The phenomenon of the “Rapid Support Forces” militia and its leader, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), was not an individual phenomenon, but rather a phenomenon with complex societal and political dimensions. I have written on these pages more than once, regretting the image in which the former Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and a number of his ministers and “experts” stood like polite students behind “MP” Hamidti, “the head of the Economic Committee,” listening with reverence to the pearls of a leader’s judgment. The Janjaweed, which provides fatwas and advice on economic policies to purporting to be international economists, many of whom hold Ph.D.s and were originally appointed to their positions as “technocrats”.
It is indisputable that the establishment and support of the Janjaweed militias was one of the biggest crimes of the Salvation Army and its ousted president, Omar al-Bashir, as we noted at the time and repeated many times afterwards, when we advised those who undertook these major sins to spend the rest of their lives in repentance and atonement for them, instead of accumulating new ones. The first sin was the state’s abandonment of its role in protecting its civilian citizens and state institutions against those who took up arms in rebellion. Then, the greater sin was in empowering some citizens over others, and assigning the task of confronting the rebellion to parties outside the state in return for a fee, knowing that their motives are settling scores, without obligating them to the ethics of war. rules and the rule of law. And the third major sin is to overlook the major crimes committed by these groups, cover them up, and increase support for them even after these crimes became known to the world. The first crimes of the militias that Hemedti led were recorded in United Nations reports in December 2004, when reports were received of their attack. On the village of Adwa in South Darfur, burning all its houses, killing 126 men and children, and raping many women.
After that, there were many reports of successive atrocities, until the death toll reached tens of thousands, and the displaced hundreds of thousands. I remember asking one of the officials at the time, whom I met in a social meeting, to explain to me what is happening in Darfur, expecting, of course, some justification or mitigation of what is happening. However, he surprised me with an answer that was shocking even from people like him, when he categorically asserted that there is no problem in Darfur, and that what is being promoted is nothing but lies from the international media. Then I said to him: Do you mean that the tens of thousands of displaced people who left their villages and sought refuge in the camps did so because they watched CNN?
A new law was issued in 2017 changing the affiliation of the Rapid Support Forces from the intelligence services to the armed forces, provided that they are directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief.
This was not the end of the crimes. After the militias became more widespread, former President Al-Bashir renamed some of them the “Border Guard Force” and appointed Hemedti as its commander with the rank of brigadier general. Later, after the regime quarreled with Hamidti’s sponsor, tribal leader Musa Hilal, his unit was renamed the Rapid Support Forces, and Hamidti was appointed as its commander in 2013, the year that witnessed a mass uprising against the regime, in which about two hundred civilians were killed. One of the former senior officials of the regime, who became an opposition at the time, recounts that a militia commander (whom he did not name) visited him in astonishment, after he protested against the repression and told him: We kill such a number in Darfur in hours. So why all the fuss?
In 2017, a new law was issued changing the affiliation of the Rapid Support Forces from the intelligence services to the armed forces, provided that they are directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief, outside the traditional hierarchy of the army. In other words, it has become a protection militia for the president personally. This came after increasing dissatisfaction in the army with the president’s policies and rampant corruption, and some senior officers protested publicly in front of the president, which led to some of them being accused of orchestrating a coup. This was the beginning of the development of these forces independent of the army and opposed to it. (Some of them argue that the issuance of that law legalizes the status of the militia and its being part of the armed forces, while rejecting all other laws of Al-Bashir!). And all this with knowledge of the history of these forces and their crimes, which continued and became frequent in the capital, represented in the indiscriminate exposure of civilians, and even diplomats. It was lavished with money, especially after the participation of a group of them in the Yemen war, starting in 2015.
The situation did not change after the fall of Al-Bashir, but rather worsened. The same opportunist mentality prevailed among the political and civil circles during the transitional period. Hemedti was appointed Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council, promoted to the rank of first lieutenant general, and his brother was given a similar rank. State funds were given to him without an account, to increase the number of his affiliates from 40,000 in 2019 to more than 100,000 currently, and he was allowed to spread in all the states of Sudan, and he was given dozens of headquarters and camps in the capital. And all of this instead of providing support to the army, police and security forces to carry out their duty to protect citizens in the rule of law. It also provided these forces with modern and advanced weapons. And it acquired a role similar to the Russian Wagner Group, or the American Blackwater mercenary company, except that these organizations did not dare to compete with the police in those countries, let alone compete with the army, directing orders to ministers, and even presidents.
Whoever descends to the point of using a criminal gang to achieve his political goals is not fit for any public office, let alone fit to rule the country.
And if there is talk of corruption and misuse of funds, then no corruption can be compared to the people’s money being given to a rogue gang, so that it plays roles that the country does not need, at a time when the official institutions that serve the people, including the police, the health system, and education, suffer from scarcity of resources. It is a complex corruption, because he was helping this militia to commit crimes, represented in the plundering of lands and gold mines and the evacuation of the population from them in Darfur and elsewhere, and it strengthens the complicity of the state and its “democratic” authority in this crime.
