they function more as a supplemental salary than a performance incentive. Changes could also be considered in sensitive areas like the appointment of notaries and real estate registrars. For instance, a rule could be implemented stating that anyone appointed to these positions would be disqualified if they have a third or fourth-degree relative serving in Congress, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or as a notary or registrar.

While concerns about “tie-in” laws are understandable, a solution could involve prohibiting the introduction of legislation during election campaigns (especially if given urgency) and banning the completion of recruitment processes for ministerial and other positions after the first round of presidential elections. This would shift the resolution of these issues from the realm of politics and opinion to the level of institutions, enhancing their quality and contributing to societal progress or decline.

Numerous other examples exist, including the appointment of ambassadors, nominations to the Council for the Defense of the State, and the Constitutional Tribunal, all of which raise legitimate questions and highlight the need for fundamental changes, not merely occasional criticism. Chile is not on the brink of collapse, just as it wasn’t facing decades of stagnation or systemic injustice in 2019. However, politicized debate is unproductive, and changes must be driven towards institutional reforms, as institutional quality is a key driver of progress.