In 2021, U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that Beijing had set a serious goal of controlling Taiwan before 2027. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then,” he warned. “And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.”
This prediction, which gained so much attention in Washington that it came to be known as the Davidson Window, quickly spurred action.Within the year, Congress authorized $7.1 billion for the newly created Pacific Deterrence Initiative, designed to boost the United States’ capability to deter Chinese military adventurism, and the policy community scrambled to develop strategies to counter Chinese military threats. The U.S. government offered so much diplomatic, political, economic, and security support to Taiwan that some veteran taiwan watchers began to remind U.S. policymakers of the importance of reassuring China that the United States doesn’t support Taiwan independence.
In the past few years, tho, many observers began to question the Davidson Window.They think China’s military is not ready for such a difficult operation-and for good reasons. An amphibious landing followed by an assault on a mountainous island like taiwan would be operationally difficult. And China’s military is embroiled in rounds of purges that have ousted numerous senior generals. The costs and consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine,meanwhile,have demonstrated the difficulty of a takeover and the devastating result of sanctions. china has enough other priorities, the theory goes, that Taiwan is unlikely to be on the agenda today.
But what this theory misses is that the Chinese view on Taiwan changed significantly in 2025. In the past year, China has been highly vocal about the inevitability and indisputability of what it calls its “reunification” with Taiwan. Even though skeptics would say China has always made these claims, this time something is different: this time China believes it. the chinese policy community is increasingly convinced that an effort to assert control of Taiwan will happen, and it could even be imminent if Taiwan dose something to provoke Beijing.The essential driver of this new assessment is U.S.politics and the perception that U.S. President Donald Trump has little interest in defending Taiwan militarily. Augmenting it is indeed Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s own tenacious pursuit of unification and the decline in popularity of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. simply put,China sees an possibility that may not arise again down the road.
There are moments in history when multiple internal and external factors act jointly to promote a certain outcome-when “perfect storms” brew and the seemingly unimaginable starts to take hold. Given the current circumstances, such a perfect storm for Taiwan might be coming sooner than peopel think.
THE XI LEGACY
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Although Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027, it is hard to imagine that China would take action that year. The Chinese Communist Party will have its 21st Party Congress in the fall of 2027,and in Chinese politics,the priority during any given party congress year is absolute stability. All decisions are evaluated first and foremost against whether they could cause even the slightest possibility of political uncertainty. The CCP is a fundamentally conservative organization, and any major decisions that could challenge the delicate balance of power within the party during a time of heightened intraparty politics would likely be postponed.
But 2027 is critical for another reason: it marks the end of Xi’s third term in charge. Discussions about the succession plan for Xi, who will be 74 years old at that time, have been quiet but ongoing. The dominant theory among observers is that Xi won’t hand over power all at once, but as early as 2027 he could give up one of the three top leadership roles: president (head of the government), general secretary of the party, and chairman of the Central military Commission. He would then incrementally give up the others, with the option to suspend or abandon this process at any time.
As 1949, the CCP led
US-China Trade and Taiwan’s Political Landscape
President Biden’s governance is navigating a complex relationship with China, balancing economic interests with concerns over Taiwan’s security and democratic future. Recent policy shifts, including discussions about reducing tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for increased chip production in the US, and a perceived softening of stance on Taiwan, are impacting both US-China relations and Taiwanese domestic politics.
US Trade Negotiations with China
The Biden administration reportedly discussed a potential deal involving $250 billion in chip production within the united States, contingent on lowering tariff rates on Chinese goods to 15 percent. This approach signals a willingness to engage in economic negotiations with China,potentially prioritizing economic benefits.
This potential shift in trade policy is detailed in reports from Reuters and Bloomberg.
Concerns Over Taiwan
President Biden’s approach to China, especially regarding Taiwan, has sparked concerns among some observers. His perceived indifference to Taiwan’s democratic status has fueled speculation that he might pursue a “grand bargain” with China, potentially trading economic concessions for China’s endorsement of its position on Taiwan.
These concerns are echoed in analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations, which highlights the delicate balance the US must maintain between its economic interests and its commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Impact on Taiwanese Politics
The shifting US policy and perceived weakening of support for Taiwan have negatively impacted the ruling democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its leader, President Lai Ching-te (William Lai).Beijing distrusts Lai, believing he promotes Taiwanese independence.
In the summer of 2023, Lai supported a recall effort targeting legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), but the effort failed, contributing to a decline in his popularity. This event is covered by Taiwan News.
The changing public opinion in Taiwan offers Beijing hope that the Taiwanese population may be moving away from the pro-independence DPP and potentially embracing unification. This shift is a key factor in Beijing’s calculations, as reported by Voice of America.
Potential for Escalation
Any action by Taiwan perceived as provocative could trigger a strong reaction from China. This was demonstrated in December 2023, when the United States announced an $11.1 billion arms deal with Taiwan.
The arms sale, detailed in a Department of Defense press release, underscores the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense capabilities, but also carries the risk of escalating tensions with China.
