Small State Security & the International Order

Estonia’s historical experience ‍with Soviet control and malign Russian activities has ⁣shaped its national security and regional security⁣ outlook. since Russia launched ⁤a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Estonia ⁣has been relentless ⁢in strengthening its national defense and pursuing an active foreign policy to⁤ prevent ⁢a ⁢similar ⁣fate from befalling itself. This provides‍ researchers a useful case‍ study for the analysis of the national and regional⁤ security interests of ‍small states as Estonia has stood between a rules-based international order that serves ⁣the⁤ interests of small states and one where powerful states prey on the weak.

In 2007, Estonia became one‍ of ⁣the first states in the world to experience cyber and⁣ information threats that disrupted its national security.‍ The removal of the Soviet⁣ era “Bronze Soldier” statue in Tallinn prompted cyberattacks that took down the websites ⁤of Estonian banks,⁢ government agencies, and⁤ media ⁣outlets, ⁢thereby impacting⁤ the lives of ⁤citizens. Concurrently, disinformation from Russian sources exacerbated the public⁤ order situation. Fast forward to‍ the present, Estonia is at the frontlines of Russian hybrid warfare. It experienced⁤ a power outage in December‍ 2024 when the Estlink⁤ 2 subsea cable connecting Estonia to Finland was cut by a vessel believed to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet.The⁤ city of Narva, ⁣which operates one of Europe’s crossing points to Russia, has ⁢seen surveillance blimps from the adjacent Russian town of Ivangorod infiltrate its airspace, and residents have been subjected to Russian influence activities. the threat situation has worsened following the September ⁤2025 intrusion of⁣ russian MiG-31 fighter jets into estonian airspace for 12 minutes.

Estonia’s national⁢ defence and foreign policy initiatives, which serve as deterrence against what Estonia ⁤perceives as ⁣an existential threat from Russia, comprise three main areas. Firstly,⁣ Estonia has been one of the few member states of the North⁤ Atlantic Treaty Organisation⁢ (NATO) that consistently spends about 2% of its GDP on defence since 2013. In March 2025, Estonia decided to raise its ⁣defence spending to⁣ at least 5% of its GDP beginning‍ from 2026. defence investments will be informed by lessons from ⁢the war in Ukraine and⁤ aim to enhance military capabilities in the areas of deep-strike capabilities, air defence, electronic warfare, and drone warfare. The Estonian Defence League, a volunteer military organisation, will also receive funding to enhance its members’ combat readiness. Given the⁣ importance ‍of protecting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, ⁤Estonia aims to ⁤boost its maritime security capabilities, including considering a Littoral Mission vessel (LMV) developed jointly by‍ Sweden’s Saab and Singapore’s ST Engineering.

Secondly,Estonia‍ has leveraged its strengths‍ in digitalisation to develop digital security measures ‍to ⁢ensure its national resilience⁤ against external threats. It established the first data⁢ embassy overseas to protect government data and maintain public services in the⁤ event of major cyber-attacks or military invasion. It‍ also led to ‍the ⁣establishment of the ⁣ Tallinn Mechanism in 2023, an international initiative to support ⁢Ukraine’s cybersecurity needs. Estonia is also ⁤one⁢ of the pioneers of cyber diplomacy and has been advocating ⁤for cyber norms, the submission of international law and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Its advocacy has expanded to include‍ other aspects of the cyber-physical domain, ⁤such as the ‍security of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), which an Estonian ‍delegation addressed during Singapore Maritime Week ⁣2025.

Thirdly, ⁢Estonia supports the regional security architecture by meeting NATO’s 2014 guideline on defence spending—2% of GDP—and backing Europe’s multilateral security initiatives.estonia ⁢hosts‍ the ⁢NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE), organiser of the multinational cyber defence exercise “Locked Shields.”⁢ Its 1st Infantry Brigade base in Tapa hosts a NATO⁤ battlegroup that,alongside the Brigade’s‍ Scouts⁢ Battalion,helps deter invasion as part of NATO’s defence of Europe’s eastern flank from the russian threat.

Estonia will likely sustain or expand these three efforts, as its resources allow. This is crucial, ⁤as ⁣the threat surroundings may worsen. Concerns are ⁤rising that Narva could be‍ the ⁢next target⁢ of Russian expansionism by military force. In 2022, President Putin commented that Narva had historically been part of⁣ Russia and needed to be reclaimed. These fears will likely intensify ⁢in 2026 as Ukraine faces U.S.pressure to cede ⁢territory, enabling Russia to meet its strategic goals. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains committed to ⁣the NATO battlegroup in Estonia. However, the weakening ⁢U.S.-Europe ⁢relations risks undermining NATO.

As ‍the security outlook for Estonia and Europe looks gloomier in 2026, Estonia will also

Estonia Intensifies Diplomatic Efforts to Bolster international Support

Estonia ⁣is significantly increasing ⁤its engagement with nations worldwide, recognizing that broad international cooperation is vital not only for its ⁤own security but ⁣also for upholding the rules-based international order, particularly considering the ongoing war in Ukraine. This push reflects⁤ a growing concern that a fragmented global landscape and perceived inconsistencies in western policy‍ could lead more countries to prioritize national interests over international law.

International cooperation ‍is a key tenet of Estonia’s National ⁣Security Concept, according to the document. Maintaining global attention and support for Ukraine is considered crucial⁢ for⁢ the future of smaller nations.

Estonian⁤ officials have been actively‍ pursuing this expanded⁤ diplomatic strategy‍ in recent months. At the 10th Singapore International Cyber ‍Week in October 2025, Estonia’s Ambassador-at-Large ⁢for cyber diplomacy, Helen Popp, stated that⁣ countries engaging in malicious cyber activities should face repercussions.Russia’s deputy⁢ Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey⁣ Vasilievich Vershinin also attended the⁣ event.

Further demonstrating this commitment, Estonian Foreign Minister⁢ Margus Tsahkna visited Beijing in November 2025 – the first such visit by an Estonian foreign minister in a decade. Tsahkna urged China to halt economic support ‍for Russia’s military efforts and join international pressure for a ceasefire⁤ with ukraine.

These efforts extend beyond Europe, encompassing engagement with states in Asia and those maintaining relations⁣ with Russia. Estonia believes that addressing perceptions of western double standards and navigating domestic challenges⁢ within other nations are⁤ essential to securing broader support for the international order.