Indonesia Straits Access Amid China Conflict
Teh Unacknowledged Gateway: Why Indo-Pacific deterrence Hinges on Indonesia
The strategic calculus of the Indo-Pacific, particularly for australia and its allies, is fundamentally incomplete without a clear understanding of Indonesia’s role. Current deterrence planning, heavily reliant on assumptions of access thru this vital Southeast Asian nation, suffers from a critical flaw: a lack of diplomatic groundwork that acknowledges Jakarta’s steadfast policy of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. This oversight risks rendering allied strategies brittle and vulnerable to miscalculation in potential conflict scenarios.
The absence of explicit agreements mapping out roles, thresholds, or access guarantees between the US, Australia, and key Southeast Asian partners, including Indonesia, is particularly problematic. Indonesia, under President Prabowo Subianto, continues to prioritize its independent foreign policy. While more globally engaged, Jakarta meticulously balances its relationships with the US, China, and other global powers, actively avoiding formal alignment. This makes passive expectations of cooperation during crises a hazardous gamble.
Recent diplomatic engagements underscore this reality. President Prabowo’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to strengthen bilateral ties,including discussions on defense cooperation and Indonesia’s potential full membership in BRICS,highlights Jakarta’s commitment to diversifying its international partnerships beyond traditional Western alliances. This strategic pivot, solidified by Indonesia’s announced intention to join the BRICS bloc in March, signifies a desire to play a more prominent role in global affairs, independent of Western-led frameworks.
Consequently, Australia and its allies must rigorously stress-test their deterrence postures. This involves scenario planning that explicitly accounts for denied access through Indonesia, such as blocked sea lanes or restricted overflight. Without such preparation, strategic plans risk being shaped more by optimistic assumptions than by operational realism.Even if a formal closure of vital sea lanes woudl contravene international law,allies cannot assume Jakarta will strictly adhere to UNCLOS if it perceives its neutrality or sovereignty to be threatened. Political alignment, therefore, remains as critical as legal rights.
For deterrence to be credible, it must be coherent not only to adversaries but also to partners. A fragmented or poorly coordinated response amplifies the risk of miscalculation. Without visible regional alignment, even if informal, allied signals of resolve will lack the necessary traction. Indonesia stands as the key geopolitical node in Southeast Asia. If Jakarta hedges or maintains neutrality, other regional actors may well follow suit. Conversely, quiet, strategic coordination with Jakarta would significantly enhance the legitimacy and operational reach of allied strategies.
Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is not solely a matter of bases and hardware. Its effectiveness is intrinsically linked to access. While initiatives in Guam and Darwin bolster allied presence, their full strategic value is contingent upon enabling regional access, with Indonesia being paramount. Real influence will hinge on building strategic trust through sustained defense dialogue and high-level engagement that respects Indonesia’s autonomy while offering tangible incentives for cooperation.
A forward-looking posture is meaningless without a viable route through Indonesia. It is indeed time for allied strategy to recognize Southeast Asian access not as a mere convenience, but as a core requirement for regional stability and effective deterrence.
Michael Roach is a management consultant and researcher whose work focuses on global economic, geopolitical, and strategic defense trends.