Will They Be Held Accountable for Their Failures? – The Cipher Brief

Analysis of⁣ Russian Intelligence Services’ Performance in⁣ Ukraine (2024)⁣ – Key ​Takeaways

This ⁣text provides a critical assessment of the ‌performance ​of Russia’s three main ⁣intelligence agencies – the ⁢SVR,GRU,and FSB – in relation to the‍ war in Ukraine,as of 2024. Here’s a breakdown‍ of‌ the key ‌findings:

Overall Theme: ‍All three agencies have demonstrably failed to achieve their​ objectives in Ukraine,despite⁣ likely avoiding significant repercussions. ​the failures are‍ attributed to poor intelligence gathering, miscalculations, and ineffective operational execution.

1.SVR⁣ (Foreign ⁤Intelligence Service):

* Failure: ⁤ Failed​ to accurately assess the political and economic situation in Ukraine, leading‍ to misjudgments about the likelihood of a speedy Russian victory⁣ and Ukrainian collapse. ⁤Failed to anticipate the strength of⁣ Western support for Ukraine.
* ⁤ Consequences: Likely to undergo modest reorganization, but will largely ‍avoid significant negative ⁤consequences.

2. ⁣GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate – formerly known as the GRU):

* ⁤ Failures:

​ ⁢ * ‍ Covert Operations: Failed attempts at sabotage and intimidation in Europe (Lithuania, DHL plane crash) backfired, strengthening European resolve to support Ukraine.
‍ * Military ⁣Operations: Wasteful deployment of ​highly-trained Spetsnaz units ⁣on the⁤ battlefield, resulting in heavy ‍casualties⁤ and a loss of their⁤ “elite” reputation. The⁤ initial decapitation ‌strike and Hostomel airport seizure were complete failures.Spetsnaz were⁣ often misused in conventional ‍combat roles.
* ‌ Reorganization: ⁤ Has already undergone a formal name ⁣change to “GU” and created a new “Department for Special Tasks” (SSD) – a large unit consolidating direct action capabilities (similar to the CIA’s Special Activities Center, but much larger).
* Consequences: Likely to ⁣grow in size despite failures,with only modest ⁢reorganizations.

3.FSB (Federal security Service):

* ⁣ ‍ Failures:

* Strategic Miscalculations: ⁣ The FSB was primarily responsible for war planning, ‌notably the “hybrid” and “non-contact war” aspects, and‍ was wrong about everything – Ukrainian resistance, Western ⁢reaction, and Russian capabilities.
* Operational ineffectiveness: FSB Spetsnaz (Alpha and Vympel) performed poorly. Cyberattacks by ⁣the FSB’s ‍16th Center were unsuccessful in altering the course of the war. Reliance ​on criminal hackers ‌didn’t yield results.
*⁤ ​ Paradoxical ⁢Outcome: Despite⁣ the⁤ most ⁣egregious failures, the FSB ⁤is likely⁣ to gain power and influence due to its role as Putin’s ​former agency ‍and its function as a secret police force.
* Consequences: ⁣Likely to be the most affected agency,​ but not through‌ accountability – rather, through increased power.

Key Implications:

* Intelligence Reform ‌is Limited: Despite clear failures, the Russian intelligence services are unlikely to undergo substantial reform or face significant accountability.
* Bureaucratic Inertia: ⁣ The agencies are ‍large, bureaucratic ‌organizations that are likely to prioritize self-preservation and expansion over ⁢genuine advancement.
* ‍ Putin’s Loyalty matters: ‍ The FSB’s likely increase ⁢in power highlights the importance of personal ‌loyalty to ‌Putin within the Russian security apparatus.
* ​ GRU’s Prestige ‌Damaged: the GRU’s ​reputation⁤ as an elite special​ operations force has been severely damaged by its performance in​ Ukraine.

In essence, the text paints a picture of a ⁢Russian intelligence apparatus that is deeply flawed, prone to miscalculation, and resistant to ⁣meaningful change, even​ in the face of demonstrable failure.