Protest in Houston, Texas, 2025

Philosopher Michaël Fœssel argues in Libération that the term “democracy” has become a conceptually exhausted label that requires fundamental reinvention. Fœssel claims the word no longer describes a specific political system but instead functions as a generic claim to legitimacy used by opposing political factions to justify their positions.

Writing for the French publication, Fœssel posits that the word has been stretched so thin across different political contexts that it has lost its descriptive power. He suggests that when people invoke “democracy” today, they are often not referring to a set of institutional rules or a specific form of governance, but are instead using the word as a signal of moral correctness.

Why does Fœssel argue the word democracy is “worn out”?

The central thesis of Fœssel’s analysis is that “democracy” has transitioned from a technical political definition to a “floating signifier.” This means the word is now a vessel into which any political actor can pour their own meaning. According to Fœssel, this linguistic drift allows contradictory groups to claim they are the “true” defenders of democracy while actively working against the definitions held by their opponents.

Fœssel argues that this exhaustion occurs because the term is used to bridge the gap between two very different concepts: the procedural act of voting and the substantive ideal of popular sovereignty. When the procedural reality fails to deliver the substantive ideal, the word “democracy” is used to mask the discrepancy rather than to solve it.

The philosopher suggests that the term has become a rhetorical tool for legitimacy. In this framework, calling something “undemocratic” is no longer a critique of a specific legal or procedural failure, but a way of labeling an opponent as illegitimate.

How does the Houston demonstration illustrate this crisis?

Fœssel uses a 2025 demonstration in Houston, Texas, to illustrate how the word operates in a modern political vacuum. He observes that during such protests, the invocation of “democracy” often serves as a unifying cry that does not actually require the participants to agree on what a democratic system looks like in practice.

In the Houston example, the word “democracy” is used by protesters to demand rights or challenge laws. However, Fœssel notes that the term does not describe the actual mechanism of the protest or the specific legal remedy sought. Instead, it functions as a badge of legitimacy that asserts the protesters’ cause is “right” because it is aligned with a broadly positive, yet undefined, concept.

This usage, according to Fœssel, demonstrates that the word has moved away from being a blueprint for government and has become a tool for political mobilization. The Houston manifestation shows that the word can energize a crowd without providing a concrete political program.

What is the proposed path for reinvention?

Fœssel argues that continuing to use the word in its current state only deepens political polarization. Because the term is so elastic, it allows parties to talk past each other while believing they are discussing the same value.

To resolve this, Fœssel suggests a conceptual reinvention. This involves moving away from the generic use of “democracy” and returning to more precise political vocabulary. He advocates for a distinction between different types of democratic desires, such as the desire for better representation, the desire for direct participation, or the desire for legal equality.

By breaking down the monolithic word “democracy” into specific, contestable demands, Fœssel believes political discourse can move from rhetorical warfare to actual negotiation. He argues that the path forward is not to “save” the word, but to admit its current uselessness and build a new language for political legitimacy.

This approach contrasts with traditional political science, which often seeks to “fix” democracy by adjusting institutional levers, such as changing voting laws or adding oversight committees. Fœssel’s argument is fundamentally linguistic and philosophical, suggesting that the crisis is not just in the institutions, but in the very words used to describe them.

The result of this linguistic exhaustion, Fœssel concludes, is a paradox where the word “democracy” is spoken more frequently than ever, yet it describes the actual functioning of power less accurately than it did in previous eras.