How Drone Strikes and Insurance Markets Paralyzed the Strait of Hormuz
- A new strategic approach to maritime disruption, termed the “Hormuz Playbook,” suggests that global shipping chokepoints can be effectively closed not through traditional naval blockades or mining, but...
- The concept emerges from an analysis of recent events in the Strait of Hormuz, where the intersection of low-cost kinetic attacks and high-stakes maritime insurance created a functional...
- The effectiveness of this strategy was evidenced following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026.
A new strategic approach to maritime disruption, termed the “Hormuz Playbook,” suggests that global shipping chokepoints can be effectively closed not through traditional naval blockades or mining, but by manipulating the insurance market through targeted drone strikes.
The concept emerges from an analysis of recent events in the Strait of Hormuz, where the intersection of low-cost kinetic attacks and high-stakes maritime insurance created a functional blockade that halted the majority of commercial traffic without the need for a formal naval seizure.
The February 2026 Hormuz Disruption
The effectiveness of this strategy was evidenced following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026. On the eve of these strikes, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained active, with 56 tankers sailing through the chokepoint.

However, the landscape shifted rapidly in the two days following the strikes. According to data from Lloyd’s List, the maritime industry’s journal of record, the number of tankers dropped to just seven, accompanied by a single gas carrier.
The vessels that continued to transit the strait were all small, and three were identified as shadow-fleet vessels—ships that often operate outside standard regulatory and insurance frameworks to evade sanctions.
While a small number of ships continued to move, hundreds of other tankers were observed drifting in the Gulf of Oman, unable or unwilling to enter the strait.
The Mechanism of the “Insurance Blockade”
The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz was not the result of a traditional military operation. The analysis from War on the Rocks notes that the chokepoint had not been mined, blockaded, or seized by any navy.
Instead, the area was “priced shut.” This occurs when a handful of drone strikes increase the perceived risk to a level that makes insurance premiums prohibitively expensive or causes insurers to withdraw coverage entirely for the region.
For most commercial shipping companies, sailing without adequate insurance is a legal and financial impossibility. When the insurance market reacts to the threat of drone attacks, the result is a functional blockade that achieves the same outcome as a naval deployment but with significantly lower military risk to the aggressor.
Potential Application in the Baltic and Black Seas
The central question now facing maritime security experts is whether Russia could adopt this same playbook within the Baltic and Black Seas. Both regions contain critical maritime chokepoints essential for energy security and global trade.
By utilizing drones to create a persistent threat environment, a state actor could theoretically drive up insurance costs for commercial vessels entering these waters. This would force shipping companies to either halt operations or rely on shadow fleets, effectively granting the aggressor control over the flow of goods and energy without requiring a full-scale naval engagement.
The reliance of the global economy on predictable insurance costs makes this asymmetric strategy particularly potent. The transition from 56 tankers to just seven in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates how quickly the commercial shipping industry responds to risk, turning a few drone strikes into a systemic economic barrier.
