– Russia’s Gray Zone Strategy: A Deep Dive
- Gray zone operations in the West are generally seen as actions that influence the course of a conflict or harm an adversary without crossing into direct kinetic attacks.For...
- There are two main components of Russian gray warfare.
- We will briefly discuss each of these concepts below,along with Russia's gray-zone developments up to its deployments into Ukraine in 2014.
Gray zone operations in the West are generally seen as actions that influence the course of a conflict or harm an adversary without crossing into direct kinetic attacks.For russia, at the core of the gray zone is the concept of “non-contact war” (bezkontaktnaya voina), which is part of a larger doctrinal framework under which gray warfare, also called “new generation warfare” by the Russians, falls. This is not a new concept in Russian military thinking, but it has developed over decades. By examining its evolution over the past thirty years through Russian sources and military thinkers, we can better understand how Moscow uses these concepts today-and how they influence the conflicts we may face now and in the future, enabling the U.S. and our allies to respond more effectively.
There are two main components of Russian gray warfare. Russians rarely use the term hybrid war,which exists in Russian only as a borrowed term from English. The first concept is non-contact warfare-the concept of preparing and softening the battlefield, then minimizing ground engagements for their troops whenever possible. The second concept is Russian intelligence active measures, also known as measures of support. This is also an old idea in russian intelligence circles, but one that has been expanded and intensified in recent decades, incorporating new elements such as cyber operations and cognitive warfare.
We will briefly discuss each of these concepts below,along with Russia’s gray-zone developments up to its deployments into Ukraine in 2014. In the second part of this series, we will analyze Russia’s doctrine as it was applied in the years promptly leading up to and through the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while also considering another key factor for Russia-their ability to evolve and adapt.
Non-Contact Warfare: Origins and Russian Military Necessities
Non-contact warfare developed from what the Russian General Staff and other military thinkers called sixth-generation warfare. The concept grew from the “reconnaissance strike complex” theory and the so-called “revolution in military affairs” at the end of the Cold War.As the Soviet Union disintegrated and the U.S. demonstrated overwhelming air power with NATO and other allies during the Persian Gulf war,former Soviet and Russian generals were not fools. They understood they could not keep pace with the new advancements in air warfare and the technological edge of NATO weapons systems.
russian General Staff thinkers recognized that the Russian Air Force could not match TTPs (techniques, tactics, and procedures), the number of pilot training hours, or the advanced systems that the U.S.and NATO could field, especially given their substantially reduced military budget following the Soviet Union’s collapse. This operational shortfall was further emphasized by the targeted bombing campaigns and overwhelming force deployed by U.S./NATO forces in the Balkan campaigns of the mid-1990s.
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In short, Russian military planners recognized they could not keep pace. NATO airpower and the reach of the alliance into all sorts of regions and conflict zones posed a significant challenge for the russian military and its intelligence services. One of the lessons they understood was that massed tank formations alone would not win wars in the 21st century. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, several critically important writings were produced by prominent Russian general staff figures, such as Generals Slipchenko and Gareev, as well as the future Chief of Staff of the Russian military and currently the commander of the Russian forces in the Ukraine war, Valeriy Gerasimov.
Slipchenko is credited in Russia with coining the phrase “sixth generation warfare” more than twenty years ago. According to Slipchenko, this new form of warfare signified a shift from nuclear-based conflict (which he called “fifth generation”) toward facts-enabled, precision-strike, so-called non-contact wars (he authored a book with that same title). These wars would be fought at a distance, relying on airpower, command, control, intelligence
Russia’s Evolution of Information Warfare Tactics
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Russia has systematically developed and deployed information warfare tactics over the past two decades, evolving from crude propaganda to complex, multi-faceted operations designed to destabilize adversaries and undermine democratic processes. These efforts, initially tested in Georgia in 2008, have become increasingly refined and integrated into Russia’s overall national security strategy.
Early Tactics: Georgia 2008
Russia first demonstrated its coordinated use of information operations during the 2008 conflict with Georgia. While the military performance was mixed, Russian intelligence services actively engaged in the information space.
Russia flooded international media with its narrative of the events, utilizing its “RTV” news network to promote claims of atrocities committed by the Georgian military. The United States and europe were largely unprepared for this coordinated effort, resulting in a limited response to Russia’s military actions and a lack of significant repercussions. This lack of response served as a key lesson for Russia, informing future operations.
The Development of ”New-Generation Warfare”
Following the Georgia conflict, Russian military thinkers began to formalize their approach to information warfare. Building on the ideas of military theorist Slipchenko, figures like Generals chekinov and Bogdanov developed the doctrine of “new-generation warfare.”
This doctrine prioritized information-psychological operations, subversion, and cyberattacks, diminishing the emphasis on conventional large-scale combat. The focus shifted towards manipulating perceptions and weakening adversaries through non-kinetic means.
Gerasimov’s Doctrine and the “second Front”
In 2013, Valeriy Gerasimov, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, publicly advocated for a continuous “second front” of information operations against Russia’s adversaries.
Gerasimov argued that these operations were crucial for weakening an enemy’s ability to resist, emphasizing the importance of proactive information warfare. His speech outlined a strategy of constant information engagement to undermine opponents before traditional military conflict even begins.