For decades, conventional wisdom held that China’s authoritarian political system would stifle innovation and prevent it from becoming a technological powerhouse. Recent analysis, however, suggests that China has defied these expectations, achieving significant advancements in technology while maintaining firm political control. This phenomenon, dubbed “smart authoritarianism,” represents a departure from traditional models of autocratic governance and poses a challenge to long-held assumptions about the relationship between political freedom and economic progress.
The core of this “smart authoritarianism” lies in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to balance control with selective economic openness. Faced with what political scientist Samuel Huntington termed the “king’s dilemma” – a choice between economic stagnation and regime collapse – China’s leaders opted for a third path: adaptation. This adaptation involved strategically fostering innovation while simultaneously maintaining a tight grip on political power.
Jennifer Lind, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, details this evolution in her new book, Autocracy 2.0: How China’s Rise Reinvented Tyranny. Lind argues that China’s success isn’t accidental, but the result of a deliberate strategy to learn from the experiences of other nations, particularly Singapore and South Korea. These models demonstrated that a state could prioritize economic development and technological advancement without necessarily embracing full-scale democratization.
Initially, China focused on building a highly skilled workforce through massive investment in higher education, particularly in science and engineering. Today, China leads the world in the production of engineering and doctoral graduates in science and engineering, with its universities securing eight of the top ten positions in a 2025 global ranking of research output. The CCP also professionalized its public administration, implementing rigorous civil service exams and prioritizing competence.
However, this pursuit of innovation hasn’t come at the expense of control. The CCP continues to monitor individuals, businesses, and non-governmental organizations, restricting dissent and maintaining a firm grip on information. Rather than relying on widespread, overt repression, the regime has adopted a more nuanced approach, employing targeted measures to suppress opposition and maintain stability. This includes monitoring dissidents, preemptively detaining activists during sensitive anniversaries, and leveraging technology for surveillance.
Lind highlights a shift from “high-intensity” to “low-intensity” repression. While the violent crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989 drew international condemnation, the CCP has since favored more subtle methods of control. This includes outsourcing coercion to “criminals for hire” to avoid direct responsibility for aggressive actions and increasingly relying on artificial intelligence, particularly facial recognition technology, to monitor and control the population.
This “smart authoritarianism” isn’t simply about repression; it’s about adaptation. The CCP recognizes that sustained economic growth requires innovation, and that innovation requires a degree of freedom. However, it also understands that unchecked freedom could threaten its political dominance. It constantly adjusts the balance between control and openness, tightening restrictions when necessary and relaxing them when it serves its interests.
The success of this model is evident in China’s growing dominance in key technological sectors, including electric vehicles, advanced batteries, renewable energy, and telecommunications. We see now competing with the United States for leadership in artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and quantum science – technologies that will shape the future of economic and military power.
However, China’s economic model is not without its challenges. Concerns remain about the country’s reliance on exports and its ability to rebalance its economy towards domestic consumption. As Dinny McMahon notes in a recent Foreign Affairs article, China’s focus on creating new wealth, rather than redistributing existing wealth, may delay the shift towards a more consumption-driven economy. The country’s property market continues to pose a risk to financial stability.
Despite these challenges, the rise of “smart authoritarianism” presents a significant challenge to the established international order. The CCP is actively sharing its technologies and methods of governance with other authoritarian regimes, including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran, potentially exporting a model of governance that prioritizes control over freedom. This raises concerns about the future of democracy and the spread of authoritarianism globally.
Lind concludes that the United States and other democratic nations must adapt to this new reality. They need to leverage their own strengths – world-class educational institutions, well-regulated financial markets, a strong entrepreneurial culture, and a vibrant civil society – to compete with China and promote their values. The ability to manage the rise of a technologically advanced, authoritarian power will depend on the willingness of democratic nations to adapt and innovate themselves.