Gamal Abdel Rahim Saleh
Our dear friend, the brilliant journalist, Professor Mohamed Latif, in his famous daily analysis dated 3/26/2023, criticized the calls of the writer of these lines for international intervention as a solution to the current Sudanese crisis. Despite my personal satisfaction that the issue of the call for international intervention is present in the public arena, regardless of the position of others on it, Professor Muhammad Latif’s intervention strayed greatly from addressing the essence and details of what I called for.
It seems that Professor Muhammad Latif’s enthusiasm for Professor Faisal Abdel Rahman Ali Taha’s opinion about the end of the era of guardianship and mandate at the level of international law, which is a correct opinion in reality, makes him forget that I am calling for international intervention under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter, which is an existing, influential and used clause. Indeed, it is It was even used in our country, where the United Nations Mission for Darfur (UNAMID) was formed under its umbrella. It is true that in one of my articles I called for international guardianship, and not the United Nations guardianship, which no longer exists, given that international intervention, regardless of the name, is a type of guardianship in its essence, based in all cases on the assumption that the situation in our country needs someone to correct its course. , from outside its borders. In fact, the matter of international interference in our affairs is not new. It has become one of the signs of our failure, and here we see before our eyes the factions in the country resorting to successive external platforms, starting from Jeddah and not ending with Manama and Algeria, and international envoys flying and landing their planes without interruption, so what remains but the use of military force? To curb those carrying weapons on all sides, according to the perspective of the writer of these lines?
What only a fool or someone with a purpose would disagree about is that what the rescue did – the systematic destruction of the public service apparatus, both its civil and military sides, the deliberate tearing apart of societal fabrics, the intentional corruption of political life, the clear obstruction of the path of modernity and development, and the reprehensible sabotage of the justice system – is unprecedented and cannot be compared. Neither with what other military governments committed nor with what civilian governments failed to do. However, it must be recognized that the country’s crisis, and the failure of its state agencies, began to manifest itself and the first national government had not completed its second month, as the tragedy of Amber Joudeh stood as a harbinger and first witness to the imbalance of justice, the absence of professionalism from the regular forces, and the weakness of the sensitivity of the political elites in responsibly dealing with issues. critical countries; It is also worth noting that the defect in the culture and doctrine of the armed forces became apparent before the nascent state completed its second year, represented by the attempted coup by Al-Sagh Abdul Rahman Kubaida in June 1957. The Sudanese state, as the late great John Garang described it, is irreparable (too). deformed to be reformed), and nothing more!
The writer of these lines has published 6 lengthy articles in which he listed, in detail, his opinion and reasons supporting the idea of the inevitability of international intervention (the honorable reader will find a list of them at the end of this article), so we decided not to burden the reader by repeating the evidence and reasons he provided that confirm its legitimacy and demonstrate its legitimacy. ; However, we believe that there are three basic questions that every opponent of international political and military intervention must answer, which are, respectively: Is it possible that the heavily armed forces will allow the establishment of civilian rule and reform of the state? Is the solution based on international intervention effective enough to allow the continuation of civilian rule? What must civil and democratic forces do in order for the international community to respond to the intervention, and for its intervention to succeed in achieving its goals?
Are heavily armed forces likely to allow for civilian rule and state reform?
There are four armed forces active in the field now and they have a deep and rooted hostility to civilian rule, and they have committed crimes on a large scale. There is no possibility that they will bow their heads and accept democratic civilian rule, even if temporarily. They are the leaders of the official army, the Rapid Support, the Islamists of the National Congress, and The movements of Minawi and Jibril and those who wrapped them around. The problem is not only its monopoly on weapons, but also its low moral and professional standards. I do not think we need to provide proof of its lack of credibility and reliability, and its practice in lying, demagoguery, spin, spin, and playing with minds. Examples are endless, and we have provided extensive examples of them in our previously mentioned articles. A protester may protest to us that Lieutenant General Kabashi’s recent statements in Gedaref may indicate something other than what we say, but his words and actions are the same, and since his appearance in our lives after the overthrow of Al-Bashir, they will not help unless his statements in Gedaref are a kind of exchange of roles between insecure leaders, or an expression About the annoyance of the expansion of the Islamists of the National Congress at the expense of the official leadership.
In the absence of an influential bloc among the four armed groups that supports the Forces of Freedom and Change, or the presence of a strong and influential military wing of these forces, there is no room for them to seize control of power and reform the entire security institution. This is the bright truth, and if there is anyone who doubts our judgment, let him come to us with something that will remove the veil from our dull eyes! I point out here an important fact that we must keep in mind, that restoring the momentum of the street is very difficult, if not impossible, after weapons became the master of the situation, and after the forces of large sectors of that street were exhausted by starvation, destruction, and dispersal into exile.
