Syria and SDF Agreement: ankara’s Cautious Approach

Recent reports have highlighted the agreement ⁣signed between ‍Syrian⁣ President Ahmed al-Share and Mazloum Abdi, commander‍ of the “Syrian ⁤Democratic Forces” (SDF). While some perceive this as a step forward, Ankara maintains a cautiously optimistic stance.

Notably, the United States, through figures like Marco Rubio, has⁢ expressed ⁢support for a political transition in Syria. Rubio stated,”The United States confirms again its support for a political transition that establishes a non-sectarian and credible government,as the best way to avoid further conflicts.”

Ankara’s expectations extend beyond Rubio’s statements.⁣ Recep tayyip⁢ Erdogan remarked that “the implementation of⁣ the agreement’s provisions in its entirety will ⁣contribute to the security⁢ and stability ⁤of Syria and will⁤ benefit all Syrians.”

A high-level⁢ Turkish delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defence ‍Minister Yasar ⁢Gular, and intelligence chief Ibrahim⁤ Kalin, visited the ‍Syrian⁤ capital to address Ankara’s concerns regarding⁢ the agreed‍ roadmap.

Syrian Consensus and Regional Implications

There ⁤is a general consensus in Syria that the March 10 ⁤agreement ⁤between al-Share and Abdi holds significant promise for the country. If implemented effectively, it could unlock political, security, and social opportunities for building a new Syrian state with broad regional and international support. while ⁢ankara is unlikely to obstruct this prospect, it prefers ‍to observe the practical outcomes on the ground, given past experiences.

Ankara’s‍ caution stems partly‍ from statements made by Mazloum Abdi, indicating that many details remain unresolved. This raises questions about whether ‍Abdi will act on ⁢behalf of the SDF⁢ or a new Kurdish entity in northeastern Syria.

Regional support is crucial‍ for successful implementation. currently,Tel Aviv and Tehran are the only entities⁣ that⁢ might benefit from escalating tensions in⁤ Syria. Some SDF leaders’ statements following the agreement contradict Damascus’s interpretations, further complicating the situation.

Ankara’s⁢ Concerns and ⁢Regional Dynamics

Ankara is less concerned with the future relationship between Damascus and Qamishli ⁢or the SDF’s new image. Rather, it⁢ focuses ⁣on external⁣ actors potentially ⁤manipulating the situation to undermine the agreement’s provisions.

Ankara is aware of the SDF’s intention to link ‍the transitional phase ⁢of implementing⁣ the agreement with Syria’s⁣ broader political, security, constitutional, and‍ economic transition.The question remains how the SDF will integrate into the new⁤ government and participate in decision-making during the coming weeks and months,especially before completing the transitional phase outlined in the bilateral agreement between al-Share and abdi.

Erdogan’s ⁤call for patience reflects Ankara’s belief ⁤that welcoming the agreement differs from endorsing ⁣its implementation. Turkey⁤ will⁣ not ⁤accept a new reality imposed ⁤on Damascus and Ankara. The SDF’s commitment to the agreement must⁣ include abandoning its political project in eastern Euphrates and refraining from exploiting opportunities to advance its⁣ agenda.

The resolution of the “Kurdistan workers’ Party” (PKK) necessitates the dissolution of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” and its military and political extensions, given the connection between the Kurdish issue on⁣ both the Turkish and Syrian fronts. Ankara’s primary concern‍ is what follows these developments. Will Washington pressure its SDF partners to implement the agreement in a⁤ way that benefits the Syrian people, or will it⁢ postpone confrontation?

The declared political will to implement the agreement is⁢ a positive step for Syria, paving the way for a shared roadmap to build the new⁣ state, even if implementation is slow and linked to other political and ⁣constitutional⁤ developments.

The image of President al-Share and Mazloum Abdi signing⁣ the agreement⁢ is a significant achievement⁣ towards reintegrating eastern Euphrates into the⁤ central state. Though, ‍Ankara urges caution in monitoring the⁣ next phase, including negotiations, portrayal, commitment, oversight, guarantees,⁣ and dispute resolution.

Ankara understands that regional recommendations to⁣ Abdi will likely promote a new political direction. Thus, it seeks to assess the ⁢plans for Syria before⁤ announcing its new policy in eastern Euphrates and⁤ deciding on troop ‍withdrawal. This agreement not only⁤ restructures Syrian affairs but also redraws regional⁢ balances in dealing with the Syrian issue. understanding Turkey’s reservations and desire for caution is essential.

The events on the Syrian coast tested Syria and its people, who successfully united behind their leadership to confront attempts to undermine national unity. This followed President al-Share’s efforts to resolve Syria’s crises and restore its Arab and islamic standing in ⁣the region. No one wants to see a ⁤repeat of such events in another‍ part of‍ Syria.

The SDF’s only chance is to adhere to ⁢the agreed-upon terms, rather than seeking external support to gain undue ⁤advantages.This partly explains Ankara’s decision to wait ⁤for ‍greater clarity and prevent any⁢ attempts to undermine the⁤ agreement.

Tel Aviv seeks to protect its interests in ⁤Syria through Washington and by⁣ threatening direct ‍military intervention,citing the Iranian card to justify potential chaos.

Ankara faces conflicting policies in syria with Iran, Israel, ⁣and the United States. ‍Without ensuring the resolution of matters in eastern Euphrates and removing this card from those‍ who exploit it against its interests, ⁣Ankara will maintain ⁤its cautious stance, awaiting implementation, even if‍ it contributed to forging⁣ the ‍agreement.