Bloodlines and Battlefields: Unraveling the Complex Roots of Sudan’s Devastating Fourth Civil War

D. Abdel Moneim Mukhtar

University professor specializing in health policies based on scientific evidence

Assuming that the Fourth Sudanese Civil War, which began in April 2023, was the result of a regional conspiracy imposed on Sudan, ignores the true nature of the conflict. It is true that external factors influence, but this analysis simplifies matters to an adverse level. The conflict we are witnessing today is essentially a fierce internal competition between two military forces and two generals, whose roots go back to the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces and the arrival of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to the position of Commander in. -Chief of the Armed Forces.

This conflict is not simply a reflection of conflicting ideologies, be it between Islamists and secularists, or as a result of the rivalry of regional powers such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Rather, these external factors are only curtains added later to cover deeper tensions, embodied in the military competition between two warring forces seeking to control power in central Sudan: the traditional Sudanese army led by Al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces led by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).

Looking at the history of Sudan, we see how internal conflicts between civil, political and religious forces contributed to military coups. The competition between the two major parties (Al-Umma and Al-Ittihadi) and between their Sufi leaders (Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghani) led to the overthrow of three civilian governments. In the 1958 contest, the Umma Party blocked the federalists’ return to power, and the army saw itself as the ideal alternative. In 1969, disagreements between the parties over their positions on the Communist Party and Gamal Abdel Nasser helped pave the way for Jaafar Numeiri’s coup. In 1989, the conflict between the government and the main parties over the war in the south led to another coup led by Islamists led by Omar al-Bashir.

What is worth noting is that these coups occurred as a result of power struggles between civilian forces that did not have armies, yet were able to destabilize the political system. So how about a clash now between two heavily armed and heavily funded armies? The tensions between Burhan and Hemedti went beyond the usual issue of influence; It has developed into an existential conflict between two military organizations, each seeking absolute supremacy. The start of a war between them was inevitable given the nature of this rivalry.

Whether the Islamists remained in the army or were eliminated, whether Egypt supported the Sudanese army or the United Arab Emirates supported the Rapid Aid Forces or even either either side, this war would have happened. The main driver of the conflict was not so much external interference as the deep institutional rivalry between the two armies and the growing personal tension between Burhan and Hemedti. Tensions rose as the RSF developed into a massive military force, initially created to assist and then continue to compete with the regular army. Al-Burhan tried to limit this threat and protect his influence within the army, without making any political concessions to Hemedti, which made the conflict between them inevitable.

We must realize that dual leadership, whether civilian or military, remains a sure recipe for conflict and division. The ideological conflict promoted by internal and external parties is only a cover for a deeper conflict. In essence, this conflict is evident in Sudan, resulting from a competition for power and control between two military powers, led by two generals who seek absolute hegemony.

The Fourth Sudanese War, therefore, is not just another chapter in a series of regional conflicts, but rather the product of internal historical accumulations over decades of competition and conflict between the political and military forces in Sudan.

Thus, external intervention is subsequent, not prior, and necessary but not sufficient in the fourth civil war in Sudan.

As a result, external intervention is subsequent, not prior, and necessary, but not sufficient in the current fourth civil war in Sudan.