Iran’s Palestine Stance: supporting the Axis of Resistance

Updated June 02, 2025

Tehran’s Meydan-e Pelestin, or Palestine Square, embodies Iran’s past relationship with both Israel⁤ and‍ Palestine.Before the 1979 revolution, ⁣the⁤ square, then called Kakh (Palace) Square, housed Israel’s embassy. In the‍ days following ‍the revolution, Yasser Arafat and his team were welcomed, the building ‍was ceded to the PLO as the Palestinian embassy, and the square was renamed.

Today, a large billboard in the square features an electronic counter displaying the days remaining until the demise of what Iran calls “the Zionist Regime.” Erected in⁤ 2015 by the Basij office of Tehran, the billboard followed the signing of the Joint Complete Plan of Action, or Iran Nuclear deal.

While the Iranian government has been vocal against Israeli aggression since the start of the war on Gaza, its actions have been restrained. An online portal was created for citizens to register to⁤ fight alongside Palestinians, but officials had no program to send ⁢fighters to Gaza. Despite pro-Palestine marches ⁤worldwide, the Iranian government did not mobilize supporters⁣ for demonstrations.

In 2024, Iran directly attacked Israel twice in response‍ to Israeli attacks, including⁢ the strike on Iran’s⁤ consulate in Syria and the assassination ⁤of Hasan Nasrallah. These attacks were calculated to avoid⁢ a full-blown confrontation and did not halt the ⁤offensive in Gaza.

Following Israel’s aerial offensive on Iran in October 2024, coupled with the weakening ⁣of Hizballah and the death of Bashar ‍al-Asad, the future of Iran-Israel escalations remains uncertain. Despite decades of threatening propaganda,even hardliners in Iran recognize the dire consequences of a⁢ full-scale conflict with Israel. The loss of Asad and the supply route to Hizballah has widened the gap between Iran’s rhetoric and its actions.

Members of the Axis of Resistance, including Hizballah, Hamas, Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’bi, and Yemen’s Ansar Allah, depend ⁢on Iranian support. However, their actions against Israel are not always coordinated with Iran. These⁣ groups have ⁢independence‍ and geostrategic significance beyond the⁣ issue of Palestine.

…what is neglected when evaluating these entities as anti-israeli ⁢“Iran proxies” is both their independence of action from Iran and their general⁤ geostrategic significance for Iran aside from the issue of Palestine.

while Hizballah has close ties with Iran, its resistance to Israel is likely decided independently. Similarly, Hamas and Ansar Allah have conducted operations supported by⁣ Iran, but not necessarily initiated by ‍Iran. Hamas’s October 7 attack, for instance, caught Iran by surprise and was detrimental to Iran’s ⁤interests, complicating normalization efforts with the U.S. and saudi Arabia.

Even with‍ solid allegiances, militias act independently. The Iraqi Hashd al-Sha’bi, while loyal to Iran, ⁢is primarily concerned with iraq’s internal dynamics. Hizballah’s exchange of fire with Israel and⁤ the Houthis’ targeting of cargo ships were enabled⁢ by Iranian support ⁤but likely not coordinated‍ with Iran.

The damage inflicted upon Hamas and Hizballah by Israel, along with the fall of Bashar al-Asad, has undermined Iran’s alliance network. Asad’s government guaranteed a supply route to Hizballah, and his⁢ demise has limited Iran’s foreign policy options.

For decades, Iran has supported armed resistance to Israel, while the U.S. and Israel have used Iran’s support to justify their policies in ⁢the middle East. As the situation evolves,Iran will continue to prioritize its strategic interests,and the implications for Palestine and its supported groups remain to be seen.

What’s next

As the ceasefire‍ agreement unfolds and a new U.S. administration takes⁢ office, Iran’s future actions regarding Palestine and its support for regional groups remain uncertain.⁣ The‍ nation will likely prioritize its own strategic interests⁣ in a shifting geopolitical landscape.