Iskander Missiles: Russia’s Supply Chain Exposed
Here’s a breakdown of the key information from the provided text, focusing on the connections between a company owned by the Mittal family, Russia’s missile production, and sanctions loopholes:
The Core Issue:
* Russian Missile Strikes: Russia is using Iskander ballistic missiles (with cluster munitions) to attack Ukraine, causing notable civilian casualties (like the recent attack on Kryvyi Rih, killing 18 including 9 children).
* Key Component: Sodium Chlorate: These missiles require sodium chlorate, a chemical Russia cannot produce in sufficient quality domestically.
* Supply Chain Link: A company called Farg’onaazot (owned by Indorama, which was acquired by the Mittal family in early 2024) is a major supplier of sodium chlorate to Russia. thay shipped $11.4 million in 2024 and $6.9 million in the first half of 2025.
* Irony: The Mittal-owned steel plant in Kryvyi Rih has been repeatedly struck by these same Russian missiles, and employees have been killed.
Sanctions Loopholes & Why This Matters:
* EU Sanctions Exist, But Are Insufficient: Sodium chlorate is on the EU sanctions list as a substance supporting Russia’s military industry.Though, the sanctions aren’t being effectively enforced.
* Three Key Loopholes:
- Incomplete Supply Chain Coverage: Not all chemicals needed for solid rocket fuel are sanctioned.
- Third-Country Suppliers: Sanctions don’t fully address companies outside the EU that supply Russia.
- Unsanctioned Companies: The actual exporters (like Farg’onaazot) and Russian importers are not sanctioned.
* China & Uzbekistan Dominance: China supplies 61% and Uzbekistan (Farg’onaazot’s home country) supplies 39% of Russia’s sodium chlorate imports.
* “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Approach: Some Western firms are indirectly allowing these workarounds to continue, enabling Russia to adapt and maintain its supply chains.
In essence, the article highlights how a company linked to a prominent family (the Mittals) is profiting from supplying a critical component used in missiles that are killing people in Ukraine, and how existing sanctions are failing to prevent this due to significant loopholes.
the article suggests that closing these loopholes requires:
* Sanctioning all solid-fuel chemical precursors.
* Extending sanctions to non-EU subsidiaries of EU companies.
* Imposing sanctions on the key foreign producers (like Farg’onaazot) and Russian importers.