Iran Courts⁤ Central Asia With Trade, Transport Deals

Tehran is ⁣actively strengthening ⁢its economic‍ and logistical links with Central Asian nations, aiming to become a pivotal trade hub despite regional risks.

Iran is aggressively ⁤pursuing ‍closer ⁢ties with Central Asia,⁢ prioritizing improved relations as ⁤a cornerstone of⁢ its foreign⁢ policy. Tehran aims to substantially increase ⁤trade with teh region‍ and ⁤establish itself as a key transportation corridor.

In ‍March 2023, Uzbekistan’s foreign minister met with Iranian counterparts to discuss boosting trade and fostering business and peopel-to-people connections.These meetings followed Iranian President Raisi’s September ‍2022 ⁤visit ⁣to Uzbekistan, which resulted in 17 agreements spanning energy, transport, and agriculture.

Iran seeks⁤ to quadruple trade with⁤ Uzbekistan⁢ to $2 billion, up ⁤from less than⁣ $520 ⁢million in 2023. It also aims for $1 billion in trade with both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and a 30 percent increase in deals with turkmenistan. Tajikistan’s meaning stems from its⁣ shared language, cultural ties, and existing defense cooperation with Iran.

Tehran and Tashkent plan to develop a‍ transport corridor through Turkmenistan, an idea frist discussed between Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev and turkmenistan’s leader Serdar Berdimuhamedov in⁣ October 2022. This builds upon transportation cooperation that began in 2017 with the opening of railway and car bridges linking the two countries.

Iranian President‍ Raisi has ⁢said⁢ Iran can⁤ easily⁣ connect Uzbekistan to high seas via Turkmenistan⁣ and Afghanistan. nargiza Umaidova, of the institute for Advanced international studies in ‍Tashkent, noted Tehran’s key role ⁤in forming a eurasian land bridge connecting China and Europe by ⁤rail.

Though, recent U.S.and Israeli actions have ⁢prompted Uzbekistan to ‍review foreign trade and transport‍ routes, ⁢potentially redirecting cargo to safer ports, which could increase⁢ logistics costs by 30 percent, Mirziyoyev said.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has said the United States would attack Iran⁢ again if ⁢concerns arise about its uranium enrichment. Further military activity could disrupt⁢ air travel from Central Asia ‍to West Asia, requiring costly rerouting.

These supply chain ⁤impacts are expected to be discussed at the 7th ‍Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of⁣ Central Asia in Uzbekistan in September 2025.

Iran is Turkmenistan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia. The two countries have agreed to a roadmap to reach $3⁢ billion in trade, up from nearly $600 million in 2024, and plan to ⁣increase annual cargo transit to 10⁤ million ‍metric tons⁣ by⁤ the end of 2027.

In ‍2024, Iran and Turkmenistan ⁣agreed to build a new 125-kilometer natural‍ gas pipeline, with Turkmenistan supplying 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, eventually increasing to 40 billion. Iran faces ⁣a⁤ gas deficit ⁤and requires $45 billion in investments to boost ⁤production.

trade between Kazakhstan and ⁤Iran is just over $300 million annually. Kazakhstan primarily ⁣exports agricultural⁤ products, while Iran‍ exports foodstuffs and industrial chemicals. In February 2025, the countries signed ⁤agreements ⁤to boost trade,⁤ with Kazakhstan ready to supply ‍Iran with 75 types of products valued at $250⁣ million.

Iran’s appeal to landlocked ⁣Central Asian⁣ republics lies in its offer of option trade routes. A 2021 conference in Tashkent highlighted Central Asia-south‍ Asia connectivity via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the U.S. and‍ NATO retreat from⁤ Afghanistan, the republics have sought alternatives.

New⁣ transport⁤ projects crossing Iran include the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a⁤ 7,200-kilometer multi-mode network⁣ spanning India, ⁣Iran,⁤ Azerbaijan, and Russia. This corridor will utilize Iran’s Chabahar port, strengthening Tehran’s ties with moscow and Delhi. In May 2025, Iran and China launched⁣ a railway route from Xi’an to Tehran’s Aprin ⁣dry‍ port, cutting travel time ⁢from 30 days⁢ by sea to 15 days, avoiding the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also plans to build the iran-Afghanistan-China corridor.

Also in ‍May ⁢2025, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, ⁢Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkiye met to ‍plan a new transport corridor.The⁤ Istanbul-Tehran-Islamabad railway, a 6,500-kilometer rail link, was launched in⁤ 2009 and revived in ⁢2021, but faces ‍infrastructure challenges. The Ashgabat agreement⁣ proposes a multimodal transport agreement between several nations, potentially connecting with the INSTC. The Southwest Corridor, from the Persian‍ Gulf/india-Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Europe, may reduce transport time from India to Europe ⁢from over 30 days to 10-12 days.

Central Asia may utilize Iran’s ports, Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, despite the risk of U.S. and Israeli attacks.‍ In january 2022,⁣ Iran and Uzbekistan agreed to grant Uzbekistan⁣ access ‍to Chabahar port. Iran offers ⁣a large internal market of over 90 million people, stability compared to Afghanistan and Pakistan, functioning government agencies, and ports near⁢ Indian and Persian Gulf markets.

The⁤ central asian republics ⁢do‍ not share ⁢Washington’s grievances against Iran, especially given⁤ the economic costs of⁢ joining a U.S.campaign against the islamic Republic.

These states seek a reliable partner to address instability in Afghanistan. Iran shares this interest and has no territorial ambitions in Central Asia,though it seeks political support and a larger regional role through groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Institution (SCO).

Iran’s ⁢position as‍ a transport node makes it⁢ a target for potential U.S. and ⁢Israeli actions. Increased economic activity could benefit Tehran, while destabilizing regional⁢ supply chains ⁢could harm Iranian citizens. Washington may be willing to sacrifice central Asia’s interests to isolate Iran.

The ⁤U.S.and Israeli⁢ stance toward Iran may hinder economic ⁣progress in ⁣the region. it⁤ remains to be seen whether Washington⁢ will prioritize its goals of isolating Iran over supporting sovereignty and economic prosperity in Central asia.