The implications of returning to the arms of Musa Hilal

Rasha Awad
The connotations of joy and celebration among the Kizan circles and, ironically, by some non-kizan intellectuals regarding Musa Hilal’s statements and his support for the armed forces can be summarized as follows:
First: The fall of the fig leaf on the narrative that the current war is a war to rid the Sudanese people of the militias and their horrific violations, and it is a war of revenge for the dignity of the raped women. Here are the proponents of this narrative putting their hands in the hands of the founder of the Janjaweed, who has the most criminal and horrific record in horrific violations of human rights, and who himself led the most horrific Mass massacres, mass rapes, and mass displacement in Darfur, as a result of which he is listed on international sanctions lists. This means that Al-Kizan’s problem with the Rapid Support is not his violations, nor is it that he is an irregular militia. Rather, their problem with him is his threat to their authority, and if Musa Hilal fails to crush Hemedti, it is very likely that It is certain that the two countries will once again put their hands in the hands of Hemedti himself in a power-sharing deal, if international and regional circumstances allow it (the syndrome of arrogance, strong-willedness, and lack of political modesty).
Second: The Kizan is still betting on enlisting political power with military force. This bet will put them in a constant search for militias parallel to the army, Al-Baraa bin Malik, Musa Hilal, the armed movements that were recently rebellious, collaborators, traitors, and so on, and the army is a result of the deep structural defect from which it suffers. What is represented by the Kizan’s control over its leadership joints, and the horrific shortage in the number of infantry will make it very difficult for it to confront the tyranny of the militias because it simply relies on them to fight on the ground. Therefore, everyone who calls for lining up behind the army in victory for the state’s institution and its one army is ignorant or foolish, because the army is in its current composition and mentality. The one who controls it will remain a breeding ground for the militias and its status is (the militias are not Kaaba, but the Kaaba of the militias is the Kaaba). The criterion for evaluating the militia and whether it is a Kaaba (bad) or tolerant is the extent of its submission to the Kaaba, its service to their authority, and its oppression of their opponents. As soon as the militia leaves the Kaaba of obedience, it suddenly turns into an accursed devil.
Third: The path to a single professional national army and getting rid of the reality of multiple armies and the proliferation of militias is the path to peace, democratic transformation, and fulfilling the conditions of a democratic civil state. It is the path to curbing this war and removing any moral legitimacy from all its parties. The forces of peace and democracy have no choice but to invest in their unity and organizing their ranks. Strengthening its alliance to raise the banner of peace and prepare to fight the battle of democratic transformation.