Ice Filming Legal Risks: Minimize Digital Tracking
- U.S.government agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence organizations, are circumventing Fourth Amendment protections by purchasing commercially available location data from data brokers, rather than obtaining warrants based on...
- For years, concerns have grown regarding the government's access to Americans' location facts.Traditionally, law enforcement needed a warrant, supported by probable cause, to track a person's movements.
- In february 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spent $75,000 on location data harvested from a popular Muslim prayer app, according to documents obtained by the American...
When an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent shot and killed Renee Nicole Good in south Minneapolis on Jan. 7, 2026, what happened next looked familiar, at least on the surface. Within hours,cellphone footage spread online and eyewitness accounts contradicted official statements,while video analysts slowed the clip down frame by frame to answer a basic question: Did she pose the threat federal officials claimed?
What’s changed since Minneapolis became a global reference point for bystander video in 2020 in the wake of George Floyd’s murder is how thoroughly camera systems,especially smartphones,are now entangled with the wider surveillance ecosystem.
I am a researcher who studies the intersection of data governance,digital technologies and the U.S. federal government. The hard truth for anyone filming law enforcement today is that the same technologies that can hold the state accountable can also make ordinary people more visible to the state.
Recording is ofen protected speech. But recording, and especially sharing, creates data that can be searched, linked, purchased and reused.
Video can challenge power. It can also attract it.
Targeting the watchers
Table of Contents
Documentation can be the difference between an official narrative and an evidence-based public record. Courts in much of the U.S. have recognized a First Amendment right to record police in public while they perform official duties,subject to reasonable restrictions. Such as, you can’t physically interfere with police.
However, that right is uneven across jurisdictions and vulnerable in practice, especially when police claim someone is interfering, or when state laws impose distances people must maintain from law enforcement a“`html
Government Agencies are Purchasing Location Data
U.S.government agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence organizations, are circumventing Fourth Amendment protections by purchasing commercially available location data from data brokers, rather than obtaining warrants based on probable cause.
For years, concerns have grown regarding the government’s access to Americans’ location facts.Traditionally, law enforcement needed a warrant, supported by probable cause, to track a person’s movements. Though, agencies discovered they could bypass this requirement by purchasing aggregated, anonymized location data from private companies that collect it from mobile apps. This practice allows them to access past location data and,in some cases,near real-time tracking without judicial oversight.The practice was highlighted in a 2022 report by the Brennan Center for Justice, detailing how agencies are exploiting loopholes in privacy law.
In february 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spent $75,000 on location data harvested from a popular Muslim prayer app, according to documents obtained by the American Civil liberties Union (ACLU). ACLU records show the purchase was made to identify individuals who frequented mosques.
How Location Data is Collected and Sold
Location data is primarily collected through mobile apps that request access to a user’s location services. Many apps collect this data even when the app isn’t actively in use. Data brokers then aggregate this information, often anonymizing it, and sell it to various clients, including government agencies.
The process isn’t always transparent to consumers. Many users are unaware of the extent to which their location is being tracked and shared. Data brokers like SafeGraph and X-Mode (now part of Gravy Analytics) have been key players in this market. These companies collect location data from a wide range of apps and sell it in various formats, including “foot traffic reports” and “patterns of life” analyses. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has extensively documented the practices of these brokers.
In January 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a settlement with Kochava, a data broker, for unlawfully selling sensitive location information. The FTC alleged that Kochava sold location data that could be used to track individuals’ movements to and from sensitive locations,such as reproductive health clinics.
The Legal Concerns: Carpenter v. United States
The Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States (2018) established that obtaining historical cell-site location information (CSLI) requires a warrant. However, the government’s purchase of location data from brokers is argued to circumvent the ruling.
In Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), the Supreme Court ruled that the government’s warrantless acquisition of 12,705 historical cell-site location records violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that CSLI constitutes a type of information that reveals intimate details about a person’s life. However, the ruling did not directly address the issue of government purchases of location data from third parties. Legal scholars argue that such purchases create a “data laundering” effect, allowing the government to access information it would or else need a warrant to obtain.
The Brennan Center for Justice argues that the government’s practice of buying location data “evades the Fourth Amendment” by sidestepping the warrant requirement established in Carpenter. Their report details how this practice undermines privacy protections.
ICE and Area Monitoring
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has utilized specialized tools for “area