The European Union is undoubtedly an economic power and a democratic bastion (despite authoritarian advances in some of its members), but it has so far failed to combine and direct both attributes into a common foreign and defense policy worthy of the times that run.
John Paul Glasinovic Vernon is lawyer
As we have mentioned on previous occasions, 2024 is a super electoral year, not only because a good part of the countries have gone through and will go through votes to renew their authorities, also because many of these processes will affect the configuration of the international order.
Among the decisive instances will be the election of the European Parliament, which in turn defines the European Commission.
In these turbulent and uncertain times, many elections are taking on the character of crossroads. That is, choosing one option or another will imply a different path, from which there will be no return. It is no longer the same direction with variations to the left or right. And the European Union, as a bloc, is not immune to this dilemma either.
The reconfiguration of the world order, although it is moving towards the consolidation of a multipolar order, more complex and revolving around alliances as was the scenario prior to both world wars, is also moving towards a separation into two large fields, under the hegemonies. from the United States and China. That dynamic could only be altered in the present time by the European Union, which could play the role of intermediate alternative and counterweight to the zero-sum alignment that stimulates the possibilities of a global conflict. But for that, urgent changes are required within it.
The European Union is undoubtedly an economic power and a democratic bastion (despite authoritarian advances in some of its members), but it has so far failed to combine and direct both attributes into a common foreign and defense policy worthy of the times that run.
Unfortunately, the global trend requires rearmament, because more and more actors are unaware of International Law and the multilateral system installed after World War II, guiding their actions exclusively based on their national interest and their hard power.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia is one of the examples of this and is the most serious threat to the European bloc since the fall of the USSR. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the European Union is at stake in Ukraine. If it is unable to neutralize that threat on its own continent and on its doorstep, then all else is in vain and not only does it risk becoming embroiled in a larger conflict, it could also implode.
Although the bloc has managed to establish a common position of support for Ukraine, there are several of its members who do not directly cooperate and would like to reverse what is being done. This means that not enough is being done to help Ukraine, neither in financial matters nor in the military sphere. This was evident in recent months during which the United States froze its aid due to opposition from the Republicans, a period during which the Europeans not only failed to fill the void, they also failed to fulfill their own commitments regarding military supplies.
Although all countries are making efforts to reach at least 2% of the product in terms of military spending, encouraged by NATO, that is not enough because the majority has a large gap in lack of investment in their armed forces. A much greater expense is then imposed, understanding that it is no longer optional, but an imperative in the face of a real threat and the probability of not counting on the intervention of the United States, or not as the main force in a continental war episode.
The increase in spending by each country must also entail coordination that affects the recovery and development of the European military industry. Currently it is atomized and is not capable of producing ammunition and weapons to sustain a war. In simple terms, if a conflict broke out now, European armies would run out of ammunition in a few weeks, basically depending on external shipments (mostly the United States), which from a logistical point of view would be very complex.
In this context, European foreign policy must go closely hand in hand with its defense policy. But this requires strong leadership within the bloc and the alignment of its members, starting with the most important ones.
This is where we converge on the European Parliament elections that will take place from June 6 to 9.
Considering the political panorama of the members, the probable projection is that the right-wing parties will increase their seats and become the majority. But that increase will be partly due to the rise of a harder right, represented by parties such as Vox in Spain, Chega in Portugal, National Rally in France, Brothers of Italy, Alternative for Germany, Swedish Democrats, Fidesz of Hungary, Law and Justice of Poland, Freedom Party of Austria, and so on in practically all EU partners.
A characteristic of these parties is that, as a general rule, they are opposed to deepening integration, if not outright in favor of leaving it. In the case of constituting a majority, it would be like leaving the cat in charge of the butcher shop, that is, weakening coordination and community policies to favor devolution and greater autonomy for each member. In short, it would truncate the project of European unity with its obvious counterpart of a decrease in the power and influence of the European Union in the world, also risking a war with Russia as a continuation of that in Ukraine.
A first dilemma then, if the right triumphs, will be the position of the more traditional right, the one that has traditionally been brought together in the conservative bloc. Pact with your right wing or seek alliances to your left? Of course that will depend on the magnitude of the advance of the anti-EU parties. If they are in the majority on the right, then the conservatives’ margin will be reduced and the quality of their leadership will be essential to avoid being a tailgater.
A second dilemma, given the eventuality of this electoral scenario, is who will be the candidate for president of the European Commission. Current President Ursula von der Leyen could run for re-election for a second 5-year term, as long as she is nominated by the European Council. This brings together the heads of state and government of the 27 members and the general rule is that decisions are made by consensus. Among the exceptions is the proposal of the president of the European Commission, which must subsequently be ratified by the absolute majority of the European Parliament.
The proposal to the European Parliament of a candidate for the presidency of the Commission, in the absence of consensus, operates by qualified majority. This will be defined with a minimum of 55% of the members of the European Council, which includes at least 15 of them, and which represents at least 65% of the total population of the Union.
There is already talk of other alternative candidates to Ursula von der Leyen. President Macron has mentioned that it could be Mario Draghi who was president of the European Central Bank and also Prime Minister of Italy, with exceptional performance in both positions. Draghi is not only convinced of the European project that he knows from the inside, he is also a leader who has good relations with the entire political spectrum. Furthermore, he has been very vocal that the European Union requires urgent renovation to adapt to new times, which includes reforming the decision-making system. In other words, it has a clear route map.
If Draghi is nominated, he would also drive a wedge into the hard right, making it difficult for the Brothers of Italy, Prime Minister Meloni’s party, not to vote favorably for him, possibly influencing others in the sector.
There is still more than a month left for these elections, but there are already many movements fully aware that the European Union and its project are risking their future. Will European voters think the same? And will the leaders of the main member countries be up to the task, even in the event of a bad election for the future of the bloc, to not derail its course?
All that remains is to wait, without forgetting that in politics a month is a long time.
