How Iran’s Victory in Conflict Could Strengthen the Regime’s Long-Term Legitimacy

A conflict intended to destabilize the Islamic Republic of Iran may instead provide the ruling clergy with long-term symbolic legitimacy and internal cohesion if the state remains intact, according to an analysis published by E-International Relations on June 26, 2026. The report suggests that external military pressure can inadvertently revive the regime by framing the struggle as an existential defense of the nation and the faith.

The central thesis of the analysis holds that the Islamic Republic’s survival through a major conflict would transform the war into a source of political strength. This dynamic allows the ruling clergy to consolidate power by presenting themselves as the sole protectors of Iranian sovereignty against foreign intervention.

How does external conflict create internal cohesion for the regime?

The analysis argues that war can trigger a “rally ’round the flag” effect, where domestic opposition is sidelined in favor of national unity. When a state faces an external threat, the ruling authority often uses the crisis to label dissent as treason or foreign collaboration.

In the Iranian context, the ruling clergy can leverage such conflicts to bridge gaps between different social classes and political factions. By centering the narrative on a struggle against an external enemy, the regime can distract from internal grievances, such as economic instability or demands for social reform.

This process of cohesion is often managed through state-controlled media and the security apparatus, which frame the conflict not as a political struggle, but as a religious and national necessity. According to the E-International Relations piece, this creates a form of “symbolic legitimacy” that persists long after the fighting ends.

What historical precedents support this thesis?

The most prominent historical example of this phenomenon is the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from September 22, 1980, to August 20, 1988. Historians and political analysts have frequently noted that the invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq helped the nascent Islamic Republic consolidate its power.

During the 1980s, the Iranian government used the war to purge internal political rivals and justify the expansion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The conflict allowed the regime to mobilize the population through a mixture of nationalism and religious fervor, effectively silencing critics of the 1979 Revolution.

The IRGC, in particular, grew from a small paramilitary force into a dominant economic and military institution during this period. The war provided the justification for the IRGC to embed itself into every level of the Iranian state, a structure that remains in place today.

How does the role of the United States influence this dynamic?

The analysis highlights the role of the United States as a primary antagonist in the regime’s narrative. US policies, including the “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions and targeted strikes, have historically been used by Tehran to validate its claims of Western hostility.

When the US engages in direct or indirect conflict with Iran, the ruling clergy often presents the US as the “Great Satan,” a term used since the 1979 Revolution. This framing transforms geopolitical disputes into a moral and religious struggle, which appeals to the regime’s core supporters.

The E-International Relations report suggests that a war meant to “break” the Islamic Republic may instead reinforce the perception that the regime is the only entity capable of resisting foreign domination. This perception can alienate moderate elements of the population who, while opposed to the clergy, remain deeply nationalistic.

What are the long-term risks of regime survival after conflict?

If the Islamic Republic emerges from a conflict intact, the analysis warns that the regime’s grip on power may become more rigid. The “symbolic legitimacy” gained from surviving a war can be used to justify further crackdowns on internal dissent for decades.

This survival can lead to a cycle where the regime actively seeks or provokes external tensions to maintain its domestic legitimacy. By keeping the threat of foreign intervention present, the clergy can maintain a state of perpetual mobilization.

The result is a state where internal cohesion is not based on popular consent or economic prosperity, but on a shared sense of siege. This dynamic makes the regime more resilient to internal pressure, as the fear of external collapse outweighs the desire for domestic change.