Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has conducted a series of military exercises in recent weeks, heightening tensions in the Middle East as the United States maintains a significant naval presence in the region and negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain stalled. The drills, focused on the strategic Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, come amid increasingly stark warnings from both Washington and Tehran.
On , units of the IRGC Ground Forces carried out maneuvers at the Madinah ol Munawarah operational base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan province, as well as on unspecified islands in the Persian Gulf. The base is located near the coast of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s traded oil passes.
According to analysis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the islands referenced are likely the Nazeat Islands, situated west of the strait and hosting IRGC facilities. These positions would allow Tehran to project power and potentially obstruct navigation in the event of regional escalation.
The exercises follow a naval drill conducted by the IRGC on , coinciding with the eve of renewed nuclear talks. A separate exercise, “Intelligent Control of the Strait of Hormuz,” took place on , during which a naval version of the “Seyed-3” air defense missile system was reportedly launched, intended to provide a regional air defense umbrella for Iranian vessels.
These military displays occur as President Donald Trump has warned Tehran of consequences if it fails to curb its nuclear program, issuing a ultimatum giving Iran ten days to reach an agreement or face potential military action. The Pentagon has responded by deploying multiple carrier strike groups to the region, including the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R. Ford, marking one of the largest U.S. Naval deployments in the area in recent years.
Recent statements from Iranian officials suggest a willingness to retaliate against any military action. High-ranking Iranian commanders have warned they might target ships in the Strait of Hormuz in response to a potential U.S. Strike. The recent exercises reportedly focused on “sea-to-coast fire” operations, aimed at neutralizing approaching vessels.
The drills included the use of drones for target identification and Shahed attack drones for neutralization. Iranian officials also reported the use of new missile systems and simulations of both offensive and defensive electronic warfare scenarios.
Negotiations between Iran and China for the acquisition of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles are nearing completion, according to Reuters, citing six sources with knowledge of the discussions. The deal, for Chinese-made CM-302 missiles, could significantly enhance Iran’s ability to target U.S. Naval forces. The supersonic weapons can travel roughly 180 miles and fly low to evade ship defenses. While no delivery date has been agreed upon and the number of missiles and financial terms remain unclear, the negotiations reportedly accelerated following last year’s 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
Carlos Novoa, an international journalist and analyst, stated that Iran possesses the capability to temporarily disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, but likely only for a limited duration – “a couple of days, two or three perhaps, no more.” He noted that the United States has sufficient military power to quickly neutralize any offensive or blockade attempt by Iran. However, even a brief interruption could have a significant global economic impact, given the volume of oil that transits the waterway.
Andrés Gómez de la Torre, a specialist in defense and intelligence, described Iran’s approach to a potential conflict with the United States as “defensive and asymmetric,” characterized by a resistance warfare mindset and the limitations of a military apparatus reportedly weakened by the conflict with Israel last June. He suggested that the Iranian military was “strongly hit” by Israel, as well as alleged intelligence operations, leaving Tehran with “slowed” capabilities that are difficult to rebuild quickly.
Gómez de la Torre believes Iran would likely pursue a strategy of attrition and indirect response, relying on its experience within the “belt of fire” – the network of non-state actors comprising the so-called Axis of Resistance. This structure could activate parallel fronts and expand the risk of regionalizing the conflict, with indirect actions against Israel. The Strait of Hormuz would remain a strategic pressure point in the event of escalation.
Beyond China, Iran is also seeking to strengthen its military capabilities through increased cooperation with Russia. According to reports, Tehran signed a contract in to acquire 500 Verba portable air defense systems and 2,500 9M336 infrared-guided missiles from Moscow. This acquisition followed the war with Israel, which exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defenses.
Novoa cautioned against overstating the extent of this cooperation. While Russia and China may offer diplomatic support and criticize Washington internationally, they are unlikely to risk direct confrontation. “In realpolitik, neither Russia nor China is going to help Iran with weapons,” he said. Russia remains focused on the war in Ukraine, and China prioritizes its long-term strategy and managing tensions with Washington.
Gómez de la Torre added that while Iran has strengthened military cooperation with Russia, providing drones crucial to the conflict in Ukraine, there are no mutual defense clauses in the bilateral agreements, unlike Russia’s pacts with North Korea. Russia has also been reluctant to supply Iran with advanced S-400 air defense systems and has offered only a limited number of Sukhoi-35 fighter jets.
Gómez de la Torre suggests that Iran is preparing to resist rather than launch a conventional war, relying on diminished capabilities, limited external support, and asymmetric deterrence as its primary tools against a potential clash with the United States.
