New START Expiration: Rising Nuclear Arms Race Fears | Global Issues

The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5th has removed the last remaining constraint on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, raising concerns among international observers about a potential acceleration of the nuclear arms race. The treaty, originally signed in 2010, capped the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each country at 1,550, and established protocols for transparency including data transfers, notifications, and on-site inspections.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres described the treaty’s end as a “grave moment for international peace and security,” urging both nations to negotiate a successor framework “without delay.” Without a binding agreement, Guterres warned, the world faces a situation with no limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the countries possessing the vast majority of global nuclear weapons.

The collapse of the New START agreement marks the effective end of arms control cooperation between Washington and Moscow that had been a defining feature of the post-Cold War era. The situation is further complicated by evolving geopolitical dynamics and the emergence of new nuclear powers.

According to a statement delivered on February 6th to the Conference on Disarmament, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno indicated a need for a “new architecture” that accounts for all Russian nuclear weapons – both existing and novel systems – and addresses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal. This ambition, however, faces significant hurdles.

While an informal understanding between the U.S. And Russia to temporarily abide by New START limits appears possible, the prospects for negotiating a new treaty involving the three major nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, and China – are considered challenging. China has so far expressed no interest in discussing limitations on its nuclear arsenal, which, while smaller than those of the U.S. And Russia, is steadily growing.

Russia, for its part, has signaled a willingness to engage in negotiations only if the U.S. Addresses concerns regarding American missile defense plans and non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities. The United States, meanwhile, is seeking discussions on Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons and the development of novel systems, such as long-range nuclear-armed torpedoes, which were not covered under the New START treaty.

The expiration of New START also comes at a time of heightened global tensions and the rise of authoritarian nationalism, factors that are not conducive to progress on arms control. John Burroughs, Senior Analyst at the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, notes that this situation endangers decades of progress in halting the growth and reducing the size of nuclear arsenals, despite the explicit objective of “cessation of the nuclear arms race” being enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPT, a cornerstone of global security, originally envisioned a three-pronged approach to halting the arms race: a cap on strategic arsenals held by the U.S. And the Soviet Union, a ban on nuclear explosive testing, and a prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Following the treaty’s entry into force in 1970, the U.S. And Russia – then the Soviet Union – engaged in bilateral negotiations that led to treaties limiting delivery systems and missile defenses.

However, the size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile continued to increase until the mid-1980s. Subsequent agreements, most notably the 1991 START I treaty, dramatically reduced the arsenals of both countries, though still leaving in place a substantial number of warheads capable of causing widespread destruction.

With the demise of New START, there is now no treaty regulating the nuclear arsenals of the United States, Russia, China, and other nuclear-armed states. China is actively expanding its arsenal, and both the United States and Russia are poised to follow suit, diversifying their arsenals and increasing the capabilities of their delivery systems. This trend, Burroughs argues, represents a repudiation of the NPT’s objective of halting the nuclear arms race and a failure to uphold the treaty’s requirement of good faith in pursuing that objective.

The upcoming five-year Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference presents an opportunity to reverse this dangerous trend. Burroughs suggests that the conference could serve as a platform for launching an initiative to address the escalating nuclear arms race and reaffirm the commitment to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. He emphasizes that arms control efforts should not be limited to the three major powers but should also encompass multilateral negotiations towards broader nuclear disarmament.

The situation demands urgent attention and a renewed commitment to diplomacy and arms control. The absence of binding limits on nuclear arsenals increases the risk of miscalculation, escalation, and the catastrophic use of nuclear weapons. The international community faces a critical juncture in its efforts to prevent a return to the dangerous dynamics of the Cold War.