China & Biological Warfare: Rethinking Global Security
- Outdated Cold War strategies for countering weapons of mass destruction are inadequate for today's threats, particularly from China, analysts say.
- China's advancements in biotechnology, combined with its military objectives, expose vulnerabilities in Western forces.
- A successful strategy must consider China's potential use of advanced biological weapons in regional conflicts, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan.
China’s rapid strides in biotechnology demand a fresh look at global security.This analysis argues outdated Cold War strategies are insufficient to deter China’s biological warfare capabilities. Primary_keyword: biological warfare threat poses new challenges, necessitating a shift in U.S. defense strategies. Considering China’s military objectives and advancements, this article highlights the need for agencies like the defense Department to focus on core competencies, particularly protecting critical infrastructure. Secondary_keyword: Deterrence by retaliation and denial face notable hurdles given China’s nuclear arsenal and advantages in the Indo-Pacific. News Directory 3 provides insights into why policymakers must re-evaluate biological weapons threats. Discover what’s next in adapting to these evolving dangers and securing global stability.
Adapting to Modern Biological Warfare: Deterring China
Updated June 10, 2025
Outdated Cold War strategies for countering weapons of mass destruction are inadequate for today’s threats, particularly from China, analysts say. The focus should shift from large-scale battlefield scenarios to address China’s evolving capabilities in biological warfare and biotechnology.
China’s advancements in biotechnology, combined with its military objectives, expose vulnerabilities in Western forces. Deterrence strategies that worked in the 20th century may no longer be effective, especially given China’s nuclear capabilities.
A successful strategy must consider China’s potential use of advanced biological weapons in regional conflicts, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan. Traditional methods of deterrence and defense may not suffice against China’s modern capabilities and nuclear arsenal.
To adapt, U.S. executive agencies must refocus on their core competencies. The Defense Department should concentrate on purposeful biological threats, while Health and Human Services addresses natural biological threats. This requires strong leadership and leveraging Congress’s interest in biotechnology for national defense.
The Defense Department should establish an office to research threats and harness new biotechnologies. Protecting critical defense infrastructure, especially in the Indo-Pacific, from novel biological threats is also vital.
Deterrence by retaliation is unlikely to work,analysts argue,as the U.S. would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons in response to a biological attack that did not cause meaningful casualties. China’s strategic nuclear arsenal and conventional superiority in the Indo-pacific further complicate the possibility of retaliation.
Deterrence by denial is also questionable, given that few countries have the resources to develop robust defenses against all potential biological threats. Cuts to U.S. health security measures and underfunding of chemical and biological defense programs undermine this approach.
Ultimately, deterring China from using biological warfare agents in a regional conflict may not be feasible. Recognizing this limitation is the first step toward developing realistic concepts and capabilities.
The challenge lies in convincing policymakers to consider how adversarial nations might use biological weapons to support their national priorities and military objectives. Biological weapons are supplementary to conventional and nuclear arms,with limited utility in specific situations.
China’s conventional and nuclear strength weakens arguments for deterrence by retaliation, while U.S. underinvestment in military biodefense and public health undermines deterrence by denial. Policymakers and military analysts must move away from Cold War-era threat models and re-examine the biological weapons threat.
What’s next
Moving forward, policymakers and military planners must collectively re-examine the biological weapons threat and take steps to move away from 20th-century threat models for biological defense. This includes addressing vulnerabilities in critical defense infrastructure and prioritizing the development of new defense strategies.