US Strike on Iran: Central Asia Impact? – Eurasia Review
explore teh escalating economic and logistical ties between Iran and Central Asia. Tehran is actively cultivating its role as a crucial trade hub, prioritizing enhanced relations. Uzbekistan and Iran are working to boost trade substantially, with planned transport corridors through Turkmenistan.the potential impacts of U.S.and Israeli actions could disrupt trade, escalating logistics expenses. Recent developments highlight the Iran’s central role in establishing a Eurasian land bridge connecting China and Europe. News Directory 3 provides essential insights into the evolving dynamics.Will the US stance reshape Central Asia’s economic future? Discover what’s next …
Iran Courts Central Asia With Trade, Transport Deals
Tehran is actively strengthening its economic and logistical links with Central Asian nations, aiming to become a pivotal trade hub despite regional risks.
Iran is aggressively pursuing closer ties with Central Asia, prioritizing improved relations as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Tehran aims to substantially increase trade with teh region and establish itself as a key transportation corridor.
In March 2023, Uzbekistan’s foreign minister met with Iranian counterparts to discuss boosting trade and fostering business and peopel-to-people connections.These meetings followed Iranian President Raisi’s September 2022 visit to Uzbekistan, which resulted in 17 agreements spanning energy, transport, and agriculture.
Iran seeks to quadruple trade with Uzbekistan to $2 billion, up from less than $520 million in 2023. It also aims for $1 billion in trade with both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and a 30 percent increase in deals with turkmenistan. Tajikistan’s meaning stems from its shared language, cultural ties, and existing defense cooperation with Iran.
Tehran and Tashkent plan to develop a transport corridor through Turkmenistan, an idea frist discussed between Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev and turkmenistan’s leader Serdar Berdimuhamedov in October 2022. This builds upon transportation cooperation that began in 2017 with the opening of railway and car bridges linking the two countries.
Iranian President Raisi has said Iran can easily connect Uzbekistan to high seas via Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. nargiza Umaidova, of the institute for Advanced international studies in Tashkent, noted Tehran’s key role in forming a eurasian land bridge connecting China and Europe by rail.
Though, recent U.S.and Israeli actions have prompted Uzbekistan to review foreign trade and transport routes, potentially redirecting cargo to safer ports, which could increase logistics costs by 30 percent, Mirziyoyev said.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump has said the United States would attack Iran again if concerns arise about its uranium enrichment. Further military activity could disrupt air travel from Central Asia to West Asia, requiring costly rerouting.
These supply chain impacts are expected to be discussed at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in Uzbekistan in September 2025.
Iran is Turkmenistan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia. The two countries have agreed to a roadmap to reach $3 billion in trade, up from nearly $600 million in 2024, and plan to increase annual cargo transit to 10 million metric tons by the end of 2027.
In 2024, Iran and Turkmenistan agreed to build a new 125-kilometer natural gas pipeline, with Turkmenistan supplying 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, eventually increasing to 40 billion. Iran faces a gas deficit and requires $45 billion in investments to boost production.
trade between Kazakhstan and Iran is just over $300 million annually. Kazakhstan primarily exports agricultural products, while Iran exports foodstuffs and industrial chemicals. In February 2025, the countries signed agreements to boost trade, with Kazakhstan ready to supply Iran with 75 types of products valued at $250 million.
Iran’s appeal to landlocked Central Asian republics lies in its offer of option trade routes. A 2021 conference in Tashkent highlighted Central Asia-south Asia connectivity via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the U.S. and NATO retreat from Afghanistan, the republics have sought alternatives.
New transport projects crossing Iran include the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer multi-mode network spanning India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia. This corridor will utilize Iran’s Chabahar port, strengthening Tehran’s ties with moscow and Delhi. In May 2025, Iran and China launched a railway route from Xi’an to Tehran’s Aprin dry port, cutting travel time from 30 days by sea to 15 days, avoiding the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also plans to build the iran-Afghanistan-China corridor.
Also in May 2025, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkiye met to plan a new transport corridor.The Istanbul-Tehran-Islamabad railway, a 6,500-kilometer rail link, was launched in 2009 and revived in 2021, but faces infrastructure challenges. The Ashgabat agreement proposes a multimodal transport agreement between several nations, potentially connecting with the INSTC. The Southwest Corridor, from the Persian Gulf/india-Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Europe, may reduce transport time from India to Europe from over 30 days to 10-12 days.
Central Asia may utilize Iran’s ports, Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, despite the risk of U.S. and Israeli attacks. In january 2022, Iran and Uzbekistan agreed to grant Uzbekistan access to Chabahar port. Iran offers a large internal market of over 90 million people, stability compared to Afghanistan and Pakistan, functioning government agencies, and ports near Indian and Persian Gulf markets.
The central asian republics do not share Washington’s grievances against Iran, especially given the economic costs of joining a U.S.campaign against the islamic Republic.
These states seek a reliable partner to address instability in Afghanistan. Iran shares this interest and has no territorial ambitions in Central Asia,though it seeks political support and a larger regional role through groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Institution (SCO).
Iran’s position as a transport node makes it a target for potential U.S. and Israeli actions. Increased economic activity could benefit Tehran, while destabilizing regional supply chains could harm Iranian citizens. Washington may be willing to sacrifice central Asia’s interests to isolate Iran.
The U.S.and Israeli stance toward Iran may hinder economic progress in the region. it remains to be seen whether Washington will prioritize its goals of isolating Iran over supporting sovereignty and economic prosperity in Central asia.