Europe’s Strategic Wake-Up Call: Lessons from Asia
Europe finds itself at a critical juncture, facing a confluence of strategic, economic, and psychological challenges. Russia’s proximity to NATO borders, China’s growing influence, and a shifting American foreign policy have exposed vulnerabilities that were long masked by assumptions of perpetual peace, automatic prosperity, and guaranteed American protection. The core issue isn’t simply a lack of military hardware or energy independence, but a deficit of strategic habits – habits that can be learned, in part, by looking eastward.
For much of the modern era, Europe dictated the rules of the international order. From the age of exploration to the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent colonial era, the continent’s primary concern was managing its own abundance and dominance. Even after the devastation of two world wars, the United States stepped in to safeguard European prosperity and security. This allowed European elites to prioritize values over interests, process over power, and declarations over concrete deterrence.
This period of relative peace fostered complacency. Defense budgets were curtailed, strategic industries were outsourced, and dependence on Russian gas was framed as enlightened interdependence rather than a potential point of leverage. China was welcomed as a partner, even as evidence mounted of its predatory economic practices. Europe operated under the assumption that rules would inherently restrain power, because for decades, power *had* largely restrained itself.
East and Southeast Asia, however, never enjoyed such luxuries. Nations like Japan and South Korea rebuilt under the American security umbrella, but always with tangible threats in their immediate vicinity. The dangers posed by North Korean missiles and Chinese naval expansion are not abstract concerns, but daily realities. Geography, as a constant and unforgiving teacher, ensured that national interest remained paramount.
Japan offers a particularly stark contrast to Europe’s current predicament. Despite being deeply integrated into the Chinese economy, Tokyo has adopted a remarkably realistic view of its relationship with Beijing. Japan has consistently increased defense spending, reinterpreted constitutional constraints on its military, strengthened ties with regional partners, and invested in strategies to complicate China’s military calculations, particularly in maritime Southeast Asia. Japan’s support for the Philippines in the South China Sea is not altruistic; it’s a matter of forward defense.
Equally significant is Japan’s focus on economic security. Having learned from past mistakes, it now views industrial policy as a core strategic function. The goal isn’t complete self-sufficiency – an unrealistic ambition – but “strategic indispensability”: dominating critical nodes in advanced manufacturing, restricting foreign investment in sensitive sectors, and ensuring that leverage is reciprocal. This stands in sharp contrast to Europe’s hesitation to confront China over espionage concerns for fear of disrupting trade relations. One side accepts friction as a necessary cost of sovereignty; the other views it as an unwelcome inconvenience.
Southeast Asia presents both opportunities and warnings for Europe. European governments have often spoken of partnerships with ASEAN while simultaneously adopting a patronizing tone, lecturing on democracy and human rights as if moral instruction could substitute for shared interests. This approach was viable when Europe possessed sufficient power to be dismissive, but that is no longer the case.
The reality is that Southeast Asian nations have spent decades navigating a complex geopolitical landscape dominated by larger powers. Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore have each developed their own strategies for balancing between Washington and Beijing, extracting benefits while minimizing vulnerability. They understand that absolute alignment is rarely achievable and that autonomy is best preserved through flexibility, not moral pronouncements.
However, ASEAN’s limitations also offer a cautionary tale. Its repeated failures to formulate a unified response to China’s expanding claims in the South China Sea are not due to a lack of understanding of international law – the rulings under UNCLOS are well-known – but rather a consequence of structural issues. Member states have divergent interests. Cambodia, economically reliant on China and lacking territorial claims, has little incentive to challenge Beijing. The Philippines, backed by the U.S. And directly affected, is far more assertive. Others hedge, calculating that ambiguity is preferable to confrontation.
This isn’t hypocrisy; it’s realism. And it underscores a crucial lesson for Europe: multilateral institutions do not eliminate national interests; they reflect them. The European Union is more integrated than ASEAN, but its integration was predicated on two pillars that are now eroding – guaranteed American security and a liberal economic order that Washington no longer fully supports. As these pillars weaken, internal divisions within the EU will become more pronounced.
Europeans who continue to advocate for a resurgent rules-based order must take note. Rules are effective only when backed by power and shared interests. When those diverge, appeals to law become empty rituals. This doesn’t mean abandoning values, but recognizing their limitations. Moral authority without material capacity is not leadership; it’s merely commentary.
Europe must quickly relearn how to operate in a world where great powers pursue their interests relentlessly, alliances are contingent, and trade-offs are unavoidable. This requires a fundamental shift in mindset as much as policy. Defense spending must be viewed as a political commitment, not an accounting problem. Economic openness must be balanced with resilience. And diplomacy must prioritize leverage alongside rhetoric.
Engagement with the Indo-Pacific is a positive step, but only if Europe approaches it as more than a commercial venture. Southeast Asia is not simply a market; it’s a laboratory for survival. Its nations have adapted – imperfectly, pragmatically – to a world where they cannot control outcomes but can influence them through careful positioning. Europe, accustomed to setting the agenda, must learn to manage constraints.
The humbling truth is that Europe is descending in the global hierarchy, not because of moral failings, but because others have surpassed it strategically. This doesn’t necessarily equate to irrelevance. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are not superpowers, yet they all wield influence disproportionate to their size because they align ambition with reality. Europe’s task is similar: to shed the illusion of historical exemptions and relearn what Asia never forgot – that peace is earned, not presumed; that prosperity requires protection; and that values are best preserved when grounded in power. The East has been living in the future Europe now faces. The lesson is there, waiting to be learned.
