Moscow is increasingly reliant on foreign recruits to sustain its war in Ukraine, turning its migration system into what critics describe as a trap for vulnerable individuals. This reliance reflects not only acute battlefield losses but also the Kremlin’s political calculations to avoid large-scale domestic mobilization.
According to estimates, Russia has suffered approximately casualties – killed and wounded – since the full-scale invasion began in . The UK Ministry of Defence reported roughly 415,000 personnel losses in alone, with averaging 1,130 casualties daily. These figures underscore the immense strain on Russia’s ability to maintain combat operations.
“Russia has no choice but to attempt to continue its foreign recruitment model given Russian military casualties and political realities of a significant mobilization in President Putin’s political bases in Moscow and Saint Petersburg,” said Alex Plitsas, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council.
The recruitment process often exploits economic hardship and legal vulnerabilities. Migrants seeking a better life find themselves coerced into military service, with detention or enlistment frequently presented as the only options. Incentives, while meager compared to Russian army pay scales, are enough to attract recruits from countries with significantly lower wages. Nepali recruits, for example, receive between 75,000 and 200,000 rubles monthly – equivalent to – while Cuban recruits are promised citizenship and financial rewards.
Several governments now describe these tactics as outright human trafficking. Investigations in Kenya revealed citizens being promised stable employment only to find themselves working on drone assembly lines in active war zones. India has documented a similar pattern, with at least 35 of its nationals reportedly sent to the front lines against their will. Nepal, where at least 14 citizens are confirmed dead and estimates suggest as many as 2,000 may have enlisted, temporarily halted work permits for Russian and Ukrainian employment in following public outrage.
Ukrainian prisoners of war report that foreign recruits receive as little as one week of training before being deployed to frontline assaults, often signing Russian-language contracts they cannot understand. Plitsas notes that these recruits are “less effective as a result of the minimal amount of training and poor equipment that they receive upon joining,” characterizing the approach as “throwing bodies at the problem” to fortify the front lines and replace fallen Russian troops.
The political calculation is deliberate. The Kremlin appears to view the loss of foreign fighters as less politically damaging than the loss of Russian citizens, avoiding the domestic backlash that followed the mobilization. Central Asian migrants, in particular, are vulnerable, facing a forced choice between military service and the loss of legal residency since legal shifts in .
While estimates of the number of foreign fighters vary, with independent assessments around 1,500 and Russian officials claiming 30,000, the long-term security implications are significant. Returning combat veterans, even in small numbers, can destabilize regions, bringing with them specialized military skills and potentially exacerbating existing conflicts.
“Foreign fighters returning home often suffer from the same types of combat-related stress disorders as troops but given that they were working for a foreign military, they do not get benefits when they return to their home country,” Plitsas cautioned. “They also have sufficient training to be able to conduct attacks at home, even if they are simplistic, involving only small arms.”
The proliferation of drone technology and tactics, honed in Ukraine, is another concern. Veterans returning to countries in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia could rapidly enhance the capabilities of militant and criminal groups. Ukraine has effectively become a laboratory for modern drone warfare.
Some nations are attempting to address the issue. Kazakhstan opened 709 criminal cases in against citizens who joined Russian formations, while Cuba, which recently joined the BRICS economic bloc, is estimated to have sent up to 20,000 citizens to fight, with 200 to 300 killed. However, accountability remains limited, with recruits often obtaining Russian passports, placing them beyond the reach of their home governments.
Oleg Ignatov, Senior Analyst for Russia at the Crisis Group, offered a more cautious assessment, arguing that the Russian army does not critically depend on foreign mercenaries and that the numbers are relatively small. He also downplayed the risk of radicalization among returning fighters, suggesting that the primary concern is the trauma of war and the lack of support for veterans.
Despite these differing perspectives, the pattern is clear: Russia’s manpower crisis is driving its reliance on foreign recruitment, creating a complex web of exploitation and potential long-term security risks. The offensive exploits global inequality while exporting costs to nations with limited capacity to respond. The situation echoes past conflicts in Syria and Iraq, where returning foreign fighters contributed to regional instability.
