Two days before Iran carried out its “response” to Israel, and while the countries of the region and the world were awaiting the repercussions of the strike on the ground, the head of the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad, gave his family and himself “a break” and visited the neighborhoods of Old Damascus as if nothing had happened and would happen in his surroundings.
Although the picture that spread of him, his wife, and his three children seemed normal as it was part of the promotional path they had begun and associated with their idea of “victory,” it was not so in view of Syria, where the spark of the current confrontation between Israel and Iran was ignited.
The Iranian response to Israel came in the wake of the bombing of the Iranian consulate building in the Syrian capital, Damascus, which Tehran accused Israel of being behind, in a development that was considered exceptional, in terms of the targeted location and the personalities who were killed, as a result of the attack.
Iran said that it launched more than 300 planes, drones and missiles towards Israel, and after the latter confirmed that the attack did not result in negative repercussions on the ground, it threatened and continues to announce that it is launching a new strike as part of a “response” as well.
There is conflicting information and analysis so far about the nature of the response that Israel will implement, and whether it will once again add fuel to the fire of confrontation, especially since the Iranians said that they would respond within seconds if they were exposed to a new attack.
While the threat and counter-threat continue, the disappearance of the name of the Syrian regime among the events taking place raises questions about the position it takes regarding what is happening now and what might happen if each party fulfills what it says publicly.
Why is the Syrian regime moving away from the scene?
The disappearance of the regime’s name and even its position was not the result of the tense moment now, as it had previously followed the same behavior when the war began in Gaza, conveying a message at the time that it was “not interested in getting involved.”
More than six months ago, his narrative was limited to denouncing and affirming positions, far from threatening or even threatening to open fronts in the “Syrian arena,” within the framework of what has been known for years as “the unity of the resistance arenas.”
After the consulate strike and the Iranian response, there was no change in his routine behavior based on denouncing and addressing United Nations institutions, in contrast to what he did inside Syria during the past 13 years.
Ahmed Al-Qirbi, a researcher at the Syrian Dialogue Center, believes that the position the Syrian regime is taking now is in its interest and in the interest of the various parties, which is a paradox considering the circumstances of the confrontation declared now.
The position is based on staying away from the scene and not taking any action “so that the base based on its presence is not disturbed with Israeli consent and as a strategic interest for Iran,” according to what the researcher told the “Al-Hurra” website.
Al-Qirbi does not consider that “the presence of Assad and his regime with an Israeli green light is a conspiracy,” and adds that his presence at the same time “achieves an interest for Iran.”
Before the consulate strike, residential apartments in the most prestigious neighborhoods of the capital, Damascus, were subjected to bombing attributed to Israel, which resulted in the killing of senior leaders in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
Israel had followed a calm path before its war in Gaza, relying on striking arms shipments passing through Syria, towards the Lebanese Hezbollah.
The Syrian regime has said for years that it “reserves the right to respond,” and for decades it has not moved or taken any military action against Israel, in response to what it is doing in Syria, especially its international airports.
However, after the “shadow war” moved from targeting individuals to diplomatic sites, Iran had to respond in a way that some considered a “theatrical play” and others “a victory that had never occurred in this way.”
“Between enemy and ally”
The Syrian regime led by Assad is a long-time enemy of Israel, a close ally of Iran, and a major facilitator of Iranian support for Hezbollah, says Aaron Lund, an expert on Syrian affairs at the Century Foundation.
On the basis of this, he told the “Al-Hurra” website that the growing Israeli-Iranian conflict now threatens to get involved in Syria, especially when Israel pursues Hezbollah’s supply lines and Iranian assets on Syrian territory.
The researcher considers that “the outbreak of a major fire between Israel and Iran, or a comprehensive war between Israel and Hezbollah, could be extremely destructive and destabilizing for Syria.”
He adds, “Another round of Israeli strikes could open a very dangerous spiral that poses great risks to all concerned and to the entire region.”
Syrian political analyst, Mahmoud Al-Fandi, confirms that the regime has not played any role since the start of the war in Gaza, and says that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah pointed this out months ago.
In an interview with the Al-Hurra website, he believed that “Syria is the weakest link due to the war it has been experiencing for 12 years,” and that the Syrian army’s loss of dozens of military units and officers played a role in its standing aside now.
Parties, which Al-Fandi did not name, sought to plunge Syria into a direct war with Israel, during the past months, through the shells and missiles that were being fired from the south of the country towards the Golan.
But Moscow quickly intervened, establishing observation points and conducting ground and air patrols on the Bravo Line that separates the Syrian forces from Israel.
The Moscow-based analyst adds: “Russia prevented Syria from being a launching pad with the development of Iranian-Israeli events.”
He points out that the crossing of Iranian missiles and drones over Jordan proves this, adding that they did not “cross Syrian territory towards the Golan.”
“In the interest of all parties”
Although Iran has great influence in Damascus, which has been evident for years, researcher Lund believes that “the Assad government is not just a puppet in the hands of Tehran.”
Historically, the Assad regime has always maintained its independence and prioritized the security of its regime. In addition, it has another major partner that it can rely on, which is Russia.
But although the risks facing Syria are very severe, the Assad government is unlikely to abandon its strategic alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, according to the researcher.
He explains, “This alliance proved important to the regime’s survival during the civil war, and is broadly aligned with the (Syrian) government’s short- and long-term interests.”
In all likelihood, the regime will continue to work to support Hezbollah, because it believes that this is in its own interest.
However, Lund believes that “there are serious concerns in Damascus about the current tensions between Iran and Israel.”
But the researcher Al-Qarbi sees the scene differently, and says that the position taken by the Syrian regime ensures its continuity.
Al-Qirbi explains that “Israel wants to narrow the scope of the tense areas, and Assad’s position falls within this context.”
As for Iran, the current regime’s position also serves its interests, according to Al-Qarbi and Iranian political analyst, Saeed Sharoudi.
Al-Qirbi also adds, “The regime’s position is in the interest of the Arab countries that are taking the path of normalization with it, as it gives an indication that it is capable of controlling the Iranian presence in Syria.”
“No need to return the favor.”
Iran is spread throughout Syrian geography, and has many militias spread from the far east of the country to its south, north, and west.
It also has military advisors, and has recently turned to concluding and concluding many economic agreements with the Assad regime.
From a military perspective, political analyst Sharoudi believes that “Iran does not cooperate with its allies at the expense of expecting them to return the favor or pay the price for the material or non-material support it provides to them.”
In the last missile attack, he says that it “decided to carry out the entire or most of the attack on its own, without any support from the allies, to prove its strength to its enemies, and to reveal that it possesses advanced technology in missiles, drones, and electronic warfare.”
Through the form of a single response, she also wanted to convey a message that she was “capable of defending herself on her own,” as the Iranian political analyst put it.
For his part, the Syrian political analyst, Al-Fandi, believes that “Syria is not willing to defend Iran in return for returning the favor,” and says that it (in reference to the Syrian regime) “has been committed to a policy of steadfastness and resistance against Israel for years.”
Iranian support for the Assad regime prevented it from falling in 2012, after the former “Free Army” factions controlled large areas of the country.
For 12 years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has brought many militias into Syria and recruited local ones on the ground, and no actual and direct confrontation has ever taken place between it and Israel from Syria.
But, on the other hand, it spread across all regions of the country, and participated mainly in the process of controlling the city of Aleppo in 2017, and before that in Homs and the areas of Eastern Ghouta, and returned to be stationed after the battles subsided in the east, where Deir ez-Zor Governorate is located.
