Gideon Sa’ar Addresses London Jewish-Kurdish Conference on Regional Relations

The Jewish–Kurdish conference held in London on 6–7 September 2026 has intensified regional scrutiny regarding foreign policy perceptions and ethnic minority dynamics inside Iran. The gathering brought together Kurdish and Jewish scholars, activists, and civil-society representatives to discuss bilateral relations and historical ties.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar Addresses London Conference by Video

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar addressed the conference via video link, praising Jewish–Kurdish relations while explicitly noting that the Kurdish people had not achieved political independence. His remarks constituted a public statement by a senior Israeli official but did not announce any formal Israeli policy concerning Iran’s borders or support for Kurdish armed action.

The event itself does not prove the existence of an Israeli plan to create a Greater Kurdistan. Cultural cooperation between Jews and Kurds should not automatically be described as a conspiracy. Yet given the current environment, statements from an Israeli minister backing Kurdish political goals are readily viewed within Turkey and Iran as components of a broader regional agenda.

Regional Strategic Sensitivities Intensify Amid Growing Competition

The sensitivity surrounding the conference is heightened while Israeli–Turkish competition grows and speculation continues regarding potential foreign use of Kurdish forces against Tehran. Inside Iran, the distinction between formal state policy and political perception can easily disappear, making any perceived foreign support for ethnic fragmentation politically explosive.

Media reports have described American and Israeli efforts to mobilize Iranian Kurdish fighters against Tehran. Such reporting differs from a publicly declared government policy, and Israel has not formally announced any such plan. The political consequences, however, do not depend entirely on whether such a policy exists. Accounts alleging foreign interactions with armed ethnic factions reinforce the conviction that external actors might exploit internal fault lines in Iran to advance their own geopolitical aims.

Digital Diplomacy Campaigns Target Diverse Regional Language Audiences

Israel conducts digital diplomacy aimed at regional audiences in several languages, including Persian, Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkish, utilizing language-specific pages and social-media accounts. Through its Persian channels, Israel depicts itself as an adversary of the Islamic Republic and an ally of the Iranian public, whereas its Kurdish messaging highlights Israeli backing for Kurdish political goals and rights. Similar messaging is directed at Arabic- and Turkish-speaking audiences, allowing Israel to appeal to different communities even when their political interests may conflict.

This messaging appears to have found a receptive audience among some Iranians, although public attitudes towards Israel remain divided. A 2026 survey found that 51 percent of respondents held a positive view of Benjamin Netanyahu, while 38 percent held a negative one. While this falls short of widespread endorsement of Israeli governance, it indicates that Israel has gained a measure of goodwill among certain segments of the Iranian population.

Political Repercussions Shape Democratic Activism Inside Iran

Any suggestion that Israel seeks to weaken or fragment Iran could damage existing public sympathy, increase public suspicion, and help Tehran portray its opponents as partners in a foreign project. It could also reinforce a longstanding government narrative. Tehran has persistently sought to paint minority-rights advocates, reporters, and pro-democracy campaigners as instruments of foreign interests. Whenever Iran’s territorial integrity faces an actual or imagined danger, the regime is able to reframe a domestic conversation about civil liberties into an existential battle for the nation’s preservation.