Russian Shadow Fleet Used for European Drone Campaign, IISS Reports
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies assessed that a Russian-linked shadow fleet and associated vessels likely served as launch and recovery platforms for a covert drone campaign across...
- The drone activity heavily clustered around sensitive nuclear deterrence infrastructure.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Europe's counter-drone architecture remains mismatched against the threat due to uneven detection, fragmented legal authorities, and slow attribution.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies assessed that a Russian-linked shadow fleet and associated vessels likely served as launch and recovery platforms for a covert drone campaign across Europe between August 2024 and February 2026, according to a report led by senior fellow Charlie Edwards. The drone activity forced repeated closures at major aviation hubs including Copenhagen, Brussels, Munich, Oslo, and Vilnius.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies dataset, researchers compiled 144 incidents across 13 European states. Approximately 48% of the sightings occurred over military facilities, while 18% targeted civilian airports and 26% concentrated over critical infrastructure such as ports and energy sites. Reported incidents surged from an average of four per month to 22.5 per month between September and December 2025, with Germany alone documenting 58 sightings.
Nuclear deterrence sites and maritime launch platforms
The drone activity heavily clustered around sensitive nuclear deterrence infrastructure. Facilities reporting sightings included Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium and Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands—both hosting United States B61-12 gravity bombs under NATO sharing arrangements—alongside the French ballistic missile submarine base at Île Longue, where five drones appeared on December 4, 2025.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies report, a subset of these incidents involved unmanned aircraft launched from shadow fleet tankers, coastal freighters, and smaller craft sailing close to European coastlines with automatic identification system transponders switched off. French naval commandos boarded one suspect tanker, the Boracay, on September 28, 2025, and discovered two employees of a Russian private military company on board.
Danish media sources previously indicated that the drones disrupting flights at Copenhagen Airport for four hours on September 22, 2025, may have arrived via Russian ships. The Swedish military provided the clearest confirmation on February 26, 2026, when forces jammed a drone launched from the Russian signals intelligence ship Zhigulevsk toward the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle during a port visit to Malmö, Sweden.
Gaps in European counter-drone defenses
The International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Europe’s counter-drone architecture remains mismatched against the threat due to uneven detection, fragmented legal authorities, and slow attribution. While initiatives like NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry and new shootdown authorizations in Germany, Lithuania, and Romania have launched, the report warns governments against mistaking activity for achievement.
The planned European Drone Defence Initiative—known as the Drone Wall, with initial operational capability targeted for the end of 2026—will only engage drones once they enter European airspace. Because no mandate exists over the vessels that launch them, and Russian-linked ships can loiter in international waters and deploy drones with impunity, the primary enabling mechanism of the campaign remains intact, according to the report.

