Why Russia’s Cynical Elite Turned to Imperial War

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Four and a half years after Russia launched its massive assault against Ukraine, the Kremlin has managed to seize only a fraction of Ukrainian land. Ultimately, half a million Russian troops have perished, the domestic economy is barely surviving, ties between Moscow and the West are completely ruined, and the nation’s dependence on Beijing deepens continuously.

Yet there is no sign of Russian President Vladimir Putin seeking peace as his army continues its bombardment of Ukraine. Ilya Budraitskis and Ilya Matveev examine the driving forces behind this costly conflict in their new book, Russia’s New Imperialism, published by Stanford University Press in September 2026 for $26 across 240 pages.

Two Sides of a Divide in Russian Analysis

Analysts of Russia have long been caught on two sides of a stark divide when interpreting Moscow’s actions. One side views Russia as nothing more than a money-making mafia racket populated by cynical political entrepreneurs scrambling to enrich themselves. This school of thought holds that the corrupt Russian elite has no truck with grand ideas or ideology.

Critics in the alternative camp perceive ideological motivations everywhere, maintaining that the Russian state is driven by nationalism, imperialism, and a population of zealous believers. Observers in this camp claim that Russia is driven by centuries of military culture and a deeply ingrained determination to subjugate its neighbors, leaving it capable of behaving in no other way.

Imperial Ideology Grew Out of Cynical Worldviews

Drawing on a complex framework of Marxist theory, political theorist Budraitskis and political economist Matveev contend that these opposing viewpoints are actually two manifestations of the exact same phenomenon. The authors argue that ideologization did not simply replace cynicism, but rather grew directly out of it.

According to their analysis, the shift in Russia from the pragmatic economic imperialism seen during the 2000s to the erratic, ideology-driven aggression observed in 2014 and onward stems from a single, continuous underlying dynamic. The Kremlin’s new imperial ideology emerged by pushing its cynical worldview to its limits and absorbing every aspect of the state into a machine of violent state antagonism.

Roots in Post-Soviet Criminal Subcultures

The authors, both staunchly anti-war Russian exiles, trace the violence of the early post-Soviet years to a loss of faith in the Soviet system and the emergence of two distinct subcultures. These were the vory v zakone, or thieves in law, and patsany, meaning lads.

The former constituted a parallel organized criminal caste that began cooperating with Soviet bureaucrats in the 1980s before fighting to control state assets after the Soviet collapse. The latter comprised thuggish urban street gangs, with each subculture offering belonging, protection, and identity while remaining deeply suspicious of outsiders.

From Rapacious Capitalist Beast to Regional Aggression

Budraitskis and Matveev connect this domestic culture of survival and violence directly to the early Putin era, where everyone viewed post-Soviet life as a social Darwinist perpetual struggle. In the 2000s, a new kind of imperialism emerged that relied on economic methods and pursued economic goals as an extension of Putin’s wheeling and dealing approach.

At the same time, Russia remained dependent on the Western economic system while trying to assert dominance over its region despite lacking global superpower status. This dynamic fostered a sense of constant conflict that drove the Kremlin’s actions, such as the brief war against Georgia in 2008, which the authors argue was designed partly to weaken Tbilisi’s gas transit projects that bypassed Russia.

[I]deologization did not simply replace cynicism