Trump’s Regime Capture Strategy: From Venezuela to Cuba

The Trump administration’s current strategy of regime capture—characterized by the rapid removal of adversarial leaders to establish vassal states—faces significant limitations in its application to Cuba and Venezuela, despite initial successes in the latter. While the administration has successfully employed “leadership decapitation” in Venezuela, analysts suggest this model may not be replicable in other revisionist states due to differing structural realities and competing global conflicts.

The Venezuela Precedent

The current U.S. Approach to regime change was catalyzed by the capture of former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. On January 3, 2026, a successful raid and arrest of Maduro converted a long-term regional adversary into a state that President Donald Trump has presented as a vassal state.

This operation led the administration to enthusiastically reinstate regime change as a primary tool of U.S. Statecraft. Following the events in Venezuela, the administration attempted to replicate this strategy with other states, including initiating a fresh conflict with Iran on February 28, 2026.

However, the outcomes in Venezuela remain contested. While the strategy of regime co-optation may have produced immediate positive results, such as the release of political prisoners, it is viewed as unlikely to achieve long-term economic stabilization or the eventual re-democratization of the country.

Maximum Pressure on Cuba

The U.S. Has shifted its focus toward Cuba, employing a “maximum pressure” campaign designed to force political and economic liberalization. Since January 2026, the Trump administration has severely restricted oil shipments to the island, exacerbating existing structural challenges and underinvestment in the energy sector.

These policy decisions have led to severe fuel shortages, sharp price increases, and significant energy instability. In March 2026, Cuba experienced three nationwide blackouts.

U.S. Officials have explicitly linked these economic pressures to the goal of changing the Cuban governmental system. On March 17, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated:

Cuba has an economy that doesn’t work and a political and governmental system that can’t fix it. So they have to change dramatically. They’ve got some big decisions to make over there.

Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State

President Trump has further suggested that the Cuban government is nearing a breaking point due to the U.S. Embargo, claiming the island is seeing the end and hinting at potential additional actions.

Strategic Limitations and Risks

Despite the aggressive rhetoric and the precedent set in Venezuela, experts express doubt that a similar military takeover of Cuba is likely. A primary factor is the United States’ current engagement in a widening conflict with Iran, which has created regional instability in the Middle East and raised questions about the replicability of the “regime capture” strategy.

Analysis from the University of Miami suggests that the administration’s approach remains unpredictable. This unpredictability may be a deliberate tactic to keep Cuban counterparts guessing regarding the eventual goals of the U.S. Government.

the transition from the “leadership decapitation” seen in Venezuela to a broader strategy of regime capture across multiple revisionist states faces significant hurdles. The instability resulting from the war with Iran and the specific economic conditions in Cuba suggest that the apparent ease of the January 3 raid in Venezuela may not be a reliable blueprint for broader U.S. Foreign policy.