Cyber Readiness Guide – War on the Rocks
- military cyber forces have struggled to meet Department of Defense readiness standards, despite an annual $14 billion investment in cyber capabilities.
- John "Strider" Cobb,an Air Force cyber officer who led the initial phase of Cyber Command's readiness campaign in 2022,argues that the problems are more deeply rooted than many...
- Instead, Cobb suggests, readiness standards have been lowered, personnel double-counted, and turnover rates obscured to mask the failure to build a capable Cyber Mission force. The core issue,...
Billions in spending haven’t translated to true cyber readiness, leaving U.S. military cyber forces struggling, as highlighted in this crucial analysis. The article dives deep into the critical need for a dedicated cyber force to conquer persistent challenges. Highlighting talent management gaps and inadequate training as core issues, the piece unpacks why current standards may overstate real capabilities. Addressing structural flaws, bolstering talent management, and focusing on a dedicated cyber service become vital for cultivating a skilled professional force. News Directory 3 brings you this essential exploration of cyber command effectiveness. What critical shifts could redefine the future of cyber warfare? Discover what’s next in building a strong cyber defense.
Cyber Command Faces Readiness Challenges: A Call for a Dedicated Cyber Force
Updated June 09,2025
For a decade,U.S. military cyber forces have struggled to meet Department of Defense readiness standards, despite an annual $14 billion investment in cyber capabilities. This persistent shortfall has spurred debate among lawmakers, the military cyber community, and national security experts about potential structural reforms to Cyber Command and its Cyber Mission force.
John “Strider” Cobb,an Air Force cyber officer who led the initial phase of Cyber Command’s readiness campaign in 2022,argues that the problems are more deeply rooted than many realize. He contends that Cyber Command has been unwilling to acknowledge the fundamental limitations of the current Cyber Mission Force structure in generating mission-effective cyber forces at scale.
Instead, Cobb suggests, readiness standards have been lowered, personnel double-counted, and turnover rates obscured to mask the failure to build a capable Cyber Mission force. The core issue, he says, is service mismanagement of career progression and assignments, leading to high turnover and low retention in critical roles.Overcoming these challenges requires a dedicated cyber service focused on cultivating a enduring, highly skilled force of military cyber professionals to improve cyber readiness.
While network security inspections are critically importent, Cobb notes thay don’t directly correlate with the readiness of offensive and defensive cyber forces. He emphasizes that even well-protected networks can be breached by skilled adversaries, necessitating highly trained cyber personnel to hunt them down.
Cobb points out that the Cyber Mission Force’s readiness shortfalls are primarily training-related.He claims that past readiness assessments have been artificially inflated through various means, such as rapidly rotating qualified personnel across multiple teams and issuing unauthorized training waivers. This has led to misleading claims about achieving readiness milestones.
The lengthy training and experience required to develop proficient cyber operators and analysts—often around 10 years—further compounds the challenge. however, service promotion and career progression requirements often pull personnel out of critical cyber roles too soon, creating a cycle of perpetual amateurism. This limits operational capacity, causes burnout, and puts the Cyber Mission Force at a disadvantage against adversaries who prioritize building cyber lethality.
A typical cyber mission team is roughly equivalent to a dysfunctional fighter squadron where one pilot is an elite TOPGUN graduate, four pilots are fully trained and mission-effective, six pilots are listed as fully trained but are only qualified to fly in a threat-free environment, and eight pilots are still in initial pilot training and have never flown a real fighter jet.
Cobb asserts that Cyber Command’s readiness numbers are based on inflated standards, with personnel counted as “fully trained and qualified” well before they complete their training. He argues that the skills required for real-world missions necessitate higher training standards, equivalent to those used by the National Security Agency.
He also notes that structural biases within the military services discourage personnel from pursuing assignments and training that would enhance their cyber expertise. This, in turn, reduces the supply of qualified trainers and creates a toxic combination of poor talent management and poor leadership.
While recent efforts have focused on financial incentives to address retention issues, Cobb believes that poor talent management and leadership are the primary drivers of low retention. He says that service policies often punish or prevent personnel from building cyber expertise,pushing them out of the military.
What’s next
Cobb concludes that without major structural changes, the United States risks falling behind adversaries in the cyber domain. He advocates for a dedicated Cyber force of approximately 20,000 personnel to provide offensive and defensive cyber capabilities to both Cyber command and the intelligence community. This autonomous Cyber Force would focus on creating and investing in dedicated professionals, breaking the cycle of perpetual amateurism and ensuring America’s ability to win future cyber conflicts.