Manila is seeking to de-escalate tensions with Beijing, not through overtures of reconciliation, but through a calculated attempt to compartmentalize the dispute over the South China Sea from broader economic and diplomatic ties. The move comes as friction in the contested waters continues, with both sides accusing the other of dangerous maneuvers and violations of maritime law.
Philippine Ambassador to the United States, José Manuel Romualdez, has articulated a strategy of “cooling” relations with China, a phrasing that underscores a deliberate effort to manage a volatile situation. This approach aims to simultaneously lower the temperature of public rhetoric and maintain channels for economic cooperation, without conceding ground on the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea.
Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in tensions, characterized by accusations from Manila of aggressive tactics by Chinese vessels, including the use of water cannons and attempts to obstruct resupply missions to Philippine outposts. , Reuters reported a deepening rift between the two nations, coinciding with a renewed Philippine alignment with the United States. The core of the conflict centers on the Second Thomas Shoal, a feature within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but claimed by China through its expansive “nine-dash line” demarcation – a claim rejected by an .
China consistently refutes the Philippine narrative, asserting its own territorial claims and accusing Manila of infringing upon what it considers its sovereign waters. This dynamic represents a classic clash between legal arguments and the exercise of power, with the Philippines emphasizing international law and China prioritizing effective control. The ongoing verbal sparring between embassies and government officials is not merely rhetorical; it forms part of a broader pattern of psychological and diplomatic pressure accompanying maritime activities.
A complicating factor is the Philippines’ current chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This position provides Manila with both a responsibility and a potential leverage point. Romualdez has explicitly linked the “cooling” of relations with the need for China’s “significant” engagement in finalizing the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea – a set of rules that has been under discussion for over two decades without reaching a conclusive agreement.
Manila is attempting to leverage its ASEAN presidency to amplify diplomatic efforts, hoping to transform the regional forum into a more effective mediator. However, progress is hampered by fundamental disagreements over key aspects of the Code of Conduct, particularly regarding international law, geographic scope, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Many scholars argue, as reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that the current draft does not adequately address these critical issues.
The potential for escalation to armed conflict remains a primary concern, with implications for regional security and international shipping lanes. As U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has pledged increased deterrence and cooperation with Manila, the possibility of U.S. Involvement in the event of a Philippine declaration of war looms large, particularly for North America and Canada.
Beyond the security implications, the economic dimension is crucial. The Philippines recognizes that prolonged conflict would damage investment, tourism, and trade. China remains a significant economic partner for the entire Southeast Asian region, including the Philippines. Beijing understands that offering economic cooperation can serve to divide regional unity and mitigate pressure on the maritime front. However, Manila is wary of a scenario where economic concessions are traded for silence on provocative Chinese actions, seeking to avoid becoming overly reliant on Chinese investment.
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense recently accused Manila of involving external countries and conducting bilateral air patrols, signaling Beijing’s determination to maintain control of the agenda. Naval and air patrols conducted between and , along with a pledge to remain on high alert, demonstrate China’s view of external presence, particularly that of the United States, as a destabilizing factor.
For the Philippines, cooperation with external partners is seen as a crucial deterrent, not aimed at winning a war, but at raising the political cost of Chinese coercion. This strategy relies on diplomacy, alliances, and international visibility to discourage aggressive actions. The pursuit of economic ties is intended as a safety valve, providing a means to sustain the strategy over time.
The Philippines’ approach represents a delicate balancing act: defending its maritime sovereignty, avoiding escalation, and maintaining economic engagement. The success of this strategy hinges, in part, on the willingness of China to accept clearer rules of engagement, a prospect that remains uncertain. The “cooling” advocated by Romualdez is not a path to genuine détente, but rather a calculated attempt at risk management. Manila is seeking to maintain its position while navigating a complex geopolitical landscape, utilizing ASEAN as a platform and upholding the framework of international law.
The completion of the third reading of the Code of Conduct at ASEAN, announced by Chinese diplomat Wang Yi last month, is viewed with skepticism by some analysts. While a step forward, the most contentious issues remain unresolved. If Manila can successfully advance the Code of Conduct during its ASEAN chairmanship, it would represent a significant diplomatic achievement. However, this requires China to accept more defined rules, a condition that is far from guaranteed.
