Countering Adversaries: The Urgent Need for US Gray Zone Strategies

The United States must integrate offensive and defensive gray zone strategies into its national security framework to maintain global leadership and counter adversary coercion, according to an analysis published by The Cipher Brief. The National Intelligence Council defines these activities as coercion and subversion that occur below the threshold of armed conflict but outside the bounds of historically legitimate statecraft.

The analysis argues that while the U.S. is currently developing a historically large defense budget, it lacks the organizational structure and specialized expertise required to combat gray zone threats. These activities occupy the space between peaceful diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact on one end, and direct armed conflict on the other, often aiming to weaken the resolve of the U.S. or its allies or to change national policies.

A critical component of these strategies is deniability, as the author notes that attribution of such acts risks escalation. The White House has taken an initial step by appointing the first National Security Council (NSC) Director for Cognitive Advantage, though the analysis asserts that cognitive advantage is only one element of a broader required strategy.

Operational Tools of Gray Zone Warfare

Effective gray zone operations require a “whole of government” approach, combining multiple non-kinetic tools. The Cipher Brief report identifies several key activities that comprise these strategies:

• Cyber and information operations designed to undermine resistance or promote U.S. goals through propaganda.
• Covert and clandestine operations, including infiltration, espionage, and subversion.
• The use of non-governmental actors and support for irregular military and paramilitary forces.
• Economic pressures that exceed standard economic competition.
• Deception and denial operations characterized by calculated ambiguity.

The analysis suggests that autocratic regimes currently hold an advantage in this domain. Because non-democratic states are not limited by the domestic laws and regulations that govern open societies, they can more effectively marshal state and society resources. The report states that the U.S. lags in the information domain specifically because adversaries have already ingrained gray zone tactics into their doctrines.

Historical Precedents for Irregular Statecraft

The report notes that while the term “gray zone” is contemporary, the methods are long-standing forms of statecraft previously referred to as political warfare, active measures, or irregular or guerrilla warfare. The author cites historical examples to demonstrate the utility of these tactics in avoiding full-scale kinetic conflict.

During the Peloponnesian War, Athens used proxy forces to sow distrust among the Helots in Sparta. According to the historian Thucydides, this created a national emergency in Sparta that eventually led the city to discuss ending the wars. Similarly, the Han Empire utilized marriage alliances, trade agreements, and cultural exchanges to manage tensions with nomadic powers and secure borders without large-scale war.

The analysis also references the Cold War, during which the U.S. and USSR utilized sabotage, espionage, and proxy support in regions such as Vietnam, Korea, and Latin America. These “active measures” allowed the superpowers to compete in a contested space without triggering immediate escalation.

Structural Obstacles to U.S. Implementation

The U.S. government currently faces significant jurisdictional and philosophical barriers to executing these strategies. The author claims the State Department remains focused on relationship building, while the National Security Council has been “hollowed out.”

Legal authority issues further complicate the landscape, as the report asserts that neither the intelligence community nor the Department of War can currently take the lead in implementing whole-of-government strategies. This has resulted in years of internal government disputes over the definition and leadership of gray zone and information operations.

Furthermore, the analysis argues that the U.S. has only trained a narrow group of intelligence professionals and special operators to think creatively regarding irregular warfare. To bridge this gap, the report suggests the U.S. must train a broader workforce in “out of the box thinking” and leverage technology to synchronize military, intelligence, economic, trade, diplomacy, and public relations assets.

Proposed Reforms for National Security

To address these vulnerabilities, the analysis recommends that the U.S. explicitly acknowledge that leading in gray zone operations is essential for national security. The author proposes using a portion of the defense budget to signal resolve and establish a seasoned professional at the NSC to integrate government-wide activities against specific adversaries.

The proposed framework involves using trained planners from the intelligence community and the Department of War to develop government-wide plans for implementation at the White House. The report concludes that without these strategies, the U.S. limits its potential responses to adversaries to kinetic ones, risking its role as a global power.