US-Russia Nuclear Deal: Why It’s Not Enough
- With the New START treaty set to expire, national security experts are reevaluating the future of nuclear arms control.
- Signed in 2010, New START limited each side to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
- Putin has modernized a large percentage of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and is developing novel intercontinental systems.
The expiration of the New START treaty demands a critical reevaluation of nuclear arms control. Our analysis reveals why the existing framework is insufficient to address the emerging threats from Russia and China. We explore the urgent need for the U.S. to adapt its nuclear strategy, including potentially reversing limitations imposed by New START. Former U.S. Strategic Command commander adm. Charles Richard’s insights underscore the “breathtaking” expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, highlighting the changing global landscape. News Directory 3 provides further context on these developments.Should the U.S.prioritize deterrence and what’s the role of secondary_keyword in all of this? Discover what’s next …
Updated June 07, 2025
With the New START treaty set to expire, national security experts are reevaluating the future of nuclear arms control. Some propose engaging Russia in a new agreement, even abiding by New START limits temporarily. However, a shift beyond New START may be necessary to address current global challenges.
Signed in 2010, New START limited each side to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. It also supported modernizing U.S. nuclear forces. Yet, the geopolitical landscape has changed considerably as then. Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated aggressive intentions, and China has emerged as a nuclear power. These developments render New START inadequate for today’s security needs.
Putin has modernized a large percentage of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and is developing novel intercontinental systems. He has also deployed a regional nuclear force of approximately 2,000 short- and medium-range weapons, violating previous agreements.China, meanwhile, is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and collaborating with russia, posing new threats to the U.S.
Former U.S. Strategic Command commander Adm. Charles Richard described China’s nuclear expansion as “breathtaking.” The Strategic Posture Commission noted the “new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats.”
In this evolving world, New START constrains the U.S.’s ability to deter both Russia and China. It also fails to address shorter-range nuclear weapons. Letting the treaty expire and increasing U.S. capabilities is one way to meet the new world order.
Treaty Limitations
Arms control agreements have historically been effective when signatories lacked aggressive intentions. However, nations with such intent have often violated or circumvented these agreements. Putin’s Russia has violated multiple arms control agreements and appears ready to skirt others. These violations make negotiating a meaningful arms control deal with Putin unlikely.
Similarly, nuclear discussions with China seem improbable. China views arms control as a sign of weakness and considers clarity intrusive. beijing is unlikely to engage in arms control until it reaches parity with Russia and the U.S., which is still years away.
In the absence of leadership changes in Moscow and Beijing, a new nuclear arms control treaty is unlikely soon. Thus, strong deterrence policies and posture are essential. Building strategic nuclear forces creates defense dilemmas for adversaries and encourages negotiation. Unilateral restraint and outdated agreements cannot ensure future security.
Strategic Adjustments
To address the two-nuclear-peer environment, the U.S. should prepare for force posture adjustments after New START expires. Reversing changes made to comply with New START is a starting point. Such as, the U.S. deactivated nearly 100 launch tubes on Ohio-class submarines and stripped nuclear capabilities from roughly 30 B-52 bombers. Reversing these moves would enhance U.S. deterrence.
The U.S. should also expand its Strategic modernization Program to respond to the current nuclear landscape. Increasing the number of Columbia-class submarines and B-21 bombers would help maintain credible deterrence against both Moscow and Beijing. The U.S. needs the adaptability to maintain a strategic force capable of deterring one adversary even after absorbing a first strike from the other.
Any new nuclear treaty should set an overall limit for all deployed nuclear weapons, both regional and intercontinental. This flexibility would strengthen U.S. military forces and extended deterrence guarantees. While this approach may increase the total number of nuclear weapons allowed, it would reflect reality.Verifying the number of regional nuclear weapons will be challenging, but it is achievable if both sides recognize the need for limits.
What’s next
Until a new treaty is absolutely possible,the U.S.should maximize the deterrent potential of its current arsenal. Clinging to New START constraints in hopes of coaxing Moscow back to the table is unrealistic. the U.S. must adapt to the challenge of dealing with two nuclear peers increasingly working against its interests to maintain effective nuclear deterrence.