Closing the Air and Missile Defense Gap in the Indo-Pacific
- The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are pursuing the networking of missile sensors and interceptors as a primary strategy to reduce the air and missile...
- The urgency of this effort is informed by the expenditure of assets during a 12-day conflict in Summer 2025 involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
- According to reports from CNN, the United States expended between 100 and 150 upper-tier, terminal-phase missile interceptors during those 12 days of fighting.
The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are pursuing the networking of missile sensors and interceptors as a primary strategy to reduce the air and missile defense advantages currently held by China. This approach aims to generate operational efficiencies in sensing and interception to compensate for vulnerabilities in existing missile stockpiles and production capacities.
The urgency of this effort is informed by the expenditure of assets during a 12-day conflict in Summer 2025 involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. During that engagement, the U.S. Military utilized regionally deployed air and missile defense assets to intercept Iranian drones and missiles in support of Israeli operations.
According to reports from CNN, the United States expended between 100 and 150 upper-tier, terminal-phase missile interceptors during those 12 days of fighting. This expenditure represented approximately 25 percent of the total U.S. Stockpile and amounted to 150 percent of the annual global production rates at that time, although production increases were anticipated following the conflict.
Indo-Pacific Vulnerabilities
The risk of stockpile depletion is viewed as more severe in the Indo-Pacific region, where the United States is facing an increasingly assertive and capable China. Modeling conducted by the Stimson Center indicates a critical timeline for U.S. Assets in a potential conflict.

the United States would likely run out of Patriot and [upper-tier, terminal-phase missile] interceptors within the first 24 hours of a military conflict.
Stimson Center
While the United States and its regional partners are increasing the procurement of air and missile defense assets to address this gap, several constraints hinder progress. These include overstretched defense industrial bases and competing spending priorities.
Strategic Alternatives to Procurement
Because expanded procurement alone may not provide near-term gains due to industrial constraints, the U.S. And its partners are exploring complementary approaches. One central method is the creation of a coalition air and missile defense network that integrates sensors and interceptors across different nations.
This integrated approach is being mirrored in the transformation of U.S. Army air defense in the region. The Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) is introducing new force structures and advanced capabilities designed to enhance multilateral integration and ensure freedom of maneuver against evolving regional threats.
Regional partners are also independently upgrading their capabilities. India is currently acquiring additional drones and air defense systems to adapt to the requirements of modern warfare.
The feasibility of these coordinated efforts depends on the ability of the United States and its partners to navigate the complex politics and geography of the Indo-Pacific to establish a functional, networked defense system.
