Pyongyang – Shifts in personnel at the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea signal a potential recalibration of North Korea’s foreign and domestic policy priorities under Kim Jong Un. While the country’s leader lauded economic achievements and regional standing, the composition of the party’s central leadership suggests a growing emphasis on diplomatic engagement and a diminished role for traditional hardliners focused on inter-Korean relations.
The newly constituted executive body of the Workers’ Party, as reported on , by the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper, reveals the ascendance of Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and Kim Song-nam, head of the Party Central Committee’s International Affairs Department. Neither official held a position in the executive body during the Eighth Party Congress five years prior. Choe Son-hui was elevated to the Political Bureau in December 2024, demonstrating a rapid rise within the regime. Her inclusion in the core leadership structure underscores a potential shift towards prioritizing external relations.
The advancement of Choe and Kim is likely linked to the strengthening of ties with Russia, particularly the reported military cooperation including the alleged supply of munitions. This burgeoning alliance, evidenced by the reported deployment of North Korean personnel to Russia’s Kursk region, appears to be a key factor in the reshuffling of power within the party.
Conversely, the exclusion of Kim Yong-chol, a veteran figure long associated with inter-Korean affairs, and Ri Son-gwon, head of the State Affairs Commission’s Inspection Department (formerly responsible for South Korean affairs), from the executive body is noteworthy. Kim Yong-chol, a prominent figure in past negotiations with the United States and South Korea, held a position in the previous executive lineup. While his absence may be partially attributable to his age – he was born in and is now eighty years old – it also reflects a potential de-emphasis on dialogue with Seoul. Ri Son-gwon’s exclusion further reinforces this trend.
This personnel shift aligns with Kim Jong Un’s increasingly assertive rhetoric towards South Korea, characterized by a rejection of unification efforts and a framing of the two Koreas as inherently hostile “adversarial states.” The absence of key figures traditionally involved in inter-Korean dialogue suggests a hardening of Pyongyang’s stance and a reduced appetite for engagement.
Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister and a key spokesperson for the regime, retained her position in the executive body, although her ranking within the lineup decreased from 20th to 36th. Despite the lower ranking, her role as a primary communicator and defender of North Korean policy remains intact, as demonstrated by her recent statements regarding perceived provocations from South Korea.
The Ninth Party Congress also saw an increase in the representation of military personnel and grassroots workers within the overall delegation of approximately 5,000 attendees. The number of military representatives rose by 16%, from 408 at the Eighth Congress to 474, potentially reflecting the regime’s prioritization of military strength and its growing reliance on the armed forces. The number of “field workers and core party members” also increased, by 4.7%, from 1,455 to 1,524, likely a consequence of Kim Jong Un’s focus on local development initiatives.
The increased representation of these groups came at the expense of other sectors, including a notable 21% decrease in the number of female representatives, falling from 501 to 413. The reasons for this decline are not explicitly stated, but it warrants further observation.
Looking ahead, the revisions to the Workers’ Party’s rules, expected to be finalized during the Congress, will provide further insight into the regime’s evolving ideological and policy direction. Specifically, the incorporation of Kim Jong Un’s “two states” doctrine – the rejection of unification and the portrayal of North and South Korea as fundamentally opposed entities – into the party’s constitution will be a key indicator of Pyongyang’s long-term intentions. The congress is expected to outline a new five-year economic plan, building on the previous plan which Kim Jong Un acknowledged had fallen short of its goals.
The changes announced at the Ninth Party Congress suggest a North Korea increasingly focused on strengthening external alliances, particularly with Russia, while simultaneously adopting a more confrontational stance towards South Korea. The implications for regional stability and the prospects for denuclearization remain uncertain, but the personnel shifts and policy signals emanating from Pyongyang warrant close monitoring.
