Flock Safety License Plate Reader Data Accessed Without Permission by Federal Agencies OR Mountain View Police Criticize Flock Safety Over Unauthorized Data Access

A California police department has suspended its use of Flock Safety’s license plate readers after discovering that federal agencies accessed the data without explicit authorization. The incident, which unfolded between August and November 2024, highlights growing concerns about data privacy and the scope of access granted to law enforcement agencies through these increasingly ubiquitous surveillance systems.

The Mountain View Police Department (MVPD) discovered the unauthorized access during a routine audit of its Flock Safety system. According to a press release issued February 3, 2026, at least six offices across four federal agencies accessed the city’s license plate data. These agencies included offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in Kentucky and Tennessee, the Inspector General’s office of the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), Air Force bases in Langley, Virginia, and Ohio, and the Lake Mead National Recreation Area in Nevada.

The unauthorized access stemmed from a “nationwide” search setting within the Flock Safety system that was activated by the company itself, rather than being a feature explicitly enabled by Mountain View. This setting allowed agencies across the country to query the database, regardless of their legitimate need to access data collected within a specific jurisdiction. The MVPD stated they were unaware this setting was active.

This incident isn’t isolated. Flock Safety has faced increasing scrutiny in recent months, stemming from its role in providing data used in investigations related to abortion access and its broader surveillance practices. The company’s willingness to provide broad access to its data, even without clear justification, has drawn criticism from privacy advocates and lawmakers alike. In October 2025, Senator Ron Wyden sent a letter to Flock Safety expressing concerns about the company’s data handling practices and its ability to prevent abuse.

The core of the issue lies in the tension between the potential benefits of license plate reader (LPR) technology for law enforcement and the inherent privacy risks associated with mass surveillance. LPR systems automatically capture and store the license plate numbers of vehicles, along with the date, time, and location of the sighting. This data can be used to investigate crimes, locate stolen vehicles, and identify suspects. However, it also creates a detailed record of individuals’ movements, raising concerns about potential misuse and abuse.

California law, specifically Senate Bill 34 enacted in 2014, prohibits state law enforcement agencies from sharing license plate data with federal agencies. The Mountain View incident appears to circumvent this law through the nationwide search setting, raising questions about the effectiveness of existing regulations and the responsibility of technology vendors to enforce them. Adam Schwartz, Privacy Litigation Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, noted that the situation demonstrates how easily license plate reader data can be mishandled, stating, “What we’re seeing is that license plate reader data is playing with fire.”

The MVPD has taken immediate action, suspending its use of the Flock Safety system, citing a loss of confidence in the vendor. Mountain View’s police chief has deferred further direction to the city council. The city is now grappling with fundamental questions about the future of its LPR program: Why was this “back door” built into the system in the first place? What legal remedies are available? And can Flock Safety be trusted to protect the privacy of its customers?

The situation also raises broader questions about the business model of companies like Flock Safety. The company’s willingness to offer a nationwide search function, even if unintentionally, suggests a prioritization of maximizing data access and revenue over protecting the privacy rights of individuals and complying with state laws. As Senator Wyden’s letter pointed out, Flock’s filters for sensitive searches – such as those related to abortion or immigration – are ineffective if law enforcement agencies provide vague search terms or none at all. The lack of independent auditing of customer searches creates a significant risk of abuse.

The incident in Mountain View is part of a larger trend of cities re-evaluating their relationships with Flock Safety. Santa Clara County Supervisor Betty Duong recently called for a wider pause on the use of Flock cameras, reflecting growing concerns about the potential for misuse and the lack of adequate oversight. The company itself announced it was pausing cooperation with federal law enforcement amid these concerns, although it initially maintained it had no direct contracts with federal agencies before admitting to running a “pilot” program.

The fundamental problem, as highlighted by the Mountain View case, is that Flock Safety appears to have designed a system that prioritizes broad data access over granular control and privacy protection. The “nationwide” search setting, which was activated without the knowledge or consent of the MVPD, exemplifies this issue. The company’s response – or lack thereof – to concerns about unauthorized access further underscores its apparent disregard for the privacy rights of individuals and the legal requirements of its customers. The future of LPR technology hinges on vendors like Flock Safety prioritizing responsible data handling practices and providing law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to investigate crimes without compromising fundamental privacy rights.