Is the solution based on international intervention effective enough to allow the continuation of civilian rule?
Experiences of international intervention have lacked efficiency in most cases, for reasons that can be exposed later, which constitutes one of the drawbacks causing discomfort with that option on the part of most democratic civil forces. Many of these forces also have legitimate reservations, such as saying that the countries concerned with the intervention have priorities and interests that are more important to them than preoccupying themselves with an unfortunate country like ours. We have responded to this in our previous articles. However, as I propose this intervention as a treatment for our country’s worsening crisis, I consider the following facts in my estimations:
* The situation in Sudan is a real threat to regional and global peace and security, and neither the neighboring countries nor the West have an interest in that.
* International military intervention has proven its effectiveness in controlling the balance of power between the opponents in at least two apparent cases, and here I am referring to what that intervention caused in terms of restraining the Serb army in the Bosnian case and Gaddafi’s army in the Libyan case, both of which were close to deciding the outcome of the civil war in their favor. In both cases, the decision to intervene was issued by the UN Security Council based on Article Seven.
* Sudan has its own experience in Darfur, where the mixed international force intervened based on the same item. It is true that Al-Bashir’s regime, with its long history in Loulwa and the bribery of all parties, both local and African, has limited the effectiveness of that intervention, but reality confirms that that intervention played a major role in stopping the bloodshed and reducing the suffering of the people of Darfur.
* The glorious December Revolution found widespread sympathy at the global level, and its first government in particular found high acceptance and respect, whether from the governments concerned by this desired international intervention, or the civil society organizations active in it. In our opinion, this makes a fundamental difference that favors success in that endeavor, given the presence of a democratic civil bloc in the country, regardless of the labels, that has the ability to manage the state’s direction in the event that weapons bearers are restrained.
* The fear of some that the countries concerned with international intervention will put their interests ahead of the interests of our people if they intervene is plausible. The street, with the spirit of revolution flowing through its arteries, has the ability and will to correct any deviation of the forces of those countries from their tasks. The positive thing is that restraining the military forces will open a wide way for the people to complete the tasks of their revolution, and for the street to regain its momentum.
* Let us be clear, the mission of foreign intervention must not stop at stopping the war and separating the forces. Rather, it must go beyond that to ensure a transitional period that establishes a new Sudan with a new national army.
What must civil and democratic forces do in order for the international community to respond to the intervention, and for its intervention to succeed in achieving its goals?
* Moving forward, as it is the largest container for civil and democratic forces currently, despite my reservations and the reservations of others regarding some of its affairs and the formative errors that accompanied it, it must capture the idea and place it among the logical options and alternatives.
* It must improve its condition, expand its scope, and give greater representation to youth, in order to become a true spokesman for the revolution.
* It must also open platforms for responsible and transparent dialogue within it regarding the proposed approach. At the same time, it must, with its significant connections, exert the necessary pressure on governments and pressure groups in the countries concerned to place the issue of the people of Sudan at the top of its agenda and agendas.
* The call for international intervention is not just a one-time invitation card to attend a social or political event, as much as it is a long, arduous and complex process that requires formulating clear and sufficient reasons and continuous communication with those concerned.
* Marketing and brandishing the idea of calling for international intervention represents in itself a powerful card in the hands of democratic civil forces.
I conclude my article by pointing out that the delay in resolving the country’s crisis portends a great evil that is coming in the near future. Even if we have been talking so far about four armies, the course of events will soon put us at the mercy of warlords, whether on the part of Islamist extremists, or on the part of the field commanders of the Rapid Support, which has expanded horizontally in a massive way, without this expansion being based on an established military doctrine. Or loyalty to a central, inspiring idea, which made him carry the seed of his division and division within him.
Below are 6 articles we have previously issued that contain extensive monitoring of the reasons that support our point of view in order to call for international intervention (they can be reviewed, of course).
1- A message in the “Taqaddum” mail: Today is more appropriate than tomorrow!
2- A message in the “Taqaddum” mail: an invitation to think outside the box
3- Taqadum must demand that the international community save Sudan today, not tomorrow
4- Yes to international trusteeship, without an exclamation mark, Professor Othman Mirghani
5- Yes to international intervention and UN guardianship as a necessary option (a two-part article)
6- The future of Sudan between the options of national dialogue and internationalization (a two-part article)
gamal.a.salih@gmail.com
