Russia’s Internet: Following China’s Control Model?

Moscow is accelerating a shift towards a more tightly controlled internet environment, increasingly mirroring the model employed by China, according to recent analysis and statements from Russian officials. This move, characterized by increased censorship and a push for technological sovereignty, is raising concerns about the future of online freedom within Russia and its potential implications for global internet governance.

The evolving Russian approach was highlighted at the “InfoForum-2026” where Dmitry Gribkov, an aide to the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, explicitly identified mobile devices, satellite internet systems like Starlink and Western-developed email services as instruments of destructive information-technical influence on Russia. This assessment will be formally enshrined in the updated version of the country’s Information Security Doctrine, currently under preparation by the Security Council. The doctrine aims to strengthen Russia’s sovereignty in the information sphere, extending state control over the digital space and personal devices throughout their entire lifecycle – from creation to operation, including systems utilizing artificial intelligence.

This tightening grip on the digital realm isn’t a new development. Russia already ranks among the world’s leading nations in terms of internet censorship and restrictions. Notably, in 2025, intentional internet shutdowns in Russia totaled 37,166 hours, impacting virtually the entire population of 146 million people. However, the new doctrine signals a move beyond simply reacting to perceived threats to proactively controlling the digital infrastructure itself.

The shift is occurring against a backdrop of differing approaches to internet control between Russia and China. While both nations employ censorship, a key distinction lies in their broader economic strategies. Analysis suggests that China prioritizes maintaining a degree of openness to foster innovation and global integration, even while restricting information. Russia, conversely, appears to be converging towards a model more akin to that of Turkmenistan – albeit with significantly greater technical capabilities. This suggests a focus on repression that, while potentially more effective, carries substantial economic risks.

The Chinese model, as described by experts, emphasizes real-time censorship, deploying large teams of censors – both within the government and at major tech companies – to scrub objectionable content from online platforms. Beijing is also willing to completely block access to platforms like Facebook, Google, and Twitter. Russia, in contrast, has historically relied more on chilling effects – intimidating administrators of online platforms and websites to encourage self-censorship – and the spread of disinformation. When these tactics fail, Moscow resorts to more direct measures.

The increasing reliance on Chinese technology is also playing a crucial role in Russia’s evolving internet control strategy. Chinese manufacturers now account for 75% of the mobile phone market in Russia, a 25% increase year-over-year. This dominance allows for greater control and censorship through the pre-installation of state-approved applications on imported devices.

This move towards greater digital sovereignty is not occurring in isolation. Russia and China are actively collaborating to establish an alternative system of internet governance, challenging what they perceive as the hegemonic influence of Western systems. This collaboration extends to the sharing of surveillance and censorship equipment, as well as training in information control techniques.

The implications of this trend extend beyond Russia’s borders. The export of these censorship models to other authoritarian regimes is a growing concern. Countries in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa are being targeted with these technologies and techniques, potentially leading to a global fragmentation of the internet and a decline in online freedom.

The rise of technologies like Starlink, offering satellite-based internet access, presents both a challenge and an opportunity in this context. While Russian officials view Starlink as a tool for destructive information-technical influence, its potential to circumvent state-controlled internet infrastructure could provide a lifeline for citizens seeking access to uncensored information. However, the ability to control or disrupt access to such technologies remains a key priority for Moscow.

The long-term consequences of Russia’s increasingly restrictive internet policies remain to be seen. The economic costs of isolating itself from the global digital economy could be significant. However, the Kremlin appears to be prioritizing political control over economic considerations, signaling a deepening commitment to a more tightly controlled and sovereign internet.