Kaliningrad, Russia – A recent interview with former US Army Europe commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (Ret.), has sparked renewed discussion regarding potential NATO responses to Russian aggression, specifically outlining scenarios involving the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Hodges suggested that in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member state, Kaliningrad would be a primary target and could be “disabled” within 24 hours.
The comments, made to German publication Die Welt and subsequently reported across international media, came in the context of a staff game simulating a Russian operation in the Suwalki corridor – a strategically vital land connection between Poland and Lithuania. The exercise, which prompted an international outcry, questioned NATO’s ability to respond cohesively to a limited Russian incursion. Hodges, writing in the British newspaper The Telegraph, described the scenario as presenting “valuable lessons” and emphasized the need for preparedness.
Hodges’ assessment centers on the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, a heavily militarized Russian territory situated between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. The exclave hosts Russian air defense systems and ballistic missiles, making it a key strategic asset for Moscow. According to Hodges, a swift neutralization of Kaliningrad’s military capabilities would be crucial in deterring further Russian escalation and demonstrating NATO’s resolve.
However, the former commander also cautioned that the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – should be prepared to defend themselves independently for a period of up to two weeks before substantial reinforcements could arrive. This timeframe, he explained, accounts for a worst-case scenario where NATO is caught off guard and logistical challenges hinder the rapid deployment of troops through the Suwalki corridor. He highlighted the critical importance of military mobility, specifically citing potential bottlenecks in the German railway system, even in a pre-conflict crisis situation.
“The main problem… is access to German Deutsche Bahn railways and DB Cargo services in peaceful conditions,” Hodges stated. “If, despite the crisis, we are not yet formally in a state of armed conflict, all railway traffic in Germany, Poland and other countries is provided as usual. You can’t just clear all the tracks overnight in order to, say, transfer a tank brigade in 24 hours.” He acknowledged that while he believes German and Polish railways would ultimately prioritize military transport, the initial delay could be significant.
The discussion also touched upon the need for Germany to establish a “state of tension” or “case of defense” – a legal framework that would allow for the prioritization of military transportation. Implementing such a framework, however, requires a two-thirds majority vote in the German Bundestag, presenting a potential political hurdle.
Hodges expressed concern about the adequacy of existing NATO deployments in the Baltic region, even with the planned expansion of the German Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania. He emphasized the importance of considering all elements of military power, including air support from allies like Finland, Sweden, and Norway, as well as long-range weaponry and, crucially, air defense capabilities. He noted that ammunition stockpiles were consistently depleted during exercises, highlighting a systemic issue of underinvestment in essential supplies.
“I am almost sure that Kaliningrad would have been disabled in the first 24 hours,” Hodges asserted, outlining a strategy involving both kinetic and non-kinetic means. “I imagine non-kinetic means of influence as follows: the use of cyber attacks and electronic warfare to disable as many weapons as possible, especially air defense and long-range systems… Then I allow the use of kinetic long-range precision weapons – artillery or missiles at key facilities in Kaliningrad.”
He suggested that allies, including Poland, could participate in strikes against Kaliningrad even without direct US involvement. He also pointed to the Kola Peninsula in northern Russia, home to key bases of the Russian Northern Fleet, as another potential area for pressure.
The interview underscored concerns about Poland’s willingness to commit ground troops to Lithuania in a crisis, suggesting that Poland might prioritize its own defense given the potential for a direct attack. Hodges reiterated the importance of maintaining a strong NATO presence in the Suwalki corridor to deter Russian aggression.
Hodges’ remarks come amid heightened geopolitical tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While he acknowledged the value of staff games like the one conducted by Die Welt in identifying vulnerabilities and prompting discussion, he also expressed concern about the negative perception of Germany’s preparedness and resolve. “As an American living in Germany, I am sensitive to this,” he said. “Germany is the strongest and most important country in Europe. And so it should remain. The external image matters.”
The discussion highlights a growing debate within NATO regarding the appropriate response to potential Russian aggression and the need for increased preparedness, particularly in the Baltic region. The potential for a rapid, decisive response – including the neutralization of Kaliningrad – is being actively considered as a means of deterring further escalation and safeguarding the security of NATO’s eastern flank. The former commander’s statements serve as a stark reminder of the potential consequences of miscalculation and the importance of maintaining a credible deterrent in the face of a resurgent Russia.