These dynamics that led to the adoption of this militia are, in the end, political dynamics, represented in the choices, fears and aspirations of political players. Al-Bashir bears the greatest sin by creating and supporting these forces, and then bringing them to Khartoum as an auxiliary to the army. Likewise, the transitional government and its supporters bear the burden of increasing support for it, and complicity in its major sins. Foremost among these sins is the dispersal of the sit-in in front of the General Command of the Armed Forces in June 2019, and the accompanying crimes, as well as the failure to complete the investigation into that crime and face its consequences. The motive for all of this was the apprehension of the army, and the hope that the militia would help support certain political forces. There is no doubt that someone who degenerates to the point of using a criminal gang to achieve his political goals is not fit for any public office, let alone fit to rule the country.
The problem of such a situation does not depend on accepting the criminality of the militia, but rather on coexisting with its composition, and its being a private institution, dominated by one man, controlling it as a private fiefdom, and using it in many criminal acts from illegal mining, looting and forbidden enrichment to murder and extortion. The leader of this militia has stated more than once that he is determined to level all the capital to the ground if someone objects to his will. Did the people revolt against a formal dictatorship, in order to hand over the state to a gang of extortionists whose only aim is power and enrichment? What kind of democracy are those who place the country’s resources in the hands of a criminal gang talking about?
Ending the militia’s existence and removing it from the arena should not mean a return to any of the old regime’s images, which was responsible for its existence.
Fortunately, the militia made the mistake of moving from extortion to action. The problem with those who practice blackmail is that they remain powerful as long as people submit to their blackmail. But once it moves from threat to implementation, it leaves no choice for its victims but to confront it. Now that the Sudanese people have seen what this criminal militia can resort to, there should not be an inch of retreat from confronting it, whatever the cost. Because it is no longer possible to allow it another opportunity after what happened, including looting, intimidation, and assaulting innocent people in their homes, and expelling them from it for using rules and foundations (and killing many of them, I know some of them) and practicing kidnapping and killing, and even rape as well, as reported by international organizations. There is room to live with it. Because it will learn the lesson and prepare itself more tightly for any upcoming confrontation. Perhaps it was fortunate that she chose confrontation at this point, revealing her face before she became unstoppable.
However, in any case, ending the existence of this militia and removing it from the political-military arena should not mean returning to any of the forms of the old regime, which was primarily responsible for its existence. Opportunistic voices were raised by supporters of the former regime, who saw in this crisis an entryway to return through the back door. There is no objection, of course, to some expiating their sins by participating in the defeat of the militia they created and bearing with it the burden of its many sins, and the affliction they brought upon the country and the people. But any illusion that this will make the people accept the active participation of those who bear the burdens of the previous stage, and did not announce any repentance for the devastation they caused, or review themselves for what their hands have earned, is another proof that they are not fit for a role. Likewise, the mentality that prevailed during the transitional period of collusion with the militia and with foreign authoritarian countries does not qualify those who showed it for any role.
We are not supporters of exclusion, and those and others have the right to run for elections if the people or sectors of it think that they represent them. But this stage must be for the people of impartiality who are the true supporters of democracy, the people of real competence, not the alleged ones, and the people of integrity and integrity. The practical proposal is the appointment of a non-partisan civilian government, and I do not say a “technocratic government,” because governance is in essence a political task that requires taking decisive decisions that affect the lives of large segments of the people, and therefore it is not suitable for it based on its “technical” experience only. The government is chosen from expert politicians and statesmen known for their integrity and impartiality, and they do not have any party affiliations (or abandon them publicly), and they are not allowed to do any political work in the next decade. This civil government assumes power for three years with broad powers, during which it works to rebuild what was destroyed by the war, reform the economy, rebuild state institutions in terms of the judiciary, service and civil society, and allow full freedoms for all political, professional and civil forces, as well as for the media and universities. With strict laws that prevent strikes and obstruction of health, educational and other services under any pretext in the relevant period, and prevent the closure of roads and obstruction of movement under penalty of law. This government seeks the assistance of committees of experts from various walks of life to support its efforts, especially in enacting election laws, appointing an election commission, organizing trade union and media work, and ensuring political freedoms. The government also uses international support to solve the problems of the displaced and refugees, return the displaced to their homes, rebuild what was destroyed by the war, and apply justice to the victims. All political forces that respect the law are also given the opportunity to organize themselves and prepare for the elections, and receive the necessary support from the state in the field of civil and legal training. And the task of this government ends with preparing the country for free and fair elections, on the basis of a consensual constitution prepared by a committee of experts, and inspired by the principles of the 2005 constitution that all Sudanese agree to, provided that it is presented after the elections to the elected parliament for final approval or amendment.
This is what the Sudanese deserve after all these sacrifices, and after all the experiences of failure and deviation that their country experienced during the last period.
Quoted from the new Arab
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