New Nuclear Arms Race Fears: US Strategy for Russia & China Talks

The international community is increasingly concerned about the potential for a new nuclear arms race following the expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia on February 5th. With the last remaining mutual limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals removed, experts are calling for a dual-track approach to address the issue, encompassing both efforts to extend the existing treaty and simultaneous negotiations with China.

According to analysts, a key element of this strategy involves attempting to salvage the New START agreement, despite ongoing disagreements over its implementation. Ariel Petrovich, a professor at the University of Maryland, suggests that the United States should accept Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the treaty, followed by working to resume data exchange, reactivate limited notification systems, and establish a clear mechanism for reinstating mutual inspections.

Researchers at the Council on Foreign Relations, Irene Dumbshir and John Dreinan, concur that accepting the Russian offer is in the United States’ interest, provided Moscow agrees to enter into subsequent negotiations and partially restore the verification system outlined in the New START treaty, while reaffirming a commitment to non-interference in its implementation.

The second, equally crucial component of this approach centers on the United States initiating parallel negotiations with China regarding nuclear arms control. The current size of China’s nuclear arsenal is viewed as a potential benchmark against which the US could reduce its own stockpile. Should Washington and Beijing demonstrate even an informal shared interest in capping nuclear holdings at China’s current level, it could exert international pressure on Russia to join a trilateral agreement establishing a new, lower equilibrium in nuclear forces. Such a move is likely to garner broad international support, representing tangible progress towards reducing the risks of nuclear confrontation.

However, some experts caution against relying solely on New START as a benchmark, warning that it could lead to complacency regarding the need for more substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals – a position aligned with the ethical imperative of disarmament. The question arises, they argue, as to why serious work towards this goal isn’t being undertaken now, before the opportunity for understanding with China is lost.

Several factors underscore the importance of pursuing both tracks concurrently. Conducting discussions with China alongside negotiations with Russia, but independently of them, could provide the United States with a better understanding of Beijing’s intentions and strategic priorities, without complicating the discussions or diverting attention by involving Russia prematurely. Even if these talks do not yield immediate results, they could pave the way for constructive dialogue to address the existing misunderstandings between China and the United States.

A researcher specializing in nuclear policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace emphasized that careful consideration of the long-term consequences of each nation’s policies, coupled with a nuanced understanding of the other side’s perspective, is essential to avoid catastrophic outcomes resulting from strategic errors and miscalculations.

Another reason to prioritize this dual-track approach stems from Russia’s inconsistent behavior during negotiations related to Ukraine, exhibiting contradictory signals. This necessitates a realistic assessment by the United States regarding the prospects for a genuine breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with Russia, particularly given Moscow’s inflexibility and hesitation concerning the Ukrainian crisis. The history of these negotiations is likely to cast a shadow over the possibility of reaching substantial nuclear agreements, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues.

Adding another layer of complexity is the nature of the evolving alliance between China and Russia, which manifests in various forms. While some analysts, including Lyle Goldstein, director of Asian Security at the Defense Priorities center, question the depth of this alliance, the United States cannot ignore concerns about its potential development. In the current transitional phase, the alliances of major powers pose a threat to the fragile nuclear balance, which was already precarious when limited to the relationship between the US and Russia.

China has strong motivations that may lead it to be content with its current nuclear arsenal size. Goldstein points out that Chinese leaders have wisely concluded that even a perceived new Cold War would pose a direct threat to China’s prosperity and national security. Having benefited from decades of sustained economic growth under the Communist Party’s leadership, any massive expenditure on a nuclear arms race would be a costly burden that could jeopardize its political legitimacy.

The substantial costs associated with building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal comparable to those of the United States and Russia represent a significant political and economic risk for China. Diana Chuliova, a researcher specializing in the Chinese economy at the Asia Society’s Center for Analysis of China, notes that Chinese leadership can no longer rely solely on industrial policies and investment to achieve the levels of growth in production and income necessary to ensure continued political legitimacy.

To achieve tangible progress in nuclear negotiations with China, a willingness to cooperate in other specific areas is essential. This includes the potential for tariff reductions as an incentive to advance nuclear talks and ease bilateral tensions, as well as opportunities for collaboration in non-defense technologies, such as joint research into nuclear fusion as a future energy source.

Recent reports indicate that China is making significant strides in this field, as detailed in a study published in the journal MIT Technology Review, titled “Why the US and Europe Are Losing the Nuclear Fusion Energy Race.”

It is reasonable to assume that nuclear fusion research will not remain exclusive to any one country for long, reducing the incentive for non-cooperation. The potential success of fusion energy projects in the long term could alleviate one source of international tension – energy security – alongside numerous other sources of conflict.

However, the proposed approach is not without significant obstacles. The administration of US President Donald Trump has not demonstrated a clear commitment to developing the institutional capabilities necessary to undertake the arduous task of reaching agreements to reduce nuclear weapons with both China and Russia. Instead, it has risked resuming controversial nuclear testing, and the “Star Wars” initiative launched during the presidency of Ronald Reagan suggests that proposals like Trump’s “Golden Shield” missile defense system may hinder negotiations rather than facilitate them.

Sergei Blokyi, a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, recalled that former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had previously offered to reduce and even eliminate nuclear arsenals entirely in exchange for the cancellation of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposal that President Reagan rejected